Nealey v. University Health Services, Inc.

114 F.Supp.2d 1358

Patricia P. NEALEY, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY HEALTH SERVICES, INC., d/b/a University Hospital; and Medical Center of Central Georgia, Inc., formerly d/b/a CareSouth Home Care, Defendants.

No. CIV.A. CV199-048.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division.

June 21, 2000.

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John Michael Brown, Augusta, GA, Amy S. Gellins, Athens, GA, for Patricia P. Nealey, plaintiffs.

Raymond G. Chadwick, Jr., Laurel L. Payne, Kilpatrick Stockton, LLP, Augusta, GA, Sharon Parker Morgan, Joseph M. Freeman, Laura K. Johnson, Victor A. Cavanaugh, Elarbee Thompson & Trapnell, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Roy Harold Meeks, Pursley, Howell, Lowery & Meeks, Atlanta, GA, for University Health Services, Inc., defendants.

ORDER

ALAIMO, District Judge.

Plaintiff brought suit against both the Medical Center of Central Georgia, Inc. ("MCCG"), and University Health Services ("UHS") under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), alleging racial discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment, her compensation, failure to promote, and retaliatory discharge. MCCG, the sole remaining defendant in the above-captioned action, has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims.¹ After careful consideration of the parties' briefs and their attachments thereto, and for the reasons stated below, the Court will DENY Defendant's motion.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that a movant is entitled to summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ..." The Federal Rules mandate granting of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute regarding even a material issue, however, must be "`genuine;' that is, the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

Evidence adduced in summary judgment proceedings must be evaluated in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655, 656 (11th Cir.1983). However, "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (internal citations omitted). All reasonable inferences must be in favor of the party opposing the motion. Carlin Communication, Inc. v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1986). In determining whether an inference is reasonable, the court must look to "the record as a whole." Id. at 1360. Inferences that are speculative and conjectural, however, are not reasonable. Chapman v. American Cyanamid Co., 861 F.2d 1515, 1518 (11th Cir.1988); Lee v. Celotex Corporation, 764 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir.1985). Once a moving party has met its burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The party opposed to the summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings. Rather, its responses ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir.1990).

II. FACTS

Plaintiff is an African-American female nurse who works in the field of home health care. Her tenure at the home health care facility in Warrenton, Georgia (the "Warrenton facility") — the site of the alleged unlawful employment practices that gave rise to this suit — began in May, 1993. At that time the facility was owned by Healthmaster, a company unrelated to any of the parties in this litigation. MCCG purchased the Warrenton facility in November, 1995, as part of Healthmaster's Chapter 11 reorganization. Throughout the period in which MCCG owned the Warrenton facility, management and administrative services were provided by CareSouth, which, at that time, was an affiliate of MCCG.² MCCG continued to own the Warrenton facility until it was sold to UHS on October 31, 1996, pursuant to the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement ("APA") executed solely between MCCG and UHS. On the same day that UHS agreed to purchase the Warrenton facility from MCCG, it also simultaneously entered into a Home Health Agency Management Agreement ("HHAMA") with CareSouth under the terms of which CareSouth agreed to provide management and administrative services to the Warrenton facility. Plaintiff continued to work as a nurse in the Warrenton facility until June 6, 1997, when UHS terminated her employment. Plaintiff, however, was subsequently reinstated to her position, pursuant to the terms of a settlement with UHS that resolved her § 1981 and Title VII claims against that defendant.

During Plaintiff's tenure at the Warrenton facility, Martha Hemphill was the administrator in charge until October of 1996. Hemphill was succeeded by Nellie Ramage as administrator in charge of the Thomson Division, beginning in November of 1996. They supervised Nealey's performance of her job-related duties as well as that of other MCCG employees who worked in MCCG's Thomson Division. Hemphill was also responsible for determining employees' salaries, as well as hiring, firing, and promotion decisions. Both Hemphill and Ramage were employees of CareSouth, MCCG's "sister company."

Hemphill, along with her friend and assistant, Edith Allen, frequently used racial slurs to describe African-American employees of MCCG, including referring to them as "niggers." One employee claimed to have heard Hemphill use the term "nigger" over 20 times. (Pessante Dep., Ex. 3 at 490). Hemphill also made other derogatory statements about African-American employees, including "you know how they all are, you can't get them to do anything," after a conversation with Plaintiff in which the latter asked permission for leave to take her father (who was then dying of cancer) to Alabama for treatment. (Rocker Dep. at 23).

Hemphill also engaged in nepotism to the detriment of Juanita Appling, an African-American file clerk whom she passed over for a promotion to office manager in favor of Becky Hughes, Hemphill's sister, despite a general policy of promoting employees to fill open positions whenever feasible instead of recruiting outsiders.³ (Id., Ex. 8 at 28). Hemphill and Allen also justified their decision not to consider Appling for this position in racial terms, saying that "You know how they are, you know she couldn't handle that job." (Rocker⁴ Dep. at 57).

Hemphill and Allen also made a habit of requesting African-American Home Health Aides ("HHAs") to perform personal services, such as cleaning their homes or ironing their clothes. On at least one occasion, Hemphill changed the schedule of an HHA to allow her to clean Hemphill's home during work hours. Of the sixty HHAs under Hemphill's supervision, only three were white. (Pessante Dep., Ex. 3 at 502). No white staff of any level was ever asked to go to Hemphill's or Allen's home to clean house. (Rocker Dep. at 26). Black employees, however, according to Rocker, "were automatically handicapped and seen as subservient." (Id.).

As a result of Hemphill's abusive management style, a group of employees working out of MCCG's Thomson Division sent a fax on September 23, 1996, to Ronald Connors, President of CareSouth, to complain about the conduct of Hemphill and Allen, as well as other supervisory personnel. (Pessante Dep., Ex. 1). Although Plaintiff was not one of the seven signatories of that fax, some of the discriminatory conduct which she challenges in this lawsuit were mentioned in the grievance. (Id. at 2, § II ¶¶ 2, 4, 5). As a result of this complaint, an investigation was initiated that ultimately led to Hemphill and Allen agreeing to tender their resignations in early October, 1996, in exchange for signing confidentiality agreements with CareSouth.

Nelle Ramage succeeded to Hemphill's position by October 31, 1996, and she continued in this position even after MCCG sold this facility to UHS under the terms of the HHAMA between UHS and CareSouth. Thus, Plaintiff continued to be managed by CareSouth even after MCCG ceased being her nominal employer.

Ramage was a long-time associate of Hemphill dating back to the days when they worked for Healthmaster. (Rocker Dep. at 41 and 47). According to Rocker, Ramage believed the employees who brought the grievance against Hemphill and Allen "were the enemy." (Id. at 40).

Plaintiff attributes her difficulties with Ramage to the fact that she filed an EEOC charge in September, 1996. Frances Harris, UHS' Employees Relations Specialist, testified in deposition that Ramage had mentioned that Plaintiff had filed an EEOC charge prior to the MCCG-UHS deal; that it bothered her; and, that she was "upset about the EEOC charge." (Harris Dep. at 28-31, 45). In late February, 1997, after a patient complaint was brought against Plaintiff, Ramage completed a written disciplinary action against Plaintiff without giving her an opportunity to explain her own version of...