Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.

827 F.3d 51

National Federation of the Blind, et al., Petitioners

v.United States Department of Transportation and Anthony Foxx, Respondents

No. 15–1026

C/w 15–5078

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued March 10, 2016

Decided June 28, 2016

Kevin D. Docherty argued the cause for the petitioners. Daniel F. Goldstein, Joseph B. Espo, Baltimore, MD, and Gregory P. Care were with him on brief.

Abby C. Wright, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondents. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Michael S. Raab, Attorney, Paul M. Geier, Assistant General Counsel for Litigation, United States Department of Transportation, Peter J. Plocki, Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Litigation, Joy K. Park, Senior Trial Attorney, and Blane A. Workie, Assistant General Counsel for Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings, were with her on brief.

Before: Henderson, Griffith and Pillard, Circuit Judges.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge:

Petitioners National Federation of the Blind, Marc Maurer and Anil Lewis (collectively, NFB) challenge a rule issued by the United States Department of Transportation (DOT). The rule requires that air carriers begin to purchase ticketing kiosks accessible to blind persons within three years of the rule taking effect so that 25 per cent of kiosks eventually will be blind-accessible. After DOT issued its final rule, NFB filed a complaint in district court, challenging the rule because, among other reasons, it does not require air carriers to make all airport kiosks accessible to the blind. The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) because the rule is an “order” over which the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction.

Instead of dismissing NFB's complaint, however, the district court transferred the complaint to our court, re-styled as a petition for review. NFB subsequently filed a notice of appeal—which we construed as a petition for a writ of mandamus—challenging the district court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we dismiss NFB's petition for review and deny its mandamus petition.

I. Background

The Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 (ACAA), Pub. L. No. 99–435, 100 Stat. 1080, prohibits air carriers from “discriminat[ing] against any otherwise qualified handicapped individual” on the basis of disability and grants the DOT Secretary the authority to promulgate regulations to “ensure non-discriminatory treatment of qualified handicapped individuals.” Id. Using its authority, DOT issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking in 2011 which proposed that all future automated ticketing kiosks purchased by certain domestic and foreign air carriers¹ be accessible to blind persons. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel: Accessibility of Web Sites and Automated Kiosks at U.S. Airports, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,307, 59,309 (Sept. 26, 2011). This requirement would have taken effect sixty days after promulgation of the final rule. Id. DOT nevertheless sought comment on a less-than-100-per-cent-accessible kiosk requirement and on the timing of implementation. Id. at 59,320.

In light of comments from both air carriers and advocacy groups for disabled passengers, DOT altered its approach. DOT now requires that covered air carriers purchase blind-accessible kiosks until at least 25 per cent of the automated kiosks at each location in domestic airports are accessible.² See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel: Accessibility of Web Sites and Automated Kiosks at U.S. Airports (Final Rule or Rule), 78 Fed. Reg. 67,882, 67,883 (Nov. 12, 2013). The Final Rule became effective on December 12, 2013, and DOT provided a grace period wherein air carriers are not required to begin purchasing accessible kiosks until three years after the effective date of the Rule's implementation. Id. at 67,882 –83.

NFB filed its complaint in district court on January 22, 2014, seventy-one days after DOT issued the Final Rule. NFB sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 –706, for DOT's alleged failure to comply with the ACAA. NFB alleged that the 25 per cent accessibility requirement and three-year grace period violated the ACAA's ban on discrimination against disabled individuals and resulted from arbitrary and capricious decision-making. The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because the Final Rule is an “order” and 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) vests the court of appeals with exclusive jurisdiction of DOT orders. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. DOT , 78 F.Supp.3d 407, 414 (D.D.C. 2015). Although NFB filed its complaint seventy-one days after DOT issued the Final Rule—and, if construed to be a petition for review, was therefore time barred under the sixty-day filing deadline of section 46110(a) —the district court declined to dismiss the complaint and instead transferred the complaint to our court to determine whether the untimely filing was excusable. Id. at 416. NFB subsequently filed a notice of appeal on February 26, 2015, challenging the district court's no-jurisdiction conclusion. We construed the notice of appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus and consolidated the two petitions for review.

II. Analysis

NFB claims that a writ of mandamus should issue because the district court erred in its jurisdictional analysis. NFB further argues that, even if the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction, NFB's untimely filing should be excused for reasonable grounds under section 46110(a) due to its confusion over the appropriate forum to challenge DOT's Final Rule. On the merits, NFB asserts that we should either vacate the Rule because DOT failed to require that all future kiosks be accessible or remand the Rule for further review in light of other alleged flaws in DOT's decision-making process. We do not reach NFB's arguments on the merits because we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction of NFB's complaint and that reasonable grounds do not excuse NFB's untimely filing.

A.

NFB first requests that we issue a writ of mandamus because the district court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction of NFB's complaint. In reviewing a request for a writ of mandamus, “[t]he threshold question is whether the [d]istrict [c]ourt's ... ruling constituted legal error. If not, mandamus is of course inappropriate.” In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. , 756 F.3d 754, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “If the [d]istrict [c]ourt's ruling was erroneous,” however, we then determine “whether that error is the kind that justifies mandamus.” Id. at 756–57. Because we agree with DOT that the district court did not err in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, we need go no further.

Section 46110(a) provides that “a person disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued by the Secretary of Transportation ... may apply for review of the order by filing a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.” 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (emphasis added). Although section 46110(a) does not specify a finality requirement, we have interpreted section 46110(a) in light of the APA's definition of “order” at 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) to require that a DOT order must be final before it is appealable. See SecurityPoint Holdings, Inc. v. TSA , 769 F.3d 1184, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2014). We have not, however, determined whether a final rule issued by DOT should be considered an order under section 46110(a).

According to NFB, the “normal default rule,” Pet'rs' Br. 22 (quoting Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC , 714 F.3d 1329, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ), is that the district court is the appropriate forum for review of agency rulemaking unless there is an applicable direct-review statute that “specifically gives the court of appeals subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Watts v. SEC , 482 F.3d 501, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ). NFB then points to language from Safe Extensions, Inc. v. FAA , 509 F.3d 593, 598 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and from SecurityPoint to argue that we have previously relied on the APA to define “order” under section 46110(a). In NFB's view, because the APA both allegedly controls our interpretation of section 46110(a) and excludes rulemaking from its definition of “order,” section 46110(a) does not vest exclusive jurisdiction of DOT rulemaking review in the court of appeals. In response, DOT asserts that our recent decision in New York Republican State Committee v. SEC (NYRSC ), 799 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2015) —which interpreted a nearly identical direct-review provision of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b–13(a), to include rulemaking under “order,” see id. at 1129–30 —controls the case. We agree with DOT that NYRSC is dispositive.

Our precedent holding that “order” in certain direct-review statutes encompasses the review of rulemakings dates at least to our decision in Investment Company Institute v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System , 551 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Investment Co., we reviewed the direct-review provision of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. See id. at 1275–78. In light of intervening Supreme Court decisions, we abandoned our earlier approach to the scope of “order” in direct- review statutes, concluding that “ ‘order’ is interpreted to mean any agency action capable of review on the basis of the administrative record.” Id. at 1278. We further explained that the term should not be limited by the APA definition of “order” because it “has several frequently utilized meanings which vary in scope, and it is therefore not surprising that different sections of the same statute might use the word in different ways.” Id. ; see also City of Rochester v. Bond , 603 F.2d 927, 933 n. 26 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“[C]ourts sometimes have construed ‘order’ for purposes of special review statutes...