Myles v. State

M. GWYN MYLES, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of WILLIAM LLOYD MYLES, deceased, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, a governmental entity; JOHN DOE EMPLOYEE(s), employees of the STATE OF WASHINGTON, a municipality; JOHN DOE EMPLOYEE(s) and JANE DOE EMPLOYEE(s), employees of CLARK COUNTY; CARLOS VILLANUEVA-VILLA and JANE DOE VILLANUEVA-VILLA, husband and wife, and the marital community composed thereof, and R.H. BRUSSEAU and JANE DOE BRUSSEAU, husband and wife, and the marital community composed thereof, Respondents/Cross-Appellants.

No. 49889-8-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2

November 17, 2020

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LEE C.J.

M. Gwyn Myles, on behalf of herself and as personal representative of the estate of her husband, William Myles, ^[1] appeals the superior court's orders granting the motions for reconsideration of its summary judgment rulings and dismissing her complaint against the State of Washington Washington State Patrol (WSP) Trooper R.H. Brusseau, and Clark County (collectively, the defendants). Myles brought a negligence action against the defendants after William was killed in a collision with a drunk driver, Carlos Villanueva-Villa. The superior court originally denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, but then granted the defendants' motions for reconsideration and dismissed Myles' complaint.

Because the defendants' actions were not the proximate cause of William's death, summary judgment was proper. And the superior court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motions for reconsideration. Accordingly, we affirm.^[2]

FACTS

On January 27, 2006, William died in vehicle collision caused by Villanueva-Villa. In January 2009, Myles filed a wrongful death lawsuit alleging negligence against the State of Washington, Trooper R.H. Brusseau, and Clark County.^[3]

The undisputed facts are that on December 23, 2005, Trooper Brusseau arrested Villanueva-Villa for Driving Under the Influence (DUI). Villanueva-Villa had been arrested for DUI in the previous month. During the December 2005 arrest, a WSP dispatcher told Trooper Brusseau that Villanueva-Villa had an outstanding Clark County warrant for failing to appear for his first DUI. The WSP dispatcher also told Trooper Brusseau that the Clark County Sheriff's Office would not confirm the warrant. Therefore, Trooper Brusseau processed Villanueva-Villa for the DUI, drove Villanueva-Villa to his sister's house, and released Villanueva-Villa. Five weeks later, on January 27, 2006, Villanueva-Villa caused a motor vehicle collision that resulted in William's death.

Myles' complaint alleged that the State and Trooper Brusseau were negligent in failing to arrest Villanueva-Villa on the warrant. The complaint also alleged that Clark County was negligent for failing to confirm the warrant because the jail was full.

On January 22, 2016, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The State supported its motion for summary judgment with declarations from Trooper Brusseau and Cary Salzsieder a communications officer with WSP (dispatcher).

In his declaration, Trooper Brusseau stated that on December 23 2005, he stopped Villanueva-Villa for speeding. After contacting Villanueva-Villa, Trooper Brusseau noticed several things that indicated Villanueva-Villa was under the influence of intoxicants. After Villanueva-Villa failed field sobriety tests, Trooper Brusseau placed him under arrest. Then Trooper Brusseau moved Villanueva-Villa's car to a safe parking space and contacted the WSP communications center. The WSP dispatcher stated there was an outstanding warrant for Villanueva-Villa for failure to appear in court on a November 26, 2005 DUI charge. The dispatcher then advised Trooper Brusseau that she had contacted the Clark County jail and it would not confirm the warrant or agree to book Villanueva-Villa into jail on the warrant.

Because Clark County jail would not book Villanueva-Villa, Trooper Brusseau took Villanueva-Villa to the WSP office for processing and a breathalyzer test. After processing, Trooper Brusseau cited Villanueva-Villa for DUI and then transported Villanueva-Villa to his sister's house. In his declaration, Trooper Brusseau explained,

I did not transport Mr. [Villanueva-]Villa to the Clark County Jail regarding the new arrest as well as the outstanding warrant for failure to appear because the jail refused to verify the warrant or accept him in the jail on the warrant. Because of space limitations, Clark County does not accept most misdemeanors, including DUIs, for booking into the county jail unless the arrest is made in conjunction with a domestic violence arrest. Even if I had transported Mr. [Villanueva-]Villa to the jail for admission of the breathalyzer following his arrest, he would have been released because the Clark County Jail would not have accepted him for this offense, as it was only accepting felony arrests for booking at that time. Even if the jail had accepted him, which they indicated they would not, a DUI charge is a book and release offense, meaning that Mr [Villanueva-]Villa would have been immediately released to the custody of a friend or relative.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 133.

In December 2005, Salzsieder was a communications officer with WSP. Salzsieder declared that she contacted the Clark County jail to verify Villanueva-Villa's warrant and asked if it would accept Villanueva-Villa for booking. She stated, "In this call the jail refused to confirm the warrant and refused to accept Mr. [Villanueva-]Villa into the jail on the misdemeanor warrant." CP at 28. She relayed this information to Trooper Brusseau.

Clark County supported its motion for summary judgment with the declaration of Ric Bishop. Bishop was the Chief Deputy overseeing the Corrections branch of the Clark County Sheriff's Office. Bishop declared that on December 23, 2005, the jail's population was 772. Bishop stated that under the jail's overcrowding policy, the jail would have requested that officers cite and release non-sex offender misdemeanants. However, officers could request that a non-sex offender misdemeanant be booked and released by the jail. "In this situation, an offender who would not normally be brought to the jails(s) [sic] as a result of the jail's overcrowding policy restrictions can be booked into the jails(s) [sic] and released immediately thereafter." CP at 42.

Bishop also reviewed Villanueva-Villa's records and determined that Villanueva-Villa's total bail would have been $20, 000 if he had been booked into the jail. Therefore, Villanueva-Villa could have secured immediate release on bond for $2, 000. Bishop also declared that, in 2005, the average length of stay for individuals booked into the jail was 17.49 days. And, in 2006, the average length of stay was 18.12 days.

In response to the motions for summary judgment, Myles relied on several of Villanueva-Villa's criminal records. Most of these records documented Villanueva-Villa's history of failure to comply with Department of Corrections (DOC) supervision for a 2003 vehicle prowl conviction. Myles also included a docket entry for Villanueva-Villa's DUI charges, which showed that he was arraigned after he was arrested and charged with the William's death. The docket entry also showed that the court imposed conditions on Villanueva-Villa including breath and urine testing, no alcohol or drug use, and Antabuse if medically able.

On October 7, 2016, the superior court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment. On October 17, the defendants each filed motions for reconsideration. The superior court heard oral argument on the motions for reconsideration on December 2. The superior court granted the defendants' motions for reconsideration and dismissed Myles' complaint.

Myles appeals the superior court's granting of the defendants' motions for reconsideration.

ANALYSIS

A. Standards of Review

We review the superior court's order granting summary judgment de novo. Vargas v. Inland Wash., LLC, 194 Wn.2d 720, 728, 452 P.3d 1205 (2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). "'A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends.'" In re Estate of Black, 153 Wn.2d 152, 160, 102 P.3d 796 (2004) (quoting Balise v. Underwood, 62 Wn.2d 195, 199, 381 P.2d 966 (1963)). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this court considers all the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Vargas, 194 Wn.2d at 728. Summary judgment is proper if, after reviewing all the evidence, a reasonable person could reach only one conclusion. Vargas, 194 Wn.2d at 728.

When the defendant files a motion for summary judgment showing the "'absence of evidence to support the [plaintiff]'s case, '" the burden shifts to the plaintiff to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Young v. Key Pharm Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225 n.1, 770 P.2d 182 (1989) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The nonmoving party cannot rely on "'speculation, argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain, or in having its affidavits considered at face value.'" Martin v. Gonzaga Univ., 191 Wn.2d 712, 722, 425 P.3d 837 (2018) (quoting Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., 106 Wn.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986)). The nonmoving party must present more than "'[u]ltimate facts'" or conclusory statements to defeat summary judgment. SentinelC3 v. Hunt, 181 Wn.2d 127, 140, 331 P.3d...