Navarro v. Herndon

MARIO NAVARRO, Plaintiff, v. DEBRA HERNDON, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:09-cv-1878 KJM KJN P

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 25, 2016

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 165.) After carefully reviewing the record, the undersigned recommends that defendants' motion be granted in part and denied in part.

II. Procedural Background

This action proceeds on the amended complaint filed August 10, 2010. (ECF No. 24.) On November 19, 2010, defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that some claims were barred by the statute of limitations and on the grounds that some claims failed to state claims upon which relief may be granted. (ECF No. 38.) On August 24, 2011, the undersigned recommended that defendants' motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 78.) On September 30, 2011, the Honorable Kimberly J. Mueller adopted the findings and recommendations in part. (ECF No. 79.) Judge Mueller ordered that this action shall proceed on plaintiff's First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against defendants Kernan, Walker, Baxter, Baker, Sclafani and Morrow. (Id.) Judge Mueller identified an issue not addressed in the findings and recommendations: how the involvement of defendants O'Brian and Grannis in denying the grievances plaintiff identified in the complaint violated plaintiff's right to access the courts. (Id.) Judge Mueller referred consideration of the access to the courts claim against defendants O'Brian and Grannis to the undersigned. (Id.)

On December 7, 2012, the undersigned issued supplemental findings and recommendations finding that this action should proceed on plaintiff's denial of access to the courts claims against defendants Grannis and O'Brian. (ECF No. 84.) On March 26, 2013, Judge Mueller adopted the December 7, 2012 supplemental findings and recommendations. (ECF No. 89.)

On May 13, 2014, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on grounds that plaintiff's claims were not administratively exhausted. (ECF No. 147.) On February 9, 2015, the undersigned recommended that defendants' motion be denied. (ECF No. 154.) On March 19, 2015, Judge Mueller adopted the February 9, 2015 findings and recommendations. (ECF No. 156.)

On May 29, 2015, defendants filed the pending summary judgment motion. (ECF No. 165.) In support of the motion, defendants filed 192 pages of exhibits. (ECF No. 165-3.) On September 21, 2015, plaintiff filed his opposition (ECF No. 171) as well as 1384 pages of exhibits. (ECF Nos. 172, 173.) On December 3, 2015, defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 180.)

III. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56 is met. "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying thoseportions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

"Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's notes to 2010 amendments (recognizing that "a party who does not have the trial burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact"). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323.

Consequently, if the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of such a factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that such a dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436(9th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted).

By contemporaneous notice provided on September 13, 2010 (ECF No. 28), plaintiff was advised of the requirements for opposing a motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

IV. Plaintiff's Claims

This action proceeds on plaintiff's first amended complaint against defendants Kernan, Walker, Grannis, O'Brian, Baxter, Baker, Sclafani and Morrow. (ECF No. 24.)

Plaintiff alleges that he was housed in administrative segregation ("ad seg") at California State Prison-Sacramento ("CSP-Sac") for 309 days, from May 4, 2005, until plaintiff's transfer to California State Prison-Lancaster ("CSP-LAC") on March 9, 2006. Plaintiff alleges five claims in connection with his placement in and retention in ad seg. First, plaintiff alleges that he was denied his right to due process with regard to the decisions to place him in and to retain him in ad seg pending his transfer to CSP-LAC. Second, plaintiff alleges that the fact and continuation of his ad seg detention violated the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff also alleges that the physical conditions of ad seg violated the Eighth Amendment. Third, plaintiff alleges that he was denied his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freely exercise his religion while housed in ad seg. Fourth, plaintiff alleges that he was denied his right to access the court while housed in ad seg. Fifth, plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against for filing administrative grievances while housed in ad seg. The undersigned addresses these claims separately herein.

After reviewing the pleadings, the undersigned has discovered that plaintiff was housed in three different ad seg units during the relevant time period.¹ From May 4, 2005, through November 14, 2005, plaintiff was housed in B Facility, Building 1. (Baker declaration, ¶ 7.) From November 14, 2005 through December 27, 2005, plaintiff was housed in B Facility, Building 2. (Id.) From December 27, 2005 through March 8, 2006, plaintiff was housed in A Facility, Building 5. (Id.) Plaintiff's claims do not distinguish between these ad seg units. In the discussion of plaintiff's claims herein, where relevant, the undersigned...