N.C. A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. The N.C. State Bd. of Elections

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NORTH CAROLINA A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE and ACTION NC, Plaintiffs, v. THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:20CV876

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina

February 14, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Joe L Webster United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on a motion to intervene by Philip E. Berger, President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and Timothy K. Moore, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives (collectively "Proposed Interveners"), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. (Docket Entry 44.) Also before the Court is a motion by forty-two individually named district attorneys ("DA Defendants") seeking to dismiss Plaintiffs North Carolina A. Philip Randolph Institute ("NC APRI") and Action NC's (collectively "Plaintiffs") Amended Complaint (Docket Entry 36) pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket Entry 46.) After response and reply briefs were filed to said motions (see Docket Entries 48, 49, 52, 53), the Court held a hearing on the matter-on January 12, 2022. (Minute Entry dated 1/12/2022.) For the following reasons, the Court recommends that the motion to intervene be denied, and the DA Defendants' motion to dismiss be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 24, 2020, Plaintiffs commenced this action against the North Carolina State Board of Elections ("NCSBE") and several of its officials (collectively "NCSBE Defendants"), along with North Carolina Attorney General Josh Stein alleging that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-275(5) (sometimes referred herein as "the challenged statute")^[1] is unconstitutional under two theories: (1) the statute is void for vagueness in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the statute constitutes intentional racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (See generally, Complaint, Docket Entry 1.) Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a motion for preliminary injunction (Docket Entry 2), which the original defendants opposed (Docket Entry 16). While filing their opposition brief to the preliminary injunction request, those defendants also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. (See Docket Entry 18.)

In November 2020, the undersigned recommended Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction be denied and further recommended that North Carolina Attorney General Josh Stein be dismissed from this action. (See Docket Entry 24.) The Court subsequently adopted the Recommendation over Plaintiffs' objections. (See Docket Entry 34.) Prior to the Court's adoption of the Recommendation, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the Complaint. (Docket Entry 29.) The motion sought to amend Plaintiffs' Complaint to name additional defendants including North Carolina's district attorneys and to make other changes, including adding more allegations concerning Defendants' role in the enforcement of the challenged statute.

(See Id. at 4.)^[2] On February 8, 2021, by stipulation of the patties in the action at said time, the previously filed motion to dismiss was withdrawn and the Amended Complaint was filed. (See Stipulation, Docket Entry 35; Am. Compl, Docket Entry 36.)^[3]

Thereafter, summonses were issued for the newly added Defendants. (Docket Entry 37.)^[4] On March 9, 2021, the NCSBE Defendants filed an answer to the Amended Complaint (Docket Entry 39.) On April 19, 2021, the DA Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss in response to the Amended Complaint. (Docket Entry 46.) In addition, the Proposed Intervenors filed their motion on the same day. (Docket Entry 44.)

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint^[5]

Plaintiffs are nonprofit, nonpartisan organizations whose missions are, in part, to increase voter participation among Black and low-income communities in North Carolina. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.) The NCSBE Defendants administer and investigate violations of North Carolina election laws. (Id. ¶¶ 16-22.) The DA Defendants are responsible for prosecuting "all criminal actions" and are also specifically empowered to "investigate . . . and prosecute any violations" of certain voting-related criminal statutes. (Id. ¶ 23 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-61, 163-278).) The Amended Complaint further alleges that at least two of the DA Defendants have brought criminal charges pursuant to the challenged statute against individuals "who mistakenly voted in the 2016 election while still on probation or parole for a felony conviction." (Id.)

As presently constructed, the challenged statute makes it a Class I felony, regardless of intent, "[f]of any person convicted of a crime which excludes the person from the right of suffrage, to vote at any primary or election without having been restored to the right of citizenship in due course and by the method provided by law." (See Id. ¶ 42 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-275(5) (alterations omitted)).) Violation of this statute while on parole, probation or post-release supervision for a felony conviction may result in imprisonment for up to two years. (Id. ¶ 46 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17 and Deposition of Karen Brinson Bell at 127:4-9, Docket Entry 1-1 at 34).)

Plaintiffs allege that the challenged statute was originally enacted with racially discriminatory intent, its key features have never been substantively amended, and it continues to disproportionately impact Black North Carolinians. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-60.) As such, Plaintiffs claim that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 105-113.) In addition, the Amended Complaint alleges that the challenged statute fails to provide fair notice of criminal liability by failing to define which crimes "exclude[ ] the person from the right of suffrage," and not providing information on restoration of citizenship rights. (Id. ¶¶ 61-78.) Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that there is confusion caused by North Carolina's voting material which is "exacerbated by the State's inadequate procedures" for providing notice to felons who are ineligible to vote. (Id. ¶ 68.) Plaintiffs also allege that the vagueness of the law, along with recent prosecutions, "have caused eligible individuals with criminal convictions to refrain from voting, for fear of unintentionally violating the law and triggering criminal charges." (Id. ¶ 79 (emphasis in original).) As a result, Plaintiffs claim that the challenged statute is void for vagueness in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 96-104.)

Ultimately, Plaintiffs contend that the challenged statute impedes their efforts to carry out their missions. (See Id. ¶¶ 93-95.) Thus, they seek a declaration that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-275(5) is unconstitutional and to permanently enjoin Defendants from enforcement of said statute. (Id. ¶ 7.)

II. DISCUSSION

1. Motion to Intervene

The Proposed Interveners move to intervene as defendants in this matter permissively pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket Entry 44.) Under Rule 24(b), a court may permit intervention upon a timely motion of any party who "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(1)(B). The decision to grant or deny a motion for permissive intervention "lies within the sound discretion of the trial court" although "some standards have been developed to guide the courts in making intervention determinations." Hill v. W. Elec. Co. Inc., 672 F.2d 381, 386 (4th Cir. 1982). "In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights." Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(3). However, "findings on those factors are not determinative of or sufficient to decide a permissive intervention motion." McHenry v. Comm'r, 677 F.3d 214, 222 (4th Cir. 2012). "A court may grant or deny permissive intervention irrespective of what it concludes inks discussion of delay and prejudice." Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 319 F.R.D. 490, 494 (M.D. N.C. 2017) (citation omitted). Ultimately, Rule 24(b) affords the Court broad discretion and "a challenge to the court's discretionary decision to deny leave to intervene must demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion in denying the motion." McHenry, 677 F.3d at 219 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, the Proposed Interveners have attached their proposed Answer to the Amended Complaint (see Docket Entry 45-1). They contend that their motion is timely and that their defenses share common factual and legal issues with those of the current defendants. (Docket Entry 45 at 4-5.) The Proposed Intervenors also argue that the intervention sought will not delay nor prejudice the parties given the matter is still in early proceedings and they are not seeking to pursue cross-claims nor add counterclaims. (Id. at 5-6.) They further contend that the intervention will also have no effect on the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiffs first oppose the motion as untimely. (Docket Entry 49 at 7-8.) They contend that the Proposed Intervenors delayed filing their motion until nearly seven months after this action commenced. (Id. at 8.) In addition Plaintiffs argue that since this publicly known action was filed and considering the procedural events thus far, the Proposed Intervenors had not been involved, have no reason as to why they did not seek intervention sooner, and provide no explanation for the sudden need for intervention at this juncture. (Id.) Plaintiffs further argue that the intervention sought will unduly...