O'Neill v. Adams Cnty. Jail

1

DAMION O'NEILL, Plaintiff, v. ADAMS COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-200

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division, Cincinnati

May 6, 2024

District Judge Douglas R. Cole

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

ORDER AND SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is currently before the Court for an initial screen of pro se Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 20) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

A. Background

On October 5, 2023, the Undersigned found that removal of this action by the Defendants from the Adams County Court of Common Pleas was proper. (Doc. 12, at PageID 41-42). The Court then screened Plaintiff's initial Complaint (Doc 2), as amended (Doc. 11), pursuant to the PLRA, and recommended that the Complaint be dismissed with leave to amend. (Doc. 12, at PageID 48). That Order and Report and Recommendation remains pending before the District Judge.

In the October 5, 2023 Order and Report and Recommendation, the Court noted, in relevant part:

In his second amended complaint, plaintiff should name as a defendant any person he contends is actually and personally responsible for the alleged violation of his rights. See Pineda v. Hamilton Cty., Ohio, 977 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (“[A] § 1983 plaintiff generally must prove both that a defendant was personally at fault and that the defendant's culpable conduct (not somebody else's) caused the injury.”). Plaintiff should also identify the relief he seeks. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(3).

(Id.).

Plaintiff then filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 15), which superseded his previous Complaint for all purposes. See In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litigation, 731 F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir. 2013). Although Plaintiff partially complied with the Court's direction to name “as a defendant any person he contends is actually and personally responsible for the alleged violation of his rights” (Doc. 12, at PageID 48), several deficiencies remained.

On January 29, 2024, the Court entered a Deficiency Order directing Plaintiff to file a Third Amended Complaint in accordance with the standards set forth in the Order. The Court notified Plaintiff that, should he opt not to file a Third Amended Complaint, the Court would screen the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) as submitted to determine whether the Complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

On February 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 20). Defendants filed an Answer on March 13, 2024 (Doc. 21). The Court will now proceed sua sponte to review the Third Amended Complaint under the standards set forth in § 1915A(b).^[1] Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint

A. Legal Standard

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).

Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under, in relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).

B. Allegations

Plaintiff alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Defendants Adams County Sheriff Kinney Rogers, Adams County Jail (“Jail”) Administrator Lt. Hayslip, and Jail employees “Paul,” “Aemeont,” Mike Shamblin, “Big John,” Mike Perigo, and Unknown Jane Doe Nurse (collectively referred to as “Defendants”) violated his rights while he was a pretrial detainee at the Jail. (Doc. 20).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sheriff Rogers is responsible for his employees, the Jail, and the administration of the Jail. (Doc. 20, at PageID 80). Plaintiff further alleges that Rogers “expos[ed] Plaintiff to conditions of confinement that posed a substantial risk of serious harm as to the structurally unsafe facility, and discrimination.” (Id.). Additionally, without factual enhancement, Plaintiff alleges that Rogers “knew that inmates housed in the [J]ail were subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement, and prior to this action the Defendants disregarded the excessive risk to inmate health and safety[.]” (Id., at PageID 80).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hayslip was the “Jail Administrator and [S]upervisor of Jail Operations.” (Doc. 20, at PageID 80-81). Plaintiff alleges that Hayslip “ha[d] personal knowledge of the various violations against this plaintiff and was indifferent when misconduct was brought to his attention.” (Id. at PageID 81).

Plaintiff further alleges that, when he arrived at the Jail, Defendants Paul and Aemeont questioned him about “his religious accommodations” and ethnic status. (Doc. 20, at PageID 83). Paul and Aemeont then allegedly reported Plaintiff's answers to Defendant Hayslip. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that, after he was booked into the Jail, Defendants Paul, Aemeont, and Hayslip placed him in an isolation cell, where he remained for 264 days until his transfer to state custody. (Id. at PageID 82-83). Plaintiff contends that he was housed in isolation “as a direct means of discrimination, due to his ethnic and religious culture.” (Id. at PageID 83). Plaintiff further asserts that “at no time” while he was in isolation “would any of the Defendants provide [him] with sanitary eating utensils or the ability to meet all hygiene needs, i.e., shaving, haircuts, toothpaste, toilet paper etc.” (Id. at PageID 83-84). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that he was “singled out” by Defendants Hayslip and Unknown Jane Doe Nurse and questioned about which mosque he attended and which Islamic sect he belonged to. (Id. at PageID 84).

Plaintiff alleges that he “feared retribution” because Defendant Hayslip denied him access to a Qur'an and Islamic religious services, and Defendants Paul, Aemeont, Big John, Shamblin, and Perigo constantly searched him and denied him pencils and pens to write and file complaints to other entities. (Doc. 20, at PageID 84). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Hayslip, Paul, and Aemeont instructed him that he could only attend Christian services. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that between April 15 and 18, 2022,^[2] Defendant Perigo denied him a meal tray. (Doc. 20, at PageID 81). Plaintiff alleges that Perigo told him that Perigo gave Plaintiff's tray to another inmate because the Jail was short on food and “because Plaintiff had purchased commissary recently [and] had ample food to feed himself[.]” (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that he reported the tray incident to Defendant Big John, who told Plaintiff to report it to Defendant Hayslip on Monday since it was a Friday dinner meal and “no administration could come in until Monday morning.” (Doc. 20, at PageID 82). Plaintiff asserts that Big John also informed him that “the next tray pass out would be breakfast.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that when he notified Hayslip on or about April 18 that he had been denied a meal three days earlier, Hayslip told plaintiff there “was nothing he could do to fix what had happened[.]” (Doc. 20, at PageID...