Murray v. Noeth

KAREEM MURRAY, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH H. NOETH, Superintendent,Attica Correctional Facility,¹ Respondent.

No. 9:19-cv-00224-JKS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 19, 2020

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Kareem Murray, a New York state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Murray is in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") and incarcerated at Attica Correctional Facility. Respondent has answered the Petition, and Murray has replied.

I. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Murray was charged in a six-count indictment with the second degree murder of Sylvester Scott after he and his uncle, Russell Palmer, fired weapons from a moving car at Scott, whom Murray believed had sexually assaulted his girlfriend. The indictment also charged Murray with second-degree conspiracy, two counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, second-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, and third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance. On direct appeal of his conviction, the Appellate Divisionof the New York Supreme Court recounted the following facts underlying the charges against Murray:

As [Murray] and the codefendant, his uncle, were being investigated through eavesdropping warrants and surveillance for drug-related crimes, law enforcement officials learned that [Murray] was targeting an individual who [Murray] believed was involved in the rape of his girlfriend. After the victim was shot and killed, [Murray] and [Palmer] were detained in a traffic stop and subsequently arrested. A search of [Palmer's] vehicle revealed loaded handguns, ammunition and narcotics. [Murray] was charged in a multicount indictment in connection with the shooting of the victim, as well as his possession of the handguns and controlled substances.

People v. Murray, 64 N.Y.S.3d 158, 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).

Murray moved to suppress statements Palmer made upon their arrest and anything recovered from the vehicle, and the county court held a Huntley²/Dunaway³/Mapp⁴ hearing to determine the admissibility of the challenged evidence. Following the hearing, the county court held that Murray lacked standing to challenge the search of Palmer's car and that the search was lawful as to Palmer.

Shortly before his trial was scheduled to begin, Murray sought to sever his trial from Palmer's, arguing that Palmer had made an "extensive statement to police" that was harmful to Murray, that Palmer and Murray had antagonistic defenses, and that Palmer's prior convictionswould create a "chilling effect" on Murray's right to testify. The county court denied severance by written, unpublished opinion.

Following a joint trial, Murray was convicted of second-degree murder, second-degree conspiracy, two counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, and second-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life imprisonment for murder, with concurrent lesser prison terms for conspiracy and weapon possession, and a consecutive determinate 14-year imprisonment term for possessing a controlled substance.

Through counsel, Murray appealed his conviction, arguing that: 1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying Murray's severance motion; 2) the admission of Palmer's recorded police interview at their joint trial violated Murray's right to confront witnesses in violation of Bruton;⁵ 3) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to challenge under Batson⁶ Murray's attempt to strike two jurors, and those jurors were improperly allowed to serve on the jury panel; 4) the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to admit evidence of a prior shooting incident; 5) evidence procured from the eavesdropping warrant should have been suppressed because there was insufficient probable cause for the warrant to have been issued; 6) the county court erred in determining that Murray did not have standing to contest the search of his uncle's vehicle; and 7) his determinate sentence of 14 years, which was ordered to run consecutively tothe other sentences, was harsh and excessive. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgment against Murray in a reasoned opinion issued on November 2, 2017. Murray, 64 N.Y.S.3d at 163. Murray filed a counseled application for leave to appeal in the New York Court of Appeals, which was denied without comment on April 10, 2018. People v. Murray, 102 N.E.3d 1066, 1066 (N.Y. 2018).

Murray then timely filed the instant pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court on February 12, 2019. Docket No. 1 ("Petition"); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Briefing is now complete, and the Petition is before the undersigned judge for adjudication.

II. GROUNDS RAISED

In his pro se Petition before this Court, Murray argues that: 1) the county court erred in denying his severance motion; 2) the introduction of Palmer's recorded police interview violated Murray's constitutional rights; 3) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to challenge Murray's attempt to strike two jurors; and 4) the prosecutor committed misconduct by making improper remarks on summation.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or "if the state court confronts a set of facts thatare materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). The term unreasonable is a common term in the legal world. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the range of reasonable judgments may depend in part on the nature of the relevant rule argued to be clearly established federal law. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) ("[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.").

To the extent that the Petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (holding that it is of no federal concern whether state law was correctly applied). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot reexamine a state court's interpretation and application of state law); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (presuming that the state court knew and correctly applied state law), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

In applying these standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by the state court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2000). Where there is no reasoned decision of the state court addressing the ground or grounds raised on the merits and no independent state grounds exist for not addressing those grounds, this Court must decide the issues de novo on the record before it.See Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 239-40 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Spears v. Greiner, 459 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2006)); cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 530-31 (2003) (applying a de novo standard to a federal claim not reached by the state court). In so doing, the Court presumes that the state court decided the claim on the merits and the decision rested on federal grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 740 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989); see also Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining the Harris-Coleman interplay); Fama v. Comm'r of Corr. Servs., 235 F.3d 804, 810-11 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). This Court gives the presumed decision of the state court the same AEDPA deference that it would give a reasoned decision of the state court. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011) (rejecting the argument that a summary disposition was not entitled to § 2254(d) deference); Jimenez, 458 F.3d at 145-46. Under the AEDPA, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

IV. DISCUSSION

Ground 1. Erroneous Denial of the Severance Motion

Murray first argues that the trial court erred in consolidating his case with the case of co-defendant Palmer. The Appellate Division disagreed on direct appeal, reasoning:

Regarding [Murray's] motion for a separate trial, we find no abuse of discretion in County Court's denial of such motion. Upon a showing of good cause, a court may order separate trials. "[S]everance is compelled where the core of each defense is in irreconcilable conflict with the other and where there is a significant danger, as both defenses are portrayed to the trial court, that the conflict alone would lead the jury to infer defendant's guilt." [Murray] relies on the statements made in the redacted video interview of [Palmer] as a basis for severance but, as discussed, such statements did not implicate [Murray]. Furthermore,

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