Murray v. Labor Comm'n

2012 UT App 33

271 P.3d 192

701 Utah Adv. Rep. 28

Michael R. MURRAY, Petitioner,

v.LABOR COMMISSION; Parks and Recreation; and Workers' Compensation Fund, Respondents.

No. 20100580–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Feb. 2, 2012.

Benjamin T. Davis, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner.

Jamison D. Ashby, Sandy, for Respondents.

Before Judges McHUGH, VOROS, and ROTH.

OPINION

VOROS, Associate Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 Petitioner Michael R. Murray seeks review of a decision of the Appeals Board of the Labor Commission (the Board) denying his workers' compensation claim due to a lack of legal causation. We decline Murray's invitation to set aside the Board's decision.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Murray was working as a park ranger for Utah State Parks and Recreation on July 13, 2008. Murray's claim for compensation arises from an incident that occurred while he was preparing to go on boating patrol at Red Fleet State Park that day. The patrol boat was tied near the end of a dock that extended thirty-five to forty feet into the water. While standing in the patrol boat, Murray untied the boat at the bow, then moved to the stern to undo the lock that secured the remaining cable. Murray bent over the edge of the boat at a thirty-five- to forty-degree angle, holding the cable and lock in his left hand and entering the combination with his right. While Murray was in this position, an unexpected five- to six-inch wave rocked the boat, knocking Murray off balance. To steady himself, Murray adjusted his right foot, brought his right arm to the edge of the boat, and twisted his body. Murray was wearing a fifteen-pound service belt and one-pound life jacket at the time. Murray felt pain in his back when he tried to steady himself; the pain increased over the next two to three hours, causing Murray to leave work early. As the pain grew over the next several days, Murray sought medical attention.

¶ 3 On September 29, 2008, Murray filed a claim with the Labor Commission (the Commission). The Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ) concluded that Murray had an asymptomatic preexisting condition, “which was aggravated by the industrial accident.” While the ALJ found medical causation, she concluded that Murray had not satisfied the higher standard of legal causation required when preexisting conditions are involved:

While the wave that came up while the Petitioner was in the boat was unexpected, the evidence does not show that this caused the Petitioner to go through any unusual exertions. He lost his balance a little but did not drop the lock or fall and was able to steady himself easily.

¶ 4 Murray petitioned the Board to review the decision of the ALJ. The Board affirmed, explaining that “simply losing and regaining one's balance while bending over slightly, even if unexpected, is not an unusual or extraordinary exertion.” Murray filed a timely petition for review in this court.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5 Murray contends that the Board erred in concluding that the work accident was not the legal cause of his back injury. Determining legal causation requires the Board first to determine the underlying facts of an incident, and second to apply the law to the facts to determine whether the test for legal causation is satisfied. See Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Utah 1986). As discussed below, the parties dispute the appropriate standard of review for an agency's application of the law.

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 “The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted to provide economic protection for employees who sustain injuries arising out of their employment, therefore ‘alleviat[ing] hardship upon workers and their families.’ ” Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613, 614 (1965)). The Act limits compensation to employees who are “injured ... by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment.” See Utah Code Ann. § 34A–2–401(1) (2011).¹ The Act is to be construed liberally, resolving any doubt as to an employee's right to compensation in favor of the employee. See Chandler v. Industrial Comm'n, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020, 1021–22 (1919); see also Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 2007 UT 4, ¶ 16, 153 P.3d 179.

¶ 7 Limiting compensation to accidents “arising out of and in the course of ... employment,” see Utah Code Ann. § 34A–2–401(1), requires the party seeking compensation to prove both an “accident” and “a causal connection between the injury and the employment.” Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah 1986). In this context, causation is a two-fold concept encompassing both medical causation and legal causation. See id. at 25. The supreme court held in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), that a higher standard of legal causation is required when an employee has a preexisting condition and the injury involves an “internal failure.” See id. at 23, 25–26. In such cases, the employee must show that the injury involved exertions or employment conditions that are “unusual or extraordinary” when compared to “normal, everyday life” (the Allen test). See id. at 25–26.

¶ 8 The parties do not dispute that an accident occurred, that Murray had a preexisting condition, or that the Board properly found medical causation. The only issue before this court is whether the heightened test for legal causation was satisfied.

I. Standard of Review

¶ 9 The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review. Respondents contend that the appropriate standard for reviewing an agency's application of the law to the facts is abuse of discretion, reviewing for reasonableness and rationality. See Utah Auto Auction v. Labor Comm'n, 2008 UT App 293, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 1252 (“Whether the Commission erroneously applied the Allen test is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed for reasonableness and rationality.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Murray contends that the reasonableness and rationality standard has been displaced by Esquivel v. Labor Commission, 2000 UT 66, 7 P.3d 777, and Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997), and that the court of appeals, in applying the reasonableness and rationality test after Drake and Esquivel, has “stubbornly or ignorantly continued to make decisions under the wrong standard.”

A. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act

¶ 10 “Prior to the adoption of the Utah Administrative Procedure[s] Act [UAPA], the Utah courts developed three levels of review in connection with agency action.” Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991), superseded by statute with regard to the Utah State Tax Commission, Utah Code Ann. § 59–1–610 (Supp.1993), as recognized in 49th St. Galleria v. Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah Ct.App.1993). The appropriate standard of review depended upon whether the court was reviewing a question of general law, a question of agency-specific law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact. See Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 606–12 (Utah 1983). Questions of general law were reviewed for correctness. See id. at 608. Questions of fact were reviewed for “evidence of any substance whatever.” See id. at 608–09 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And questions of agency-specific law and mixed questions of law and fact—or questions involving the application of the law to the facts—involved an intermediate standard of review. See id. at 610–11. Under this intermediate standard, an agency's decisions were “entitled to weight, but ... subject to judicial review to assure that they [fell] within the limits of reasonableness or rationality.” Id. at 610.

¶ 11 UAPA provided a new framework for determining the standard of review. See Morton Int'l, 814 P.2d at 583–84; Columbia HCA v. Labor Comm'n, 2011 UT App 210, ¶ 8, 258 P.3d 640 (mem.) (“The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) determines the standard of review for a formal adjudicative hearing.”). For judicial review of formal administrative proceedings, UAPA authorizes courts to grant relief only if “a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced” by certain agency actions, including misinterpreting or misapplying the law:

The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:

....

(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; [or]

....

(h) the agency action is:

(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;

(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;

(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or

(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Utah Code Ann. § 63G–4–403(4) (2011). The supreme court has held that the several grounds for judicial relief set forth in what is now section 63G–4–403(4) necessarily “incorporate[ ] standards that appellate courts are to employ when reviewing allegations of agency error.” See Morton Int'l, 814 P.2d at 584. However, case law discussing pre-UAPA standards of review was only displaced to the extent that it was inconsistent with UAPA. See id. at 585–89.

¶ 12 Interpreting the UAPA provision authorizing relief when “the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law,” see Utah Code Ann. § 63G–4–403(4)(d), the supreme court has held that questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are generally reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to the agency. See Morton Int'l, 814 P.2d at 587–88 (“[T]he term ‘erroneous' ... connotes a correction-of-error standard ....”); see also Esquivel, 2000 UT 66, ¶ 14, 7 P.3d 777. However, under the case law, “[a]n exception to this general rule exists if the legislature has...