Murray v. Leblanc

1

JAMES MURRAY, ET AL. v. JAMES LEBLANC, ET AL.

Civil Action No. 21-592-JWD-RLB

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana

May 16, 2023

ORDER

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel Discovery from Secretary LeBlanc (“Motion to Compel”). (R Doc. 98). The motion is opposed. (R. Doc. 100).

Also before the Court is Defendant James LeBlanc and Defendant Seth Smith's Motion to Stay Discovery (“Motion to Stay”). (R. Doc. 99). The motion is opposed. (R. Doc 101).

I. Background

Plaintiffs commenced this action on October 15, 2021 raising various allegations regarding their confinement at the Madison Parish Correctional Center (“MPCC”). (R. Doc. 1). The operative pleading in this action is the Third Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 64), which was filed in accordance with the district judge's ruling dismissing without prejudice all claims raised against James LeBlanc (“LeBlanc”), the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”). (R. Doc. 59).

Plaintiff has named the following as defendants: LeBlanc; Seth Smith (“Smith”), Chief of Operations of DPSC; Sammie Byrd, the Sheriff of Madison Parish (“Sheriff Byrd”); LaSalle Management, LLC (“LaSalle”), the privately-owned operator of MPCC; and various wardens and correctional officers at MPCC (Arthur Anderson, Chris Stinson, Tommy Farmer, Steven Chase, Cantrell Guice, John Murray, Wendell Hughes, Edward McDowell, Johnathan Knox, Jonta Shepherd, Esco Tillman, and Robert Thornton). LaSalle and the individuals employed at MPCC are collectively referred to as the “LaSalle Defendants.”

Plaintiffs in this case were all confined at MPCC, which houses both sentenced and pretrial prisoners from around the State of Louisiana. (R. Doc. 64 at 1; see R. Doc. 64 at 21-35). Plaintiffs allege that LaSalle, LeBlanc, Smith, and Sheriff Byrd are responsible for ensuring the safety of the individuals held at MPCC. (R. Doc. 64 at 1-2). Plaintiffs allege that they were pretrial detainees while confined and attacked at MPCC and, after the attacks, were placed in “punitive lockdown conditions” where they were deprived of exercise and natural light. (R. Doc. 64 at 1; see R. Doc. 64 at 21-37).

Plaintiffs allege that the foregoing defendants “have allowed fatally dangerous conditions of confinement to flourish at MPCC,” with each “aware that MPCC has no functional classification, investigation, or staff supervision in place” and each “aware that these conditions allow threat of serious injury from rampant violence to go unchecked.” (R. Doc. 64 at 2). Plaintiffs maintain that, because of these conditions, they were stabbed and beaten by attackers who should not have been confined with them on the same unit. (R. Doc. 64 at 2).

Among other things, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants knew of the levels of extreme violence at the facility, the lack of a classification plan, the lack of investigation and response to known drivers of violence, and the chronic understaffing, but nevertheless continued to operate the facility with minimal adjustments, including continuing to house sentenced DPSC prisoners in the facility, allowing an intolerable risk of harm to come to those held in Defendants' custody, including Plaintiffs.” (R. Doc. 64 at 39). Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants knew of the failure of individuals at MPCC to perform crucial duties, including failures to develop and implement a classification plan, failures to respond appropriately to imminent risks of harm by correctional officers under their supervision, and failures to investigate incidents of harm.” (R. Doc. 64 at 39). Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants failed to train, supervise, or discipline individuals who engaged in these behaviors[, which] was a moving force behind the harm experienced by Plaintiffs.” (R. Doc. 64 at 41).

Plaintiffs seek recovery for violation of their rights under the Fourteenth and Eight Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, for violation of their rights under the Louisiana Constitution's rights to due process and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, and under the state law torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. (R. Doc. 64 at 37-44). In particular, Plaintiffs seek recovery against LeBlanc and Smith in their individual capacities for violations of the Fourteenth and Eight Amendments. Plaintiffs bring a separate state law claim seeking recovery from the defendants' insurer, Old Republic Union Insurance Company. (R. Doc. 64 at 44-45). Plaintiffs pray for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, judgment against the defendants for the asserted causes of action, attorney's fees, and compensatory and punitive damages. (R. Doc. 64 at 41).

On November 7, 2022, LeBlanc filed a Motion to Dismiss raising the defense of qualified immunity with respect to the claims brought against him in his individual capacity. (R. Doc. 66).

On February 16, 2022, Smith filed a Motion to Dismiss raising the defense of qualified immunity with respect to the claims brought against him in his individual capacity. (R. Doc. 91).

There is no dispute that prior to the filing of the instant motions, Plaintiffs conducted discovery with respect to Sheriff Byrd and the LaSalle Defendants. In fact, the Court has previously ordered those defendants to provide supplemental discovery responses and productions with respect to written discovery. (R. Doc. 90).

On March 23, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Compel with respect to discovery served on LeBlanc on February 6, 2023. (R. Doc. 98). Plaintiffs represent that LeBlanc did not provide any discovery responses and would not participate in a Rule 37 conference in light of his qualified immunity defense. (R. Doc. 98-1 at 2). Plaintiffs note in support of their motion that LeBlanc had not moved for a stay of discovery prior to the filing of the Motion to Compel. (R. Doc. 98-1 at 4). Plaintiffs did not, as required by the Court's local rules, “quote verbatim” the discovery requests at issue or otherwise provide the Court with a copy of the discovery requests as an attachment to the Motion to Compel. See LR 37. LeBlanc filed his opposition to this Motion to Compel only after seeking a stay of discovery in this action, as discussed below. (R. Doc. 100).

On April 4, 2023, LeBlanc and Smith filed the instant Motion to Stay on the grounds that they have both raised the defense of qualified immunity in their respective Motions to Dismiss. (R. Doc. 99). Plaintiffs oppose a stay of discovery to the extent it pertains to claims raised against these defendants in their official capacities or with respect to any of the remaining defendants. (R. Doc. 101).

II. Law and Analysis

A. Legal Standards

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to issue a protective order after a showing of good cause “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1). Rule 26(c)'s “good cause” requirement indicates that the party seeking a protective order has the burden “to show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, Inc, 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garret, 571 F.2d 302, 3026 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

“Trial courts possess broad discretion to supervise discovery.” Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 436 n.114 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “A trial court has broad discretion and inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary questions that may dispose of the case are determined.” Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1987).

“The qualified immunity defense affords government officials not just immunity from liability, but immunity from suit.” Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985)). Qualified immunity shields government officials from individual liability for performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

The Fifth Circuit has clarified that all discovery involving a defendant raising the defense of qualified immunity must be stayed until resolution of the defense of qualified immunity:

The Supreme Court has now made clear that a plaintiff asserting constitutional claims against an officer claiming [qualified immunity] must survive the motion to dismiss without any discovery.

Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2022). In Carswell, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a district court abused its discretion by deferring its ruling on a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds and subjecting the public official defendants to discovery on the plaintiff'sMonell claims, which created an undue burden in light of increased litigation costs and complications caused by bifurcated discovery. Id. at 310-314. The Fifth Circuit expressly held that the required stay of discovery is not limited to claims to which the defense of qualified immunity is raised. Id.

In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit highlighted the Supreme Court's concerns about the burdens of litigation imposed on public officials. It also noted that these same burdens would be present if the Court allowed discovery to proceed against defendants in different capacities or against co-defendants that make no claim for qualified immunity:

It is no answer to these concerns to say that discovery for petitioners can be deferred while pretrial proceedings

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