Nabelsi v. Holmdel Twp.

WAEL NABELSI, Plaintiff, v. HOLMDEL TOWNSHIP, KEVIN GALLOGLY, LINDSAY MEEHAN, and JOHN and JANE DOES 1-10 fictitious persons and/or entities yet to be identified, Defendants.

No. 20-20702 (FLW)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

November 30, 2021

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

Hon Freda L. Wolfson U.S. Chief District Judge

Wael Nabelsi (“Plaintiff”) brings suit against Holmdel Township, Kevin Gallogly, Lindsay Meehan, and various fictitious persons/entities (collectively “Defendants”), alleging that they falsely arrested him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and equivalent state laws. Defendants move to dismiss, arguing mainly that the arresting officer had probable cause for the arrest insofar as he relied on a facially valid warrant. For the following reasons, I GRANT Defendants' dismissal motion, DISMISS Nabelsi's Complaint with prejudice as to the federal claims, and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The statutes of limitation associated with the remaining state law claims are TOLLED for thirty (30) days to permit Nabelsi time to refile in state court, should he wish to do so pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).^[1]

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This dispute stems from a family court proceeding. On August 23 2019, Nabelsi's wife obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) prohibiting Nabelsi from entering their residence or contacting their children pending a final hearing on domestic violence allegations. Compl ¶¶ 16-17.^[2] The TRO barred Nabelsi from contacting his wife, including “making or causing anyone else to make harassing communications” with her. Nabelsi could retrieve his belongings from his residence if accompanied by a police officer. Id. ¶¶ 19-20.

Notwithstanding the TRO, on August 23, 2019, Nabelsi's wife received a call from someone purporting to be Nabelsi's attorney. The caller stated that Nabelsi wanted to see his children before the TRO hearing. Nabelsi's wife said she would think about it, then called the Holmdel Police Department (“HPD”) to report the call. Vincent Imperato, an Officer with HPD who is not named as a defendant, called Nabelsi in response and asked him to come to headquarters. At first, Nabelsi agreed, but shortly thereafter, he retracted and instead gave Officer Imperato the phone number for his attorney, which happened to be the same as the number Nabelsi's wife reported earlier. As well, when questioned on the phone, Nabelsi refused to answer whether he authorized his lawyer to call his wife and would not provide his new address. After attempting to reach Nabelsi's attorney multiple times to no avail, Officer Imperato applied for a warrant for contempt, suspecting that Nabelsi violated the TRO by causing his lawyer to call his wife about access to their children. Lindsay Meehan, the Municipal Court Administrator for Monmouth County, entered the warrant that day, which identified Nabelsi's name, address, social security number, and phone number in addition to the date, time, and location of the incident underlying the contempt charge. Def. Br., Exs. D-E.

A week later, on August 27, 2019, Nabelsi called HPD to retrieve his belongings from his residence. Compl., ¶ 37. He met Officer Kevin Gallogly, who, upon conducting a records check, noticed the outstanding contempt warrant and arrested Nabelsi. In response, Nabelsi's attorney contacted Meehan. Id. ¶¶ 31-37. 48-49. Meehan then contacted Officer Gallogly to inform him that the contempt charge would likely be dismissed. Nabelsi was released after spending 46 minutes in custody. Id. ¶¶ 45-47. The prosecutor assigned to Nabelsi's case administratively terminated the contempt charge the next day, id. ¶ 50, and wrote in a letter that Nabelsi “was not arrested.” Def. Br., Ex. G. Meehan disclosed this information to Nabelsi in an email one day later, stating that “[w]e were able to get this [charge] deleted from the system so it will not be on your record, not even as a dismissal, ” and “[a]lthough you were taken to the Holmdel police station, you were not brought out and processed at the Monmouth County Correctional Institution which is what [the statement ‘defendant has not been arrested'] was referring to.” Id., Ex. 3; Compl., ¶ 52. Nevertheless, on January 21, 2020, Nabelsi's prospective employer (Southwest Airlines) flagged his arrest during a background check. Id. ¶ 57. Concerned, Nabelsi emailed Meehan. Id. ¶ 58. Jeffrey Ackerson, a lieutenant with HPD, eventually replied: “you were arrested by the [HPD] on August 27, 2019, and you were fingerprinted as part of the arrest processing procedure.” Id. ¶ 59. Ackerson advised Nabelsi that he may apply for expungement to clear his name. Def. Br., Ex. 3.

Unsatisfied with how HPD and Meehan handled his arrest, Nabelsi filed a lengthy Complaint on December 31, 2020. ECF No. 1. The twelve-count Complaint fails to link any of its claims to specific defendants, and thus borders on impermissible group pleading. See, e.g., Sheeran v. Blyth Shipholding S.A., No. 14-5482, 2015 WL 9048979, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2015) (dismissing complaint because it “fails to separate out the liability for each defendant”); Ingris v. Borough of Caldwell, No. 14-855, 2015 WL 3613499, at *5 (D.N.J. June 9, 2015) (“[T]o the extent Plaintiff seeks to lump several defendants together without setting forth what each particular defendant is alleged to have done, he has engaged in impermissibly vague group pleading.”). Group pleading is improper because it does not give proper notice or allow the court to separate out liability. Shaw v. Housing Auth. of Camden, No. 11-4291, 2012 WL 3283402, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2012) (finding that “[e]ven under the most liberal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a), a plaintiff must differentiate between defendants”) (citation omitted); Murray v. Cty. of Hudson, No. 17-2875, 2018 WL 3000333, at *4 (D.N.J. June 15, 2018) (same). This is particularly problematic in a § 1983 case, because that civil rights statute requires personal involvement. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.3d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.”); Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a plaintiff must show that each and every defendant was “personally involved in depriving him of his rights”) (alterations omitted).

Regardless, based on the facts alleged, I construe the following counts to involve the following defendants. Count I alleges false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Gallogly and Meehan. Compl., ¶¶ 76-89. Count II alleges a due process violation under § 1983, on the grounds that non-defendant Officer Imperato did not read Nabelsi his Miranda rights before taking (what Nabelsi insists are) incriminating statements over the phone, Officer Gallogly impugned Nabelsi's reputation by creating a “permanent arrest record, ” and Meehan misled Nabelsi about his arrest. Id. ¶¶ 90-99. Count III alleges abuse of the legal process against Officer Gallogly and Meehan for much the same. Id. ¶¶ 100-05. Count IV alleges Monell liability against HPD (through Holmdel Township) for what Nabelsi calls an “ask first, Miranda later”^[3] policy, id. ¶¶ 106-13, while Count V alleges supervisory liability against “yet to be identified Defendant Does.” Id. ¶¶ 114-19. Count VI alleges a violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), which is the state law version of § 1983, against Officer Gallogly and Meehan. Id. ¶¶ 120-25. Count VII alleges negligence. Id. ¶¶ 133-36. Count VIII alleges that Defendants placed Nabelsi in a “false light before the public and prospective employers.” Id. ¶¶ 137-43. Count IX alleges interference with economic advantage. Id. ¶¶ 144-49. Count X alleges respondeat superior liability against HPD in connection with all state law claims. Id. ¶¶ 150-54. And Count XI alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive Nabelsi of his civil rights, id. ¶¶ 155-59, while Count XII alleges aiding and abetting liability. Id. ¶¶ 160-64.

Defendants moved to dismiss the entire Complaint on April 16, 2021. ECF No. 6. The gist of their motion is that Nabelsi fails as a matter of law to plead false arrest because Officer Gallogly detained Nabelsi pursuant to a facially valid warrant, which Meehan issued based on probable cause. Also, according to Defendants, Nabelsi cannot plead a due process violation because he was neither in custody nor subjected to interrogation while on the phone with Officer Imperato on August 23, 2019, and cannot identify any false or defamatory statements which harm his reputation. Defendants further contend that Nabelsi does not so much as identify an official HPD custom or policy to support Monell liability, much less aver plausible factual allegations that the custom or policy deprived him of a constitutional right, and likewise cannot name any supervisors or specific unconstitutional acts they committed. Finally, Defendants argue that all claims against Meehan must be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment because municipal courts are arms of the state for sovereign immunity purposes.^[4]

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may dismiss an action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). A complaint survives dismissal if it contains sufficient...