Murray v. Mason

244 A.3d 187

Kelsey MURRAY, Plaintiff,

v.Michael MASON, Natalie Mason, Lauren Rizzo, Jacob Lopez, and Brandywine Valley SPCA, Inc., Defendants.

C.A. No. N20C-01-254 MAA

Superior Court of Delaware.

Submitted: September 9, 2020

Decided: December 16, 2020

Corrected: January 5, 2021

Frederick S. Freibott, Esquire and Dennis A. Mason, II, Esquire (Argued), of THE FREIBOTT LAW FIRM, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Sarah B. Cole, Esquire (Argued), of MARSHALL DENNEHEY WARNER COLEMAN & GOGGIN, P.C. Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant Brandywine Valley SPCA.

OPINION

Adams, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case presents an issue of first impression: whether a nonprofit animal shelter can be held liable in negligence for a dog attack that occurred in a private residence months after an animal was released from its care to a person with no affiliation with the organization. Under Delaware law, to be liable in tort for negligence, the Court must determine that a defendant owed a duty to plaintiff as a matter of law. Absent such duty, a defendant cannot be held liable for negligence, no matter how harmful or reprehensible their conduct may be.

Here, the Court finds that as pleaded, plaintiff's Complaint does not establish any actionable negligence claims. Plaintiff Kelsey Murray has not established that Brandywine Valley SPCA ("BVSPCA") owed her a duty of care to protect her from a dog attack in an acquaintance's home. To the extent the claims in Murray's Complaint are those of nonfeasance, the viability of which depend upon the existence of a "special relationship," BVSPCA's motion to dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice . Likewise, the motion to dismiss as to any claims that relate to an undertaking under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 is GRANTED with prejudice . The motion to dismiss as to an undertaking under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324 claim, however, is GRANTED without prejudice , to reflect that the Complaint, as pleaded, fails to state any claim of negligence but might, if further amended, state a claim under Restatement (Second) § 324A.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts ¹

Plaintiff Kelsey Murray ("Murray") is a Delaware resident.² On September 11, 2019, Murray was a guest at the home of co-defendants Natalie Mason and Lauren Rizzo ("Rizzo") in Wilmington, Delaware.³ The home is owned by co-defendant Michael Mason. Around 11:30 p.m., Nitrous, a five-year old dog who was "owned, harbored and/or in the custody of" Natalie Mason, Rizzo, and fellow co-defendant Jacob Lopez ("Lopez"), severely attacked Murray while she was walking to the bathroom.⁴

Prior to the attack, Natalie Mason and Lopez lived with each other and were owners of Nitrous.⁵ During that time, they trained the dog to be aggressive toward people.⁶ In addition, in the months before September 11, Nitrous attacked and injured Lopez's friend or relative.⁷ Subsequently, Lopez took the dog to defendant BVSPCA, told them about the attack, and indicated that he was not able to control Nitrous.⁸

After Nitrous was confined and placed in the care of BVSPCA, Rizzo went to BVSPCA and reclaimed Nitrous.⁹ She then brought the dog home to reside with herself and her roommate, co-defendant Natalie Mason.¹⁰ Thereafter, both Rizzo and Natalie Mason claimed ownership of the dog.¹¹ BVSPCA failed to warn Rizzo or any others of Nitrous's dangerous propensities, despite BVSPCA's knowledge of the dog's "aggressive and vicious behavior toward people."¹² On September 11, 2019, Murray was attacked by Nitrous.

B. Procedural Posture

Murray filed her Complaint on January 30, 2020.¹³ On March 23, 2020, BVSPCA filed its motion to dismiss ("the Motion") the Complaint.¹⁴ The Court granted the stipulated briefing schedule on the Motion on April 8, 2020.¹⁵ On April 17, 2020, Murray served a subpoena upon BVSPCA.¹⁶ BVSPCA filed a motion to quash the subpoena and stay discovery (the "Motion to Quash") on April 30, 2020.¹⁷ The Court granted BVSPCA's Motion to Quash with amendments on May 13, 2020, effectively staying discovery until Murray's motion to dismiss is resolved.¹⁸ The Court heard oral argument on the Motion on September 9, 2020.¹⁹

III. STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

The Court's function in considering a motion to dismiss is to read the complaint generously, accept all well-pleaded allegations as true, and construe them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.²⁰ Under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss presents the question of "whether a plaintiff may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof under the complaint."²¹ Dismissal is warranted only when "under no reasonable interpretation of the facts alleged could the complaint state a claim for which relief might be granted."²² The Court need not, however, accept conclusory allegations that lack factual support, nor "accept every strained interpretation of the allegations proposed by the plaintiff."²³

B. Rule 9(b)

When a complaint includes claims of negligence, the Court must also take into account Superior Court Civil Rule 9(b), which requires the plaintiff to plead allegations of negligence with particularity.²⁴ "The purpose of Rule 9(b) is one of fairness and notice."²⁵ Under the Rule, incorporating claims by reference is insufficient to cure allegations that are pleaded without particularity, as all claims of negligence must be pleaded with particularity.²⁶

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Materials Outside the Pleadings

The Court will not consider any materials outside of Murray's Complaint for purposes of deciding the Motion. "The complaint generally defines the universe of facts that the trial court may consider in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss."²⁷ A court will only consider materials outside the complaint in three limited instances: (1) when a document is integral to a claim and incorporated into a complaint; (2) when the document is not being relied upon to prove the truths of its contents; or (3) when the document is an adjudicative fact subject to judicial notice.²⁸ Whether a document is integral to a claim and incorporated into a complaint is largely a "facts-and-circumstances inquiry." ²⁹

Generally, a document is integral to the claim and incorporated into the complaint if it is the source for the facts as pleaded in the complaint.³⁰

A post hoc attempt to clarify allegations in a complaint in response to a motion to dismiss "cannot be received as a supplement or amendment to the pleading itself."³¹ Murray's answering brief contains facts outside of the complaint and arguments heavily buttressed by those facts.³² At oral argument, both parties, but plaintiff in particular, likewise referred to and relied upon matters outside of the pleadings.³³ When plaintiff's counsel was asked if Murray wished to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, counsel declined.³⁴ The Court will not convert the motion to one for summary judgment, and instead will consider it as-styled under Rule 12.³⁵ Because the facts outside of the Complaint introduced by Murray do not fit within any of the narrow exceptions as delineated above, to the extent either party relies on such materials, the Court will not consider them.³⁶ Instead, the Court will focus solely on the four corners of the Complaint.

Though the Court will not consider materials extraneous to the Complaint when deciding the Motion, the Court must determine whether the additional facts "should be ignored altogether or whether some proper purpose may be served by taking notice of those facts."³⁷ The Court will consider the extraneous materials for the limited purpose of deciding whether to grant Murray leave to amend her Complaint.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court has determined that Murray has failed to state a claim of nonfeasance under Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)") § 315, and that any amendment in which Murray might attempt to state such a claim would be futile. Likewise, Murray has failed to state a claim under § 323, and the claim, as pleaded, must be dismissed. The extraneous facts submitted by Murray, however, are such that she may be able to state a viable § 324A undertaking claim against BVSPCA upon further amendment of the Complaint. Leave to amend the Complaint as to this claim will be granted.

B. Negligence Claims under the Restatement (Second) of Torts

BVSPCA has moved to dismiss Murray's claims, arguing that none of the theories of negligence advanced against the organization hold water. Specifically, BVSPCA moves to dismiss for two primary reasons: (1) Murray has not pleaded facts to support an allegation that a "special relationship" existed that would constitute a duty of care under the Restatement (Second) § 315; and (2) even if BVSPCA undertook to render services to someone, thus creating a duty of care, the undertaking did not trigger a duty owed by BVSPCA to Murray under §§ 323 or 324A.

1. Negligence Generally

To prevail on a claim of negligence, Murray must allege that: (1) BVSPCA owed her a duty of care; (2) that BVSPCA breached that duty; and (3) that BVSPCA's breach proximately caused Murray's injury.³⁸ Common law duty is "essentially a question of whether the relationship between the actor and the injured person gives rise to any legal obligation on the actor's part for the benefit of the injured person."³⁹ BVSPCA has raised the threshold question of whether it owed a legal duty to Murray. Whether such a duty is owed is a question of law to be determined by the Court.

2. Nonfeasance Claims under Restatement (Second) § 315

Delaware courts look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts to determine whether one party owes another a duty of care.⁴⁰ The Restatement (Second) distinguishes between negligent acts ("malfeasance") and negligent omissions ("nonfeasance") for purposes of determining the nature of the duty owed.⁴¹ Anyone who performs an affirmative act is under a duty to others to "exercise the care of a reasonable man to protect...