Naranjo v. City of Redwood City

GABRIELA NARANJO, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, ET AL., Defendants.

CASE NO. 19-cv-01549-YGR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

August 15, 2019

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 11

Plaintiff Gabriela Naranjo, individually and as guardian ad litem for her three minor children J.B., A.B., and D.B., brings this civil rights action against defendants San Mateo County (the "County"), City of Redwood City, detective Michael Ruybal, officer Richard Santiago, special agent Amanda Meier, special agent Jeffrey Clements, special agent Michael Leishman, police chief JR Gamez, Sheriff Carlos Bolanos, and Does 1-25, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. (Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl.").)¹

Now before the Court is the County, Sheriff Bolanos, and special agents Clements and Leishman's (together, the "County Defendants") motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 11 ("Motion").) Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART County Defendants' motion.²

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges as follows:

On March 28, 2019, at approximately 7:10 a.m., detective Ruybal, officer Santiago, and special agents Meier, Leishman, Clements (together, "Officer Defendants") executed a signed warrant authorizing the search of plaintiffs' home at 238 Park Street, Redwood City, California. (Compl. ¶¶ 26-27.)³ The home is a single story. (Id. ¶ 28.) Ms. Naranjo lived there with her three children, also plaintiffs, as well as her boyfriend Jesus Bustos. (Id.) Ms. Naranjo rented a room in the home to an individual named Marcellino Barragan. (Id.)

At the time the search warrant was executed, plaintiffs were present in the home. (Id. ¶ 29.) Officer Defendants entered the residence without knocking and with their guns drawn. (Id. ¶ 31.) J.B. (15 years old) was in the living room of the home, with the family dog, getting ready for school. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 32.) Officer Defendants pointed their guns at J.B. and ordered him to control the dog or the dog would be shot. (Id.). J.B. complied with the order. (Id.)

Officer Defendants also entered the bathroom where Ms. Naranjo was taking a shower. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.)⁴ They pointed a gun at Ms. Naranjo and ordered her not to move. (Id. ¶ 34.) Ms. Naranjo was naked and asked an officer if she could retrieve a towel to cover herself because she was wet and cold. (Id.) She was told not to move until a female officer arrived. (Id.) Ms. Naranjo remained in the shower, with an officer pointing his gun at her. (Id.) After a few minutes, special agent Meier, a female officer, arrived and ordered Ms. Naranjo to get out of the shower. (Id.) Mr. Naranjo complied with the order. (Id.) Special agent Meier then handcuffed Ms. Naranjo, placed a bathrobe over her shoulders, and led her to the front yard of the home. (Id. ¶¶ 35-39.) Ms. Naranjo's repeated requests for clothing were denied, and her bathrobe remaineduntied and open in the front, exposing Ms. Naranjo's breasts, stomach, and pubic area. (Id. ¶¶ 37-38.)

Twenty minutes later, after repeatedly asking about her children, Ms. Naranjo was escorted back inside the home and into the master bedroom. (Id. ¶ 40.) She was then uncuffed and told to get dressed. (Id.) Once dressed, she was told to wake up her two other children and take them outside. (Id.) Thereafter, Officer Defendants placed plaintiffs in a van. (Id. ¶ 41.) Despite the cold temperature in the van, plaintiffs were not permitted to retrieve shoes, sweaters, or blankets. (Id.) Ms. Naranjo asked whether D.B. (10 years old) and A.B. (6 years old) could use the bathroom and was told they needed to wait, which they did for over 30 minutes. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 42.)

Officer Defendants then escorted plaintiffs back inside the home. (Id. ¶ 43.) They were placed in the living room. (Id.) When A.B. attempted to enter the kitchen to get food, Officer Defendants yelled at him to get out. (Id.) Officer Defendants eventually completed their search of the residence and left. (Id. ¶ 44.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This "facial plausibility" standard requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim, a court must assume that plaintiff's allegations are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court is not required to accept as true "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Leave to amend must be granted unless it is clear that the complaint's deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Fourth Amendment Claim

Plaintiffs bring a single cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging in part that Officer Defendants violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and for sufficient probable cause to exist for said searches and seizures. (Compl. ¶ 51.)⁵ The instant motion is similarly short. County Defendants argue that the Fourth Amendment claim should be dismissed simply because plaintiffs' home was searched pursuant to a valid search warrant supported by probable cause. (Motion at 4.) Specifically, County Defendants aver that because the complaint alleges that "[a] search warrant was signed by [a state court judge], authorizing the search of [plaintiffs'] home," plaintiffs "ha[ve] admitted that the search of [their] home was conducted with a valid warrant." (Id.) Thus, County Defendants argue, plaintiffs fail to state a claim for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.

County Defendants' argument fails to persuade. The Fourth Amendment proscribes "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Where, as alleged here, a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, plaintiffs bringing a Fourth Amendment claim must show "either that the warrants were invalid under the Fourth Amendment or that, even if valid, the warrants were executed in a manner that rendered the searches unreasonable." United States v. Artis, 919 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis supplied); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985) (holding that the reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on, among other things, "how it is carried out") (emphasis in original). Here, plaintiffs frame their Fourth Amendment claim as challenging not the validity of the warrant but the way it was executed. (Dkt. No. 38 ("Opp.") at 5.)⁶ Indeed, the complaint states that it "arises from conduct by [Officer Defendants]during the execution of a search warrant," and nearly all of the factual allegations in the complaint center around this conduct. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 27-45.) Accordingly, even if plaintiffs had admitted the warrant was valid, which the Court is not persuaded they have, plaintiffs allege a plausible Fourth Amendment violation based on the manner in which Officer Defendants executed the warrant. See Pierce v. Cty. of Marin, 291 F. Supp. 3d 982, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (rejecting argument that plaintiff's detention "was pursuant to a facially valid warrant and was therefore reasonable" where complaint alleged that "defendants['] conduct after plaintiff's wrongful booking . . . caused the subsequent wrongful arrests and detentions").

County Defendants' motion to dismiss is therefore denied with respect to their argument that the Fourth Amendment claim should be dismissed based on the validity of the warrant.

B. Qualified Immunity

Next, County Defendants argue that plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim must be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity. (Motion at 4-6.)⁷

"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages 'unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was 'clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct.'" Woodv. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 745 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). "Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense from suit, not merely from liability, '[u]nless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.'" Doe By and Through Doe v. Petaluma City School Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged approach for analyzing qualified immunity. First, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, establish the violation of a constitutional right. Id. at 201. Second, the Court decides whether the right is "clearly established" such that a reasonable government official would have known that "his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 202.⁸ A "clearly established" constitutional right must not be stated as a general proposition, but rather, must be "particularized" to the facts of the case. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (quo...