Neil v. St. Louis Cty.

688 S.W.3d 268

Lauren NEIL, et al., Appellants,

v.ST. LOUIS COUNTY, et al., Respondents.

No. ED 111474

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION FOUR.

Filed: April 9, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, No. 18SL-CC04457, Honorable Bruce F. Hilton, Judge

Daniel T. Ryan, 3008 Sutton Boulevard, Suite 100, Maplewood, Mo., 63143, Cyrus C. Dashtaki, Co-Counsel, 5205 Hampton Ave, Saint Louis, Mo. 63109, John S. Steward, Co-Counsel, 14824 Clayton Rd, Suite 24, Chesterfield, Mo. 63017, John G. Simon, Kevin M. Carnie, Co-Counsel, Patrick Mcphail, Co-Counsel, 800 Market Street, Suite 1700, Saint Louis, Mo. 63101, Christopher B. Bent, Co-Counsel, 111 Westport Plaza Drive, Ste 1025, St. Louis, Mo. 63146, for appellant.

Robert T. Plunkert, 100 South Fourth Street, Suite 400, St. Louis, Mo. 63102, Michael E. Hughes, Co-Counsel, 41 S. Central Ave, 9^th Floor, Clayton, Mo. 63105, Thomas J. Magee, Co-Counsel, 701 Market Street, Suite 1400, St. Louis, Mo. 63101, for respondent.

Thomas C. Clark II, P.J., James M. Dowd, J., and John P. Torbitzky, J.

Thomas C. Clark II, Presiding Judge

Introduction

This appeal arises after the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of St. Louis County police officers Alex Maloy and Mark Jakob ("Officers"), finding they were not negligent for pursuing Appellants’ decedent and driver Mikel Neil ("Neil") in a high-speed police chase that resulted in the death of Neil and his passenger ("T.W.") when the vehicle crashed into a tree. The trial court granted the Officers’ motion for summary judgment because the Officers did not owe a duty to the decedents, there was not any evidence of proximate causation and the Officers were protected from civil liability by the public duty doctrine and official immunity.

Neil’s family ("Appellants") now claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) the Officers owed a duty to decedent Neil under statutory and common law; (2) the Officers proximately caused decedent’s death by conducting an illegal Precision Immobilization Technique ("PIT") maneuver where the police vehicle struck the decedent’s vehicle from behind and by failing to cease the pursuit; and (3) official immunity and the public duty doctrine are inapplicable to the Officers because they were driving in a non-emergency situation and they acted with bad faith or malice.

We affirm because the Officers did not owe a duty to decedent, a fleeing motorist, under either statutory or common law.

Background

On the evening of August 10, 2018, Officers Maloy and Jakob saw a silver 2003 Hyundai Elantra, driven by Neil, run a red light when turning left onto Airport Road in St. Louis County. The Officers were on duty but were traveling outside their specifically assigned patrol area. As the driver of the marked police vehicle, Officer Maloy turned on the emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop, but did not activate the siren. Neil did not stop his vehicle and instead began, driving erratically. The Officers commenced pursuit, however they violated St. Louis County police policy because they did not inform dispatch of their decision. They followed as Neil sped through traffic signals, weaved in and out of traffic and drove at speeds up to 90 miles per hour ("mph") which exceeded the 35-mph speed limit posted on Airport Road.

As the vehicle neared Tyndall Drive, Neil swerved into oncoming traffic, forcing other drivers to swerve out of his path before crashing into a tree. The parties dispute whether Officer Maloy purposefully hit Neil’s Elantra from behind in what is commonly referred to as a PIT maneuver, an action preceding the crash. The entire pursuit lasted approximately forty seconds. After the crash, Officer Maloy turned off the emergency lights and continued to drive past the Elantra, through the debris field, without rendering aid. Neil and his passenger died at the scene from blunt trauma. The medical examiner revealed that at the time of the accident Neil was intoxicated, testing positive for fentanyl and cocaine.

Neil’s daughters, Lauren and M.N., brought a wrongful death action in the circuit court against Officers Jakob and Maloy individually, and against their employer, St. Louis County, under a theory of respondeat superior. Their petition alleged that the defendants violated their duty to operate the police cruiser or the emergency vehicle with the highest degree of care and their negligent conduct during the pursuit caused their father’s death. The Officers and the County both moved for summary judgment on the basis that the Officers did not owe a duty to the decedent and that plaintiffs cannot prove that the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of decedent’s injuries. The Officers further argued that their actions were protected by official immunity and the public duty doctrine. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Neil’s family appeals.

Standard of Review

[1–6] Our review of summary judgment is de novo. Kinnaman-Carsan v. Westpart Ins. Corp., 283 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Mo. banc 2009) (citing Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Mo. banc 2008)). We apply "the same criteria as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment was proper." Bowden v. Am. Modern Home Ins. Co., 658 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022). Thus, we do not defer to the trial court’s order granting summary judgment. Barry Harbor Hames Ass’n v. Ortega, 105 S.W.3d 903, 906 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003). Rather, "[s]ummary judgment will be upheld on appeal if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and no genuine issues of material fact exist." Cowin v. Shelter Mutual Ins. Co., 460 S.W.3d 76, 77 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment when she "shows facts that negate any one of the necessary elements of the plaintiff’s claim." Blackwell Motors, Inc. v. Manheim Servs. Corp., 529 S.W.3d 367, 379 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). We review the record "in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered, and that party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record." Walsh v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 662 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (quoting Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Mo. banc 2020)).

Discussion

[7] In their first point on appeal, Appellants assert that the Officers owed a statutory and common law duty of care to decedent. We disagree and find Point I dispositive. This case presents an issue of first impression for Missouri courts, whether police officers owe a duty of care to fleeing motorists. "The issue of whether a defendant had a duty of care to protect a decedent from injury under the circumstances of a given case is ‘purely a question of law’ to be decided by a court." Scales v. Whitaker, 615 S.W.3d 425, 431 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (internal quotation omitted).

[8] In order to prevail in an action for negligence under these circumstances, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff’s decedent; (2) the defendant breached that duty; and (3) the defendant’s breach proximately caused decedent’s injury. Wieland v. Owner-Operator Services, Inc., 540 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Mo. banc 2018). Therefore, whether Appellants can overcome summary judgment hinges on their ability to first establish that the Officers owed decedent, a fleeing motorist, a duty of care. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that such a duty does not exist.

I. Statutory Duty

[9] First, Appellants argue that law enforcement officers engaged in vehicular pursuit owe a duty of care to the fleeing motorist pursuant to section 300.100,¹ which states that drivers of authorized emergency vehicles have "the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons." Appellants urge that we cannot read "all persons" to mean "all persons except fleeing suspects" without eviscerating the plain language of the statute and assuming the legislature made a mistake. We disagree and hold that to interpret section 300.100 as Appellants suggest would lead to an unreasonable result and contradict the legislature’s intended effort to safeguard the best interests of the general public. See State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 508 (Mo. banc 2011). To conclude otherwise, fleeing motorists would take off at high rates of speed to avoid police apprehension safe in the knowledge that the legislature has insured them against pursuing law enforcement while law enforcement must risk civil liability to the fleeing motorist or cease pursuit and permit wrongdoers to escape. This is an untenable proposition and one that we cannot endorse. We find support for our holding in the decisions of sister states interpreting similar statutory language and finding that it does not create a duty of care to fleeing motorists.

[10–12] "Determinations regarding issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo review." Fox v. State, 640 S.W.3d 744, 757 (Mo. banc 2022) (citing Holmes v. Steelman, 624 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Mo. banc 2021)). "When interpreting statutes, [we] must ascertain the intent of the legislature by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms and give effect to that intent if possible." Wilmoth v. Dir. of Revenue, 669 S.W.3d 102, 110 (Mo. banc 2023) (quoting Cosby v. Treasurer of Mo., 579 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Mo. banc 2019)). However, "[s]tatutes cannot be interpreted in ways that yield unreasonable or absurd results, and it is assumed that the legislature’s enactment of a statute is meant to serve the best interests and welfare of the general public." State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 508 (Mo. banc 2011).

[13–16] "In interpreting a uniform act, decisions from other states may provide guidance." Schutter v. Seibold, 632 S.W.3d 820, 829 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (citing Curtis v. James, 459 S.W.3d 471, 475 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015)). As this is a case of first impression, "it is instructive to examine cases from other...