Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, Spring Valley Branch v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist.

464 F.Supp.3d 587

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR the ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, SPRING VALLEY BRANCH; Julio Clerveaux; Chevon Dos Reis; Eric Goodwin; Jose Vitelio Gregorio; Dorothy Miller; and Hillary Moreau, Plaintiffs,

v.EAST RAMAPO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

No. 17-CV-8943 (CS)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed June 1, 2020

Claudia T. Salomon, Corey A. Calabrese, Andrej Novakovski, Latham & Watkins LLP, New York, New York, Marc Zubick, Russell Mangas, Latham & Watkins LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Andrew Clubok, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, D.C., Arthur Eisenberg, Perry Grossman, New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, New York, Counsel for Plaintiff.

David J. Butler, Randall Levine, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, New York, New York, Washington, D.C., William S.D. Cravens, Clara Kollm, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C., Counsel for Defendant.

ORDER

Seibel, J.

Before the Court is Defendant's emergency motion to stay the Court's May 25, 2020 Decision and Order pending appeal. (Doc. 571.)

I. BACKGROUND

On November 16, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging that the at-large election system used by Defendant East Ramapo Central School District (the "District") denies to black and Latino voters an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice to the District's Board of Education (the "Board"), in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("Section 2"). (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs sought to enjoin any future elections under the at-large system and compel Defendant to replace the at-large system with a ward system. (Id. ¶ 7.)

A bench trial was held before this Court with closing arguments heard March 24, 2020. (See Minute Entry dated Mar. 24, 2020.) On May 25, 2020, the Court entered a Decision and Order finding that Plaintiffs had convincingly proved their case of vote dilution, enjoining the Board election scheduled for June 9, 2020, and ordering the District to propose a remedial plan within thirty days. (Doc. 568 ("Decision & Order") ¶¶ 87-88.)

On May 27, 2020, Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the Decision and Order. (Doc. 569.) On May 28, Defendant made an emergency motion to stay the Decision and Order, (Doc. 571), and filed a memorandum of law in support, (Doc. 572 ("D's Mem.")). That same day I ordered Plaintiffs to oppose by May 30, (Doc. 573), and thereafter Plaintiffs timely did so, (Doc. 575 ("Ps’ Opp.")).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Courts consider four factors when deciding to issue a stay pending appeal:

"(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies."

In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig. , 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill , 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987) ). The likelihood of success on the merits and irreparably injury are the most critical factors. Nken v. Holder , 556 U.S. 418, 434, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009). "The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion." Id. at 433-34, 129 S.Ct. 1749.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that the Court should lift its injunction of the District's June 9 election, (see D's Mem. at 5-12), and that the Court's Order requiring it to submit a districting proposal should be stayed pending appeal, (see id. at 12-21). As to the first request, Defendant's analysis is divorced from the four factors articulated above – so it has not shown that the circumstances justify an exercise of the Court's discretion – but I consider Defendant's arguments in connection with its overall likelihood of success on the merits.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

1. Injunction of the June 9 Election

The District argues that federal courts are generally prohibited from enjoining imminent elections, so it is likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal as to the June 9 injunction. But it is the "unusual case in which a court would be justified in not taking appropriate action to insure that no further elections are conducted under the invalid plan," Reynolds v. Sims , 377 U.S. 533, 585, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), and although the Supreme Court has "recognized that the substantial risk of voter confusion arising from changes to election law or procedures on the eve of an election may warrant a stay pending appeal," Covington v. North Carolina , No. 15-CV-399, 2018 WL 604732, at *7 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2018) (per curiam ) (emphasis added), such a stay is not required here.

Plaintiffs’ intent to seek an injunction has been clear since November 16, 2017. (See Doc. 1.) In its opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction filed February 19, 2018, Defendant argued "it is generally against the public interest to interfere with upcoming elections unless absolutely necessary," citing preliminary injunction cases. (Doc. 76 at 38-39.) Then, more than two years passed and Defendant failed to raise this issue again. Indeed, Plaintiffs specifically asked for that relief in their pretrial proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Defendant had every opportunity to argue that an injunction would not be appropriate – in the run-up to trial, through the motions in limine , in its pretrial or posttrial proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, or at trial – yet it chose not to do so until the instant application. It also had every opportunity to prepare for a possible injunction. Now, after the Decision and Order following the bench trial has issued, Defendant for the first time raises legal objections to what Plaintiffs sought all along. That Defendant chose to put all its eggs in the basket of prevailing at trial is no reason to prolong the disenfranchisement of minority voters.

In any event, Defendant's arguments are unavailing. Defendant raises concerns that the injunction will disrupt the election process, create confusion and delays, pose administrative challenges, and cause waste. But the cases Defendant cites have circumstances risking voter confusion or involving complicated changes in voting procedures that are not present here. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206-07, 206 L.Ed.2d 452 (2020) (per curiam ) (injunction changed voting rules and imposed gag order on election officials five days before election, granting relief not even requested by plaintiffs); Purcell v. Gonzalez , 549 U.S. 1, 3, 127 S.Ct. 5, 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) (per curiam ) (Court of Appeals had enjoined voter identification requirements without giving reasons, which could result in voters staying home); Veasey v. Abbott , 830 F.3d 216, 272 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (where further findings and conclusions were required as to statewide voter-identification requirements, district court's remedy (if any) would be made effective after next election); Veasey v. Perry , 769 F.3d 890, 891-92 (5th Cir. 2014) (staying injunction that required change to statewide voter-identification requirements), motion to vacate denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 9, 190 L.Ed.2d 283 (2014) ; Colon-Marrero v. Conty-Perez , 703 F.3d 134, 136 (1st Cir. 2012) (per curiam ) (injunction would have "order[ed] the immediate reinstatement of the more than 300,000 voters [in Puerto Rico] who had been stricken from the registration roll"); Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley , 344 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam ) (in statewide election, new technology would be needed in numerous counties, and "enormous resources" had already been expended on election materials and hiring and training of poll workers); Silberberg v. Bd. of Elections , 216 F. Supp. 3d 411, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (injunction would affect 5,300 poll sites and 60,000 trained poll workers in a statewide general election); Konst v. New York , No. 92-CV-615, 1992 WL 281092, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1992) (at time pro se litigant filed complaint, legislature had passed and Justice Department had pre-cleared challenged apportionment plan months before, filing deadlines had passed, and primary election was five days away; injunction against general election would require primary to be redone).¹

Here, there is no complication or confusion. The injunction has simply put a full stop to the Board election. There is no change of wording or election protocols; due dates and procedures for returning mail-in ballots are unchanged; no ballots need to be reprinted; no polling place personnel must be trained or retrained. Rather, the election may proceed as planned, and the District simply need not tally any votes received for Board seats.² Indeed, given the publicity around the injunction, to stay it now and reinstate the election would likely create more confusion.

Defendant's reliance on Goosby v. Town Bd. of Hempstead , 981 F. Supp. 751 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd , 180 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 1999), is also misplaced. On February 20, 1997, after a bench trial, the court ordered a remedial plan to be proposed. 981 F. Supp. at 754. On September 16, the plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin the election scheduled for November 7. Id. at 762. On October 20, the court entered the remedial plan but did not enjoin the election, noting that it was three weeks away. Id. at 763. But here, as discussed, Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction comes as no surprise. As Plaintiffs point out, in October 2019 they requested a trial date "in light of the upcoming May 2020 School Board elections," (Doc. 434 at 1), the Court scheduled trial accordingly, and I informed the parties that a decision would issue before the election. (Tr. at 2912:20-22.)³ And yet, as described above, Defendant failed to object to, or...