N.G. v. Downey Reg'l Med. Ctr.

140 F.Supp.3d 1036

N.G.

v.Downey Regional Medical Center, et al

Case No. CV 15-06597-BRO (FFMx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed October 23, 2015

John F. Denove, Shane V. Hapuarachy, Cheong Denove Rowell and Bennett ALPC, Los Angeles, CA, for N.G.

Daniel K. Dik, Stephen C. Fraser, Susan E. Shube, Fraser Watson and Croutch LLP, Glendale, CA, Julia E. Murray, Schmid and Voiles, Los Angeles, CA, for Downey Regional Medical Center, et al.

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND [19]

Present: The Honorable BEVERLY REID O'CONNELL, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is a motion to remand filed by Plaintiff N.G. ("Plaintiff").

(Dkt. No. 19.) Plaintiff filed the motion after Defendant Downey Regional Medical Center-Hospital, Inc. ("Downey Regional" or "Defendant") removed this case from the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles ("Los Angeles Superior Court"), on August 28, 2015. (Dkt. No. 3.) After considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the instant motion, the Court deems this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument of counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; C.D. Cal. L. R. 7–15. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion and REMANDS the action to state court.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a minor suing by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Grizel Perez. (Removal, Ex. 1.) On June 3, 2015, Plaintiff initiated this action in the Los Angeles Superior Court, asserting one cause of action for professional negligence resulting from damages Defendant Downey Regional and co-defendant Gil Bender allegedly caused before and during Plaintiff's birth. (Id. ¶¶ 1–12.)

Defendant Downey Regional is a privately-owned hospital and surgical center that provides comprehensive medical care to the public. (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendant explains in its Notice of Removal that it is authorized to provide healthcare to persons eligible to receive Medicare or Medicaid through the State of California Department of Public Health. (Id. ¶ 5.) As an approved Medicaid and Medicare provider, Defendant contends that it is "required to follow Medicaid/Medicare directives" and is "is expected to comply with utilization and professional protocols decided on by federally designated Quality Improvement Organizations." (Id. ¶ 7.)

Defendant timely removed the matter to this Court on August 28, 2015, invoking this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Dkt. No. 3.) Defendant maintains that jurisdiction is appropriate for two reasons: (1) Defendant is a federal officer for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) because it is an approved Medicare and Medicaid provider; and, (2) Defendant is entitled to blanket immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1320(c)(1–2), which Defendant argues creates a federal question under § 1331. (Removal, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 7–11.)

On September 8, 2015, the Court ordered Defendant to show cause as to why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 13.) Defendant responded to the Court's Order on September 14, 2015, (Dkt. No. 14), and Plaintiff replied to Defendant's response on September 21, 2015, (Dkt. No. 15). On September 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand the case to the Los Angeles Superior Court. (Dkt. No. 19.) Defendant then filed its Opposition on October 5, 2015, (Dkt. No. 23), and Plaintiff timely replied on October 12, 2015, (Dkt. No. 25).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Whether a defendant may rightfully remove a case from a state court to a federal district court is entirely governed by statutory authorization by Congress. Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co. , 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir.1979). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a civil action may be removed to the district court only if that court has original jurisdiction over the issues alleged in the state court complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, they possess original jurisdiction only as authorized by the Constitution and federal statute. See, e.g. , Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case "arises under" federal law if a plaintiff's "well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action" or that the plaintiff's "right to relief under state law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal. , 463 U.S. 1, 13, 27, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983).

Further, the removal statute is "strictly construe[d] ... against removal jurisdiction," and the removing party "always has the burden of establishing that removal was proper." Gaus v. Miles, Inc. , 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992). "Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant raises two arguments to support the removal of this action. First, Defendant asserts that it qualifies as a federal officer and that removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Second, Defendant claims that it is eligible for immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1320c–6 and 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(5) and that such immunity confers federal question jurisdiction. The Court will address each argument in turn.

A. Standing as a "Federal Officer"

As discussed above, Defendant first argues that subject matter jurisdiction exists in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the federal officer removal statute. Section 1442(a)(1) provides as follows:

A civil action or a criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:

(1) the United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of revenue.

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The basic purpose of the statute is to

protect the Federal Government from the interference with its operations that would ensue were a State able, for example, to arrest and bring to trial in a State court for an alleged offense against the law of the State, officers and agents of the Federal Government acting within the scope of their authority.

Watson v. Philip Morris Cos. , 551 U.S. 142, 150, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the statute counteracts any significant risk of state-court prejudice against federal officers. See id. at 150–52, 127 S.Ct. 2301.

While the removal statute applies to private persons who lawfully assist a federal officer in the performance of his or her official duty, to fall under the scope of the statute, a private person must do more than "simply [comply] with the law." Id. at 151–52, 127 S.Ct. 2301. Thus, a "highly regulated firm cannot find a statutory basis for removal in the fact of federal regulation alone."

Id. at 153, 127 S.Ct. 2301. To satisfy the requirement of "acting under" a government agency, a private actor must perform "a job that, in the absence of a contract with a private firm, the government itself would have had to perform." Id. at 154, 127 S.Ct. 2301.

Here, Defendant's only connection to the Federal Government is that Defendant is a Medi-Cal provider, as Defendant itself is a privately-owned hospital. (Resp. to Order to Show Cause ("Resp.") at 9–10; see Mot. at 3.) Defendant implies that by providing medical treatment for patients receiving Medi-Cal benefits, which allows it to receive payments from the Federal Government for providing such treatment, it was assisting a federal officer in the performance of an official duty. (See Mot. at 9–10.) However, Defendant has not provided any case law to support this assertion. Under Defendant's line of reasoning, every private medical entity providing medical services for Medi-Cal,¹ Medicare, or Medicaid recipients would be acting under a federal officer for purposes of § 1442(a)(1). Accordingly, every medical malpractice claim filed against such entities that arises under state law could be removed to federal court. The Court declines to adopt this broad rule. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (holding that federal courts are of limited jurisdiction); see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc. , 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that the removal statute is "strictly construe[d] ... against removal jurisdiction," and "[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal").

Defendant further claims that it "perform[s] a task that the United States government would ordinarily do for itself." (Id. at 10.) Yet, the United States Government does not ordinarily administer medical treatment to the exclusion of other entities. For instance, both private and government hospitals, such as VA Medical Centers, provide medical treatment to the public. Thus, Defendant cannot claim the government is relying on Defendant to step into the government's shoes to perform a task the government normally reserves for itself. In other words, the government is not outsourcing a government task to Defendant and overseeing Defendant's conduct. Instead, Defendant merely collects Medicare, Medicaid, and/or Medi-Cal payments from the government for providing medical treatment to eligible members of the public.²

Even...