Nahar v. ADR Ventures WPR LLC

1

AKTHER NAHAR, Plaintiff, v. ADR VENTURES WPR LLC, d/b/a DUNKIN DONUTS, Defendant.

No. 23-CV-3835 (VSB)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

September 3, 2024

Daniela Mendes, Morgan L. Mickelsen, Brittany Alexandra Stevens, Phillips & Associates, PLLC Counsel for Plaintiff

Nadia M. Pervez, Pervez & Rehman, P.C., Counsel for Defendant

OPINION & ORDER

VERNON S. BRODERICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

In this action, Plaintiff Akther Nahar claims that Defendant ADR Ventures WPR LLC, doing business as Dunkin Donuts (“Dunkin”), unlawfully discriminated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the New York State Human Rights Law (the “NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. L. § 290, et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a) et seq.^[1] Before me is Dunkin's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because I find that Nahar plausibly alleges discrimination under the relevant statutes, Dunkin's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

I. Background and Procedural History^[2]

Akther Nahar, an observant Muslim woman who wears a hijab, began working for Dunkin Donuts on April 23, 2021.^[3] (Am. Compl ¶¶ 6-7.) At all relevant times, Nahar was a Crew Member^[4] at the Dunkin Donuts store located at 2200 White Plains Road, Bronx, New York 10467. (Id. ¶ 13.) She worked approximately sixteen hours per week, and her shifts were scheduled on a weekly basis. (Id. ¶ 14.) Although Nahar's coworkers were allowed to float between the front and back of the store, Nahar was often directed to stay in the back, where she would make drinks and snacks away from customers. (Id. ¶ 17.) When coworkers asked why Nahar was relegated to the back of the store, Nahar's supervisor, Anwar Hossain (“Andy”), would explain that Nahar's hijab would drive customers away. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 18.) Similarly, Andy would make comments like “[t]he customers will be scared” and “[Nahar] will drive away the customers.” (Id. ¶ 17.) On one occasion, Nahar observed Andy tell a Muslim woman “who had come into the location to begin employment” not to wear her hijab inside the store. (Id. ¶ 21.)

During one of Nahar's last shifts, Saikot Hassan, another one of Nahar's supervisors who began working at Dunkin in March 2022, instructed Nahar to move the ovens and clean under them, a task Nahar believed was never before assigned to just one person. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 22.) Nahar objected and stated that the ovens were too heavy for her to move on her own.^[5] (Id. ¶ 22.)

On April 16, 2022, after Defendant stopped scheduling Nahar to work and removed her from the shift schedule, Nahar tried to contact Andy to discuss her absence from the schedule. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) Andy never responded to Nahar, leading Nahar to believe that she had been terminated. (Id. ¶ 24.) At some point thereafter, a former employee told Nahar that she was fired based on her “gender and religion, namely her wearing a hijab in the workplace.” (Id. ¶ 25.)

Based on these events, Nahar filed this lawsuit against Dunkin on May 8, 2023. (Doc. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”).) On June 12, 2023, Nahar amended her Complaint, alleging religious and gender discrimination under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-43.) On July 28, 2023, Dunkin moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 9.) Nahar filed her opposition brief on August 11, 2023. (Doc. 12.) Dunkin did not file a reply.

IT. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint is properly dismissed, where, as a matter of law, “the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. Accordingly, a district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). However, that tenet “is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Discussion

Nahar claims that Dunkin discriminated against her on the basis of religion and gender. As noted, Nahar brings claims under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. I analyze the Title VII and NYSHRL claims together, because the substantive standards for liability under these statutes are the same. See Walsh v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 828 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 2016). I address Nahar's NYCHRL claim separately.

A. Title VII & NYSHRL

Discrimination claims under Title VII are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under that framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008). To do so, the plaintiff must show that “(1) [she] belonged to a protected class; (2) [she] was qualified for the position [she] held; (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

At the motion to dismiss stage, however, the plaintiff “is not required to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he requirements for establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas do not apply to the pleading standard that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Instead, “[t]he facts alleged must give plausible support to the reduced requirements that arise under McDonnell Douglas in the initial phase of a Title VII litigation.” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015).

Dunkin does not dispute that Nahar's allegations, taken as true, suffice to establish the first and second prongs of a prima facie case of discrimination. Dunkin moves to dismiss on the ground that Nahar has not suffered an adverse employment action and, even if Nahar had suffered an adverse employment action, that the alleged adverse action was not, “in any way, related to her protected status as a woman or a Muslim.” (Doc. 9-3 at 1.) I address each argument in turn.

1. Adverse Employment Action

An adverse employment action in the context of a discrimination claim is one that has “a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

To be materially adverse, a change in working conditions must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. Examples of such a change include termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices unique to a particular situation.

Id. (quoting Sanders v. N.Y.C. Hum. Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir. 2004)).

Nahar identifies several purportedly adverse employment actions. Specifically, she states that the adverse employment actions included (1) the direction that she work in the back of the store, (2) the instruction to move and clean under the ovens, (3) being subjected to offensive and discriminatory comments about her hijab, and (4) the termination of her employment. (See Doc. 12 at 12-13.) Of these purportedly adverse employment actions, I conclude that only termination of Nahar's employment constitutes an adverse employment action.

Nahar's allegations that she was “directed to stay in the rear of the store,” (Am. Compl. ¶ 17), and “instructed to move the ovens and clean under them,” (Id. ¶ 22), do not amount to “materially adverse change[s] in the terms and conditions of [her] employment.” Joseph v Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Nahar does not allege that either assignment carried with it any negative ramifications, such as a demotion or loss of wages. See Hill v. Rayboy-Brauestein, 467 F.Supp.2d 336, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (recognizing that a “change in job responsibilities” and “underutilization of Plaintiff's skills” were not adverse employment actions unless “accompanied by materially adverse changes in employment, such as demotion or loss of wages”); Smalls v. Allstate Ins., 396 F.Supp.2d 364, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (concluding that unfavorable shifts and undesirable work assignments are not adverse employment actions because they do not have a material impact on terms and conditions of employment). Nor does she allege that the working conditions were inconsistent with the scope of her job responsibilities. See Rodriguez v. Coca Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., No. 12-CV-234, 2013 WL 5230037, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013) (“[A]ssignments that are part of an employee's normal responsibilities are not ‘adverse employment actions' where, as here, the rate of pay and benefits remains the same.”). At most, this conduct-that she was...