Navajo Nation v. San Juan County

929 F.3d 1270

NAVAJO NATION, a federally recognized Indian tribe; Lorena Atene; Tommy Rock; Harrison Hudgins, a/k/a Harrison Hutchins; Wilfred Jones ; Elsie Billie; Herman Farley, Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Utah governmental subdivision, Defendant - Appellant.

City of Blanding, Utah, Amicus Curiae.

No. 18-4005

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

FILED July 16, 2019

Jesse C. Trentadue (Carl F. Huefner, Michael W. Homer, and Britton R. Butterfield with him on the briefs), Suitter Axland, PLLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant-appellant San Juan County.

Paul Spruhan (Ethel Branch, Attorney General, with him on the brief), Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock, Arizona, for plaintiff-appellee Navajo Nation.

Steven Boos, Maynes, Bradford, Shipps & Sheftel, LLP, Durango, Colorado (Maya Kane, Maynes, Bradford, Shipps & Sheftel, LLP, Durango, Colorado, and Eric Swenson, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellees Lorena Atene, Tommy Rock, Harrison Hudgins, Wilfred Jones, Elsie Billie, and Herman Farley.

R. Blake Hamilton, Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, for amicus curiae City of Blanding, Utah.

Before BRISCOE, MORITZ, and EID, Circuit Judges.

MORITZ, Circuit Judge.

In 2012, the Navajo Nation and several of its individual members (collectively, the Navajo Nation) sued San Juan County, alleging that the election districts for both the school board and the county commission violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301 –14 (transferred from 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 – 1973o ). The district court denied the county’s motion to dismiss, found that the election districts violated the Equal Protection Clause, and awarded summary judgment to the Navajo Nation. It later rejected the county’s proposed remedial redistricting plan because it concluded the redrawn districts again violated the Equal Protection Clause. The district court then appointed a special master to develop a proposed remedial redistricting plan, directed the county to adopt that remedial plan, and ordered the county to hold special elections based on that plan in November 2018.

On appeal, the county challenges each of the district court’s decisions. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

Background

San Juan County occupies the southeastern corner of Utah. Geographically, it’s the largest county in the state. The county seat is Monticello, and the county’s largest city is Blanding. Approximately 52% of the county’s population is Native American. Most Native American residents live in the southern portion of the county, on the Navajo Nation Reservation; the northern portion of the county contains "most of the non-Hispanic [w]hite population." App. vol. 43, 8420. As of the 2010 census, 14,746 people lived in the county.

A three-member county commission governs the county. Until the early 1980s, the county elected its commissioners in at-large elections. But in 1983, the United States sued the county, alleging that the at-large elections violated the Constitution and § 2 of the VRA because they denied Native American residents "an equal opportunity to participate in the [c]ounty political process and to elect candidates of their choice."¹ App. vol. 2, 277. In its complaint, the United States pointed out that although the county had a substantial Native American population, it had never elected a Native American representative to the county commission.²

Rather than going to trial, the county entered into a consent decree with the United States. The district court accepted the parties’ agreement and entered a settlement order. The settlement order acknowledged that the county’s at-large election system "fail[ed] to comply fully with the requirements of [§] 2 of the [VRA]." Id. at 223. As such, it provided that the county would adopt "fairly drawn single[-]member districts." Id.

Accordingly, the county established three single-member county-commission districts: Districts 1, 2, and 3. A former county official who helped design the districts "testified that she understood that District [3] ‘was to be heavily loaded with Navajo voters.’ " App. vol. 49, 9836 (quoting App. vol. 30, 5580). Thus, when the county first created the single-member districts in the 1980s, Native Americans made up 88% of District 3’s population. And in the years since the county adopted single-member districts, "the commissioners elected from Districts [1] and [2] have been white, and the commissioners elected from District [3] have been Native American." App. vol. 3, 450. As the district court put it, "[i]n this way, the [c]ounty moved from a system that historically denied representation to a minority group to one that allowed th[e] group greater participation in the political process." App. vol. 49, 9834.

In 2011, the Navajo Nation asked the county to redraw the county-commission districts in response to the 2010 census. It argued that District 3, which was now over 92% Native American, had "an inordinately large population of Native Americans." App. vol. 3, 450. The county declined to change District 3’s boundaries, and it made only a few small changes to Districts 1 and 2 to equalize the population of those districts. In response, the Navajo Nation brought this action against the county in federal district court. The Navajo Nation alleged that the boundaries of the county-commission districts, specifically the boundaries of District 3, were unconstitutionally based on race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Additionally, the Navajo Nation challenged the constitutionality of the county’s school-board districts. By state law, the school board has "five members, each elected from a single[-]member district." App. vol. 43, 8344; see also Utah Code Ann. § 20A-14-202(1)(a), (h). As of the 2010 census, the total population deviation among the five school-board districts was around 38%. In other words, the districts weren’t equally populated; some districts contained substantially more voters than other districts. The Navajo Nation contended that this high population deviation resulted in vote dilution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee of one person, one vote. See Avery v. Midland Cty. , 390 U.S. 474, 478, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45 (1968) (explaining that right to vote "is infringed when legislators are elected from districts of substantially unequal population").³

The county moved to dismiss the Navajo Nation’s claim related to the county-commission districts, arguing that it was an impermissible collateral attack on the 1984 consent decree and settlement order. It also argued that the United States was an indispensable party to any litigation related to the consent decree and settlement order. The district court disagreed and denied the county’s motion.⁴

The parties then cross-moved for summary judgment on the Navajo Nation’s two Equal Protection claims: (1) that District 3 of the county-commission districts was unconstitutionally based on race; and (2) that the population deviation among the school-board districts caused unconstitutional (although not race-related) vote dilution. The district court found that both the school-board and county-commission districts violated the Equal Protection Clause and were therefore unconstitutional. Accordingly, it awarded summary judgment to the Navajo Nation on both claims.

The district court then ordered the county to develop a remedial redistricting plan.⁵ See Large v. Fremont Cty. , 670 F.3d 1133, 1138 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that when court declares election districts unconstitutional, it should allow legislature to create new plan). It stated that "it would adopt [the county]’s proposed remedial plan[ ] if [the plan] cured the identified violations and [was] otherwise legally sound." App. vol. 54, 10825–26; see also Large , 670 F.3d at 1138 (noting that district court should adopt legislature’s remedial plan "unless it, too, is challenged and found to violate the Constitution" (quoting Wise v. Lipscomb , 437 U.S. 535, 540, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978) (plurality opinion))).

After the county submitted its proposed remedial redistricting plan, the district court found that the remedial plan was also unconstitutional. Specifically, it found that some districts in the remedial plan were based on race and didn’t survive strict scrutiny. So the district court rejected the county’s plan and appointed a special master. After the special master created several proposed redistricting plans, the district court conducted two public hearings and accepted input from the parties. The special master then drafted a final plan, and the district court ordered the county to adopt it. The district court further ordered the county to hold special elections utilizing the new districts in November 2018.

The county appeals.

Analysis

The county raises five challenges; we examine each in turn. We first address the county’s argument that the district court erred in denying its motion to dismiss the Navajo Nation’s claim relating to the 2011 county-commission districts. Second, we consider whether the district court erred when it ruled that the county lacked a compelling interest to justify the racially drawn boundaries of county-commission District 3. Third, we review the county’s assertion that the district court erred in rejecting the county’s justifications for the population deviation in the 1992 school-board districts. Fourth, we ask whether the district court erred in finding that the county’s proposed remedial redistricting plan was predominantly based on race and failed to satisfy strict scrutiny. Last, we consider whether, as the county contends, the district court erroneously ordered the county to adopt the special master’s remedial redistricting plan.⁶

I. The County’s Motion to Dismiss

The county first argues that the district court erred in...