National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 86 C 7888.

897 F. Supp. 1047

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., and its women members and other women who use or may use the services of women's health centers that provide abortions; Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc., and Summit Women's Health Organization, Inc., on behalf of themselves and all other similarly-situated clinics, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph M. SCHEIDLER; Pro-Life Action League, Inc.; Randall A. Terry; Andrew Scholberg; Conrad Wojnar; Timothy Murphy; Monica Migliorino; Vital-Med Laboratories, Inc.; Project Life; and Operation Rescue, Defendants.

No. 86 C 7888.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

July 25, 1995.

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Fay Clayton, Susan Valentine, Judi A. Lamble, Sara N. Love, Robinson Curley & Clayton, P.C., Chicago, IL, Patricia Ireland, National Organization for Women, Inc., Washington, DC, Jack L. Block, Angela Im, Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., Chicago, IL, Miriam G. Bahcall, Rawn H. Reinhard, Dayla Khan, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, Chicago, IL, Alan M. Pollack, Pollack & Greene, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Thomas L. Brejcha, Abramson & Fox, Robert S. Harib, Chicago, IL, for defendants Joseph M. Scheidler, Timothy Murphy, Andrew Scholberg, and the Pro-Life Action League.

Lawrence M. Gavin, Bell Boyd & Lloyd, Chicago, IL, Jay Alan Sekulow, Walter M. Weber, American Center for Law & Justice, Washington, DC, Larry L. Crain, Brentwood, TN, Benjamin W. Bull, American Center for

Law & Justice, Phoenix, AZ, for defendants Randall A. Terry, Project Life and Operation Rescue.

Charles F. Redden, Mark D. Roth, Pretzel & Stouffer, Chtd., Chicago, IL, for defendant Vital-Med Laboratories.

Craig Parshall, The Rutherford Institute, Fredricksburg, VA, Philip King, Tribler & Orpett, Chicago, IL, for defendant Monica Migliorino.

Jennifer C. Neubauer, Lake Forest, IL, for defendant Conrad Wojnar.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COAR, District Judge.

                                 INDEX
Background ...............................................................1054
  I. Res Judicata ........................................................1056
     A.  Legal Standard for Res Judicata .................................1057
     B.  Applicability of Res Judicata to the Parties ....................1057
         1.  NOW .........................................................1057
         2.  Wojnar ......................................................1060
             a. Identity of the Parties ..................................1060
             b. Identity of Causes of Action .............................1060
             c. Final Judgment on the Merits .............................1060
 II. Supplemental, Ancillary, or Pendent Jurisdiction Over Vital-Med .....1061
     A.  Applicability of 28 U.S.C. ? 1367 ..........................1062
     B.  History of Supplemental Jurisdiction ............................1062
         1.  Application to Vital-Med ....................................1063
         2.  Application to Wojnar .......................................1064
III. Failure to State A Claim ............................................1064
     A.  Proximate Cause and Standing ....................................1065
         1.  Standing ....................................................1065
             a.  DWHO & Summit ...........................................1065
             b.  NOW .....................................................1067
         2.  Requirement of Predicate Act as Proximate Cause .............1070
     B.  Pleading Deficiencies ...........................................1072
         1.  Hobbs Act Pled ?€” Mandated Issue .......................1072
         2.  Pleading a RICO Conspiracy ..................................1074
         3.  Other Predicate Acts ........................................1078
             a.  Travel Act and State Law Extortion as Predicate Acts ....1078
             b.  Theft of Fetal Remains as Predicate Act .................1080
     C.  Availability of Injunctive Relief ...............................1081
 IV. First Amendment Concerns ............................................1083
     A.  Freedom of Speech ...............................................1083
  V. Constitutionality of RICO ...........................................1089
     A.  Vagueness .......................................................1089
     B.  Overbreadth .....................................................1089
 VI. Conclusion ..........................................................1091

Background

This nine-year-old case has a long and convoluted history, portions of which must be reviewed in order to understand the issues before the court. For a more detailed exposition of the facts and procedural history of this case, please refer to NOW v. Scheidler, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2958, 125 L.Ed.2d 659 (1993).

In 1986, plaintiffs National Organization for Women ("NOW"), and two women's health centers brought this action against various anti-abortion activists, anti-abortion organizations, and a pathology testing laboratory. They alleged that defendants conspired to drive out of business health centers that provide abortion services. Plaintiffs contended that defendants committed extortion, engaged in physical and verbal intimidation, destroyed property, orchestrated phone campaigns to tie up clinic phone lines, made false appointments at the clinics, and disrupted the clinics' relationship with their landlords ?€” all in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and sections 1962(a), (c) and (d) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). Plaintiffs also raised several pendent state claims.

On May 28, 1991, the district court dismissed the Second Amended Complaint. NOW v. Scheidler, 765 F.Supp. 937 (N.D.Ill. 1991). The court held the Sherman Act inapplicable to the conduct alleged in the complaint because defendants' conduct was incidental to a valid effort to influence governmental action and therefore immune. The court dismissed the ? 1962(a) RICO claim because defendants' receipt of donations from supporters was not income derived from racketeering. The ? 1962(c) RICO claim was dismissed because the court concluded that RICO requires that economic motive be alleged. The RICO conspiracy count was dismissed because all substantive RICO counts failed. The state law claims were also dismissed because the dismissal of the claims based on federal law destroyed the basis for jurisdiction over the state law claims. The plaintiffs appealed.

On June 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir.1992). The plaintiffs sought and obtained a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court limited to the question of whether a RICO violation required motivation by an economic purpose. NOW v. Scheidler, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2958, 125 L.Ed.2d 659 (1993).

On January 24, 1994, the Supreme Court reversed. NOW v. Scheidler, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994). The Court held that RICO does not require proof that either the alleged racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic purpose. In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter emphasized that although the First Amendment does not require reading an economic motive into the unambiguous RICO statute, legitimate free speech issues may be implicated in this case. Justice Souter advised that those concerns should be addressed as they arise. The defendants petitioned for a rehearing, which was denied on March 21, 1994. NOW v. Scheidler, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1340, 127 L.Ed.2d 688 (1994).

On October 3, 1994, in an unpublished opinion, the Seventh Circuit recapitulated the Supreme Court's opinion. The Court of Appeals directed the district court to address the issue of whether the predicate acts alleged in the complaint in fact violated the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. ? 1951). The court specifically reaffirmed its original dismissal of the Sherman Act count and RICO ? 1962(a). The court further stated:

The Supreme Court's decision reinstated count 3 (RICO ? 1962(c)) and count 4 (RICO ? 1962(d)). Counts five, six, and seven, which allege violations of state law, survive as well pursuant to the district court's supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. ? 1367.

Also on remand, if necessary, the district court should consider which of the defendants' activities, as alleged, are protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Scheidler, ___ U.S. at ___ n. 6, 114 S.Ct. at 806 n. 6. As Justice Souter pointed out in his concurring opinion, "even in a case where a RICO violation has been validly established, the First Amendment may limit the relief that can be granted against an organization otherwise engaging in protected expression." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 807 (Souter, J., concurring). This includes Hobbs Act extortion ?€” the sole RICO predicate act alleged by plaintiffs in both their complaint and their RICO Case Statement.

NOW v. Scheidler, 25 F.3d 1053, 1994 WL 196761 **2 (7th Cir.1994). The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Before the district court could comply with the mandate of the Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. On October 21, 1994, Judge Holderman granted plaintiffs' motion and ordered plaintiffs to file an updated RICO case statement (Tr. p. 31). The Third Amended Complaint (hereinafter the "Complaint") has four counts.

Count I of the Complaint is brought by all plaintiffs¹ and alleges violations against all defendants except Vital-Med Laboratories, Inc. ("Vital-Med").² Count I also alleges that the defendants violated RICO by participating in the Pro-Life Action Network ("P...