N.W.M. v. Langenbach

316 A.3d 7

N.W.M. and E.M., Minors, THROUGH Their Parents and Natural Guardians, J.M., N.M., and J.A.M., Appellees

v.Patrice LANGENBACH and Defender Association of Philadelphia, Appellants

No. 25 EAP 2022

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: September 14, 2023

Decided: May 31, 2024

West Codenotes

Recognized as Invalid

23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5334; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6311(b)(9)

Appeal from the Judgment of Superior Court entered on 2/01/2022 at No. 1532 EDA 2020 Reversing/Remanding the order entered on 7/08/2020 in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division at No. 200300399. Abbe F. Fletman, Judge

Melissa Marie Blanco, Esq., William J. Leonard, Esq., Matthew Stephan Olesh, Esq., Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel LLP, for Appellants.

Jonathan Budd, Esq., Thomas C. Welshonce, Esq., KidsVoice, for Appellant Amicus Curiae KidsVoice.

Charles Lyman Becker, Esq., Nadeem A. Bezar, Esq., Ruxandra Maniu Laidacker, Esq., Kline & Specter, PC, Jay L. Edelstein, Esq., Andrew Justin Thomson, Esq., Edelstein Law, LLP, Jared Scott Zafran, Esq., for Appellees.

David C. Harrison, Esq., Laurence M. Kelly, Esq., for Appellee Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Association For Justice.

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE WECHT

Immunity from civil liability is an "exceptional protection."¹ When courts extend such protection, they displace remedies otherwise available at law, a step not lightly taken. Here, we consider whether to extend absolute, quasi-judicial immunity in tort to attorneys appointed as guardians ad litem ("GAL") to represent children in juvenile dependency proceedings.² In such proceedings, GALs represent the best interests of children, and, absent any conflict of interest, the legal interests of those children as well. GALs in juvenile dependency cases serve an important and unique role. That role consists of legal advocacy, not adjudication, and, as such, confers no quasi-judicial immunity on GALs. We hold as well that our Superior Court, as an intermediate appellate tribunal, is authorized to address such claims when squarely presented. We affirm the intermediate panel’s order, which reversed the trial court’s decision, a decision that had relied on assertions of quasi-judicial immunity. We remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

This dispute stems from a legal malpractice claim filed by N.W.M., through her parents, J.M. and N.M., against her former GAL, Patrice Langenbach, Esquire, and Attorney Langenbach’s employer, De- fender Association of Philadelphia.³,⁴ Attorney Langenbach represented N.W.M. in a dependency matter pursuant to the Juvenile Act,⁵ and, later, in a corresponding termination of parental rights matter pursuant to the Adoption Act.⁶

When N.W.M. was seven weeks old, Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia ("CHOP") discovered that she had sustained several rib fractures. Parents denied harming N.W.M. and denied knowledge of how N.W.M. was injured. They theorized that a variant in N.W.M.’s genes caused the fractures, or that N.W.M.’s two-year-old brother, E.M., inflicted the injuries during rough play. However, a CHOP physician opined that the fractures were caused by non-accidental trauma inflicted by an adult. The Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS") obtained and executed an emergency court order removing N.W.M. from Parents’ custody.

The juvenile court appointed Defender Association to represent N.W.M. as GAL, and Defender Association assigned Attorney Langenbach to the case.⁷ After hearing testimony from a DHS social worker, the CHOP physician, and Mother, the juvenile court adjudicated N.W.M. dependent pursuant to the Juvenile Act⁸ and made a finding of child abuse pursuant to the Child Protective Services Law ("CPSL").⁹ The juvenile court declined to place N.W.M. with Grandmother, as requested by Parents, and ordered DHS to place N.W.M. in non-kinship foster care.¹⁰

The juvenile court adjudicated E.M. dependent as well, but the siblings’ dependency cases followed different paths. After E.M. was removed from Parents’ care, he was placed into kinship care with Grandmother. At the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court returned E.M. to Parents’ care under DHS supervision. The juvenile court discharged E.M.’s dependency case entirely at the first permanency hearing,¹¹ finding that Parents had the protective capacity to care for E.M.

Despite the ultimate finding that E.M. was safe in Parents’ care, and that Grandmother was an appropriate kinship care-giver for E.M. in the meantime, the juvenile court repeatedly refused to return N.W.M. to Parents or to place her with Grandmother. At a permanency hearing six months after the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court proclaimed that, considering the CHOP physician’s testimony at the adjudication hearing, the court was unwilling to consider reunification without an admission of abuse by Parents or a plausible explanation as to how N.W.M. was injured. The juvenile court also informed the parties that it was "not going to consider kinship care," stating, "if I leave her in foster care maybe I get closer to an answer as to what happened instead of moving her to grandmom."¹² These rulings prompted Parents to file several appeals in the Superior Court.

While those appeals were pending, DHS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights pursuant to the Adoption Act.¹³ Attorney Langenbach continued to represent N.W.M.’s best interests as GAL in the termination matter.¹⁴ The juvenile court conducted a hearing and granted DHS’s petition to terminate Parents’ rights to N.W.M. Parents appealed, and the dependency and termination appeals were consolidated.

The Superior Court held that the juvenile court abused its discretion by refusing to place N.W.M. in kinship care with Grandmother and by keeping N.W.M. in foster care as a means to pressure Parents into a confession of child abuse.¹⁵ The Superior Court reversed the permanency review order that prohibited N.W.M.’s placement with Grandmother, vacated the dependency order changing N.W.M.’s permanency goal to adoption, and vacated the termination of parental rights orders. The Superior Court expressed significant concerns regarding the trial judge’s conduct in N.W.M.’s dependency case and "strongly suggested" that the trial judge recuse herself on remand.¹⁶

The trial judge abided by the Superior Court’s recusal suggestion, and a new judge was assigned. After reviewing transcripts from the dependency and termination matters, the new trial judge issued an order vacating Attorney Langenbach’s appointment as GAL. The juvenile court found that Attorney Langenbach failed to act in N.W.M.’s best interest by

standing silently and failing to object or challenge the trial court while it denied N.W.M. her right to be placed with her grandmother in violation of the CPSL¹⁷ and while the trial court advanced its plan to judicially coerce a confession from the Parents as to the cause of N.W.M.’s injury. This mute acquiescence requires a new GAL be appointed for N.W.M.¹⁸

The same day that it issued that order, the juvenile court placed N.W.M. into kinship care with Grandmother. Not long after, the juvenile court returned N.W.M. to Parents and closed the dependency case.

N.W.M. then filed the legal malpractice complaint at issue in this appeal. In her complaint, N.W.M. alleged that Attorney Langenbach acted negligently throughout her representation of N.W.M. as GAL. N.W.M.’s complaint is peppered with Attorney Langenbach’s alleged transgressions in the court proceedings and outside of court. Most of the allegations concern Attorney Langenbach’s alleged efforts to advocate for N.W.M.’s continued placement in foster care and adoption by her foster parents while failing to support N.W.M.’s reunification with Parents or placement into kinship care with Grandmother.

For example, N.W.M. alleges that Attorney Langenbach’s representation of N.W.M. fell below the standard of care because she:

• did not challenge the CHOP physician’s credentials or testimony;

• challenged Parents’ credibility and asserted inconsistent arguments;

• disparaged Parents to service providers outside of court;

• interfered with Parents’ bond with N.W.M. by dismissing N.W.M.’s need for breast milk, supporting N.W.M.’s absence from Parents during significant early events in her life, and preventing Parents from providing her with a Halloween costume;

• objected to Parents’ efforts to introduce contrary medical evidence concerning the cause of N.W.M.’s injuries;

• colluded with the solicitor representing DHS to remove service providers who provided positive reports concerning Parents;

• manufactured safety concerns about Grandmother;

• objected to Parents’ motion seeking the original trial judge’s recusal from presiding over the petition to terminate their parental rights;

• supported the agency’s efforts to terminate Parents’ parental rights, including objecting (or joining the agency’s objections) thirty-seven times in the termination of parental rights hearing;

• objected to Grandmother’s presence at the dependency hearing following the Superior Court’s remand, opposed N.W.M.’s immediate placement into kinship care, referred to Parents and Grandmother as strangers, and questioned Parents’ ability to keep N.W.M. safe ever though they had been parenting E.M. without issue.¹⁹

N.W.M. alleged that Defender Association was vicariously liable as Attorney Langenbach’s employer. N.W.M. alluded as well to Defender Association’s alleged negligent supervision of Attorney Langenbach and its failure to terminate her employment.²⁰

[1, 2] Attorney Langenbach and Defender Association filed preliminary objections asserting that they were immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial or quasi-judicial immunity.²¹ The trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed all claims, ruling that Attorney Langenbach and Defender Association were immune...