Neel v. CRST Expedited, Inc.

EVE NEEL, Plaintiff, v. CRST EXPEDITED, INC., Defendant.

No. C18-98-LTS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION

March 3, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT WITNESS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 2

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................. 2

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS .............................................. 3

IV. RELEVANT FACTS ....................................................................... 6

A. CRST's Business Model .................................................................... 6

B. CRST's Policies Regarding Sexual Harassment and Retaliation .................... 6

C. Michael Anderson's Employment with CRST .......................................... 7

D. Neel's Employment with CRST ........................................................... 9

E. Neel's Allegations and CRST's Response ............................................... 9

V. DISCUSSION ................................................................................. 11

A. Sexual Harassment - Hostile Work Environment .................................... 12

1. CRST's Duty to Prevent and Remedy Sexual Harassment ...................... 14

a. CRST's Decision to Rehire Anderson ............................................. 16

b. CRST's Sexual Harassment Policies and Trainings ............................. 22

B. Retaliation .................................................................................. 25

VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 29

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before me on a motion (Doc. No. 37) for summary judgment and a motion (Doc. No. 40) to exclude expert report and testimony, both filed by defendant CRST Expedited, Inc. (CRST). Plaintiff Eve Neel has filed resistances (Doc. Nos. 41, 42) to both motions and requests oral argument. I find that oral argument is not necessary. See Local Rule 7(c).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Neel filed administrative complaints with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) on February 26, 2018, alleging that CRST engaged in sex discrimination. On July 12, 2018, both the EEOC and ICRC issued Right-to-Sue Letters. Neel then filed a complaint (Doc. No. 1) with this court on September 10, 2018, asserting claims of (1) sexual harassment, (2) retaliation and (3) aiding and abetting in discrimination against CRST, Karen Carlson and "other presently unknown defendants." Neel brought her claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.) and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (Iowa Code ch. 216). She invoked the court's federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, along with supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Following discovery, but before CRST filed its motion for summary judgment, Neel filed a motion (Doc. No. 36) to amend her complaint. The motion to amend was granted (Doc. No. 38). In her amended complaint (Doc. No. 39), Neel dropped all claims against individual defendants, leaving only the following claims against CRST:

Count I Hostile environment under federal law

Count II Hostile work environment under Iowa law

Count III Aiding and abetting in discrimination and retaliation under Iowa law

Count IV Retaliation under federal law

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Any party may move for summary judgment regarding all or any part of the claims asserted in a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

A material fact is one that "'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, "the substantive law will identify which facts are material." Id. Facts that are "critical" under the substantive law are material, while facts that are "irrelevant or unnecessary" are not. Id.

An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), or when "'a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party' on the question." Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Evidence that only provides "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, or evidence that is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, does not make an issue of material fact genuine.

As such, a genuine issue of material fact requires "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute" so as to "require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. The party moving for entry of summary judgment bears "the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue." Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate specific facts showing that thereis a genuine issue for trial. Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005). The nonmovant must show an alleged issue of fact is genuine and material as it relates to the substantive law. If a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim or defense with respect to which that party has the burden of proof, then the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

In determining if a genuine issue of material fact is present, I must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88. Further, I must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. However, "because we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we do not weigh the evidence or attempt to determine the credibility of the witnesses." Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2004). Instead, "the court's function is to determine whether a dispute about a material fact is genuine." Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996).

No unique summary judgment standards apply to employment discrimination cases. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (rejecting prior decisions that applied a "discrimination case exception" to the analysis of summary judgment motions). However, as another judge of this court explained, applying summary judgment standards to the motivation-intensive elements present in most employment discrimination cases is not a simple task:

Employment discrimination and retaliation, except in the rarest cases, are difficult to prove. They are perhaps more difficult to prove today—fifty years after the passage of the EPA, more than forty years after the passage of Title VII and the ADEA, more than twenty years after the passage of the ADA, and nearly two decades after the passage of the FMLA—than during the earlier evolution of these anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation statutes. Today's employers, even those with only a scintilla of sophistication, will neither admit discriminatory or retaliatory intent, nor leave a well-developed trail demonstrating it. See, e.g., Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1987). Indeed, the FifthCircuit Court of Appeals recognized more than thirty-five years ago, that "[a]s patently discriminatory practices become outlawed, those employers bent on pursuing a general policy declared illegal by Congressional mandate will undoubtedly devise more sophisticated methods to perpetuate discrimination among employees." Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971) (later relied on by the Supreme Court in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986), as one of the principal authorities supporting recognition of a cause of action for hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII).

My experience suggests the truth of that observation. Because adverse employment actions almost always involve a high degree of discretion, and most plaintiffs in employment discrimination and retaliation cases are at will, it is a simple task for employers to concoct plausible reasons for virtually any adverse employment action ranging from failure to hire to discharge. This is especially true, because the very best workers are seldom employment discrimination and retaliation plaintiffs due to sheer economics: Because the economic costs to the employer for discrimination or retaliation are proportional to the caliber of the employee, discrimination or retaliation against the best employees is the least cost effective. See, e.g., id. Rather, discrimination and retaliation plaintiffs tend to be those average or below-average workers—equally protected by Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, the EPA, or the FMLA—for whom plausible rationales for adverse employment actions are readily fabricated by employers with even a meager imagination. See, e.g., id. On the other hand, it is also relatively easy for disgruntled former employees to claim a protected basis under federal and state anti-discrimination laws as a reason for their discharge when

...