O'Neal v. Camp

ALBERT O'NEAL, JR. v. JOHN CAMP, ET AL.

Civil Action No. 21-0555

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Monroe Division

July 16, 2021

SECTION P

TERRY A. DOUGHTY, JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Kayla Dye McClusky, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Albert O'Neal, Jr., a prisoner at Richland Parish Detention Center proceeding pro se, filed this proceeding on approximately March 3, 2021, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He names the following defendants: Lieutenant John Camp Assistant Warden Frank Dear, Kilee Miller, Sergeant Trey Boone, Officer Sherman Watkins, and Warden Patricia Miller.^[1]

For reasons that follow, the Court should retain Plaintiff's claims against Lieutenant Camp, Officer Sherman Watkins, and Sergeant Trey Boone.^[2] The Court should dismiss Plaintiff's remaining claims, including his request for acquittal and release from confinement.

Background

Plaintiff alleges that another inmate, Dennis Lewis, obtained his PIN code-which is his social security number-that Plaintiff uses to access a kiosk machine and the telephone by “peeping” over Plaintiff's shoulder when he input the code. [doc. # 1, p. 2]. He maintains that other inmates can see his code when he uses it because the kiosk and telephone lack privacy barriers. Id. at 3. Plaintiff claims that he asked Assistant Warden Frank Dear Kilee Miller, and Warden Miller to change his code, but they did not. Id.

On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff caught Dennis Lewis “logged in to [Plaintiff's] messages.” Id. Then Lewis attacked Plaintiff, knocking him unconscious and severely beating him. Id. Plaintiff was rushed to a hospital in Shreveport, Louisiana, where a physician performed surgery and repaired Plaintiff's shattered cheekbone with a plate and ten screws. Id.

Plaintiff claims that when he returned from the hospital on January 17 2021, he knocked on his cell door and requested a nurse to evaluate his pain. [doc. #s 1, p. 4; 5, p. 3]. Lieutenant Camp “opened the cell door in a rage and began choking [Plaintiff] until [Plaintiff] lost consciousness.” [doc. # 9, p. 5]. Camp placed his hands around Plaintiff's throat, lifting Plaintiff's “feet off the floor” and causing Plaintiff to “lose consciousness for a few seconds.” [doc. #s 5, p. 3; 9, p. 2]. Plaintiff did not provoke Camp. Id. Camp later apologized. [doc. # 9, p. 2].

Plaintiff claims that Sergeant Trey Boone and Officer Sherman Watkins failed to protect him from Camp's use of force. Id. at 3. He alleges that Boone witnessed Camp choking him but “failed to both prevent and later stop [Camp].” Id. He alleges that he “called out to [Watkins] for help during the attack[, ]” but Watkins failed to prevent or stop Camp from choking him. Id.

Officials then returned Plaintiff to the same dormitory where Lewis beat him. [doc. # 1, p. 3]. Plaintiff maintains that his life is in danger. Id.

Plaintiff faults Assistant Warden Frank Dear, Kilee Miller, and Warden Patricia Miller for both attacks, claiming that the incidents “may have been avoided” if Dear, Miller, and Warden Miller were not negligent in failing to change his code. [doc. # 9, pp. 2-5].

Plaintiff asks the Court to (1) acquit him of his pending charges and order his release from confinement and (2) to award $1, 000, 000.00 for his pain and suffering. Id. at 5.

Law and Analysis

1. Preliminary Screening

As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, Plaintiff's complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.^[3] See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Section 1915A(b) provides for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. Courts are also afforded the unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id.

A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, supra. A well-pled complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra.

In making this determination, the court must assume that all of the plaintiff's factual allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. “[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp, 632 F.3d 148, 152-53 (5th Cir. 2010). Courts are “not free to speculate that the plaintiff ‘might' be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint.” Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).

A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court may dismiss a prisoner's civil rights complaint as frivolous based upon the complaint and exhibits alone. Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986).

“To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the standard above, a “[S]ection 1983 complaint must state specific facts, not simply legal and constitutional conclusions.” Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).

2. Habeas Corpus

Plaintiff seeks acquittal and release from incarceration. Although Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he challenges the very fact and duration of his physical imprisonment. Plaintiff should, after he exhausts his state court remedies, pursue his request for immediate release from custody through a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 (1973) (“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”); Stringer v. Williams, 161 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1998) (construing a request for release from pending state criminal proceedings as a habeas petition under Section 2241). Accordingly, the Court should deny Plaintiff's request for acquittal and release.

The undersigned again cautions that Plaintiff must first exhaust his available state court remedies before seeking habeas relief in this Court. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 477 (observing that if “habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy . . . a plaintiff cannot seek the intervention of a federal court until he has first sought and been denied relief in the state courts, if a state remedy is available and adequate.”).^[4] Plaintiff is further cautioned that the Court may abstain, under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), or Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225, if Plaintiff asks the Court to interfere with his ongoing criminal prosecution.^[5] See Gibson v. Orleans Par. Sheriff, 2014 WL 1066987, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2014) (affirming abstention under Younger v. Harris, where a petitioner sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241).

3. Negligence

Plaintiff claims that Assistant Warden Frank Dear, Kilee Miller, and Warden Patricia Miller were negligent in failing to change his code and that as a result Dennis Lewis attacked him and Lieutenant Camp battered him. [doc. # 9, pp. 2-4]. Plaintiff adds, “Both incidents may have been avoided if my password was changed.” Id. at 5.

To prevail under a negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove five elements:

(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element);

(2) the defendant failed to conform his conduct to the appropriate standard (the breach of duty element);

(3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element);

(4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of liability or

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