O'Neill v. Int'l Paper Co.

KENNETH O'NEILL, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-455 (MAS) (LHG)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

August 19, 2021

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Michael A Shipp, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Kenneth O'Neill's ("Plaintiff) Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 4.) Defendants International Paper Co. and Kenneth Kazar (collectively, "Defendants") opposed (ECF No. 5) and Plaintiff did not reply. The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides the matter without oral argument under Local Civil Rule 78.1.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this slip-and-fall case are straightforward. Defendant International Paper Co. employed Plaintiff, a technician working for Eastern Lift Truck, to repair machinery at its plant in Spotswood, New Jersey. (O'Neill Aff. ¶¶ 2, 4, ECF No. 4-4.) Plaintiff asserts that during his employment, he primarily interacted with Kenneth Kazar ("Kazar"), who managed the maintenance department at the plant. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) Plaintiff alleges that Kazar "had responsibilities to operate, control, maintain and/or inspect the premises" of the plant. (Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 4-2.) Specifically, Plaintiff avers that, during repairs, he "report[ed] directly to Kenneth Kazar who would direct me to the machine in need of repair" and that Kazar "sign[ed] off on the repair order." (O'Neill Aff. ¶ 4.)

One such repair took place on January 11, 2019. On that day, Plaintiff alleges that he slipped and fell on oil on the plant floor, leaving Plaintiff with "serious and permanent personal injuries." (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants caused those injuries by negligently maintaining the plant floor and failing to warn him of the oil spill. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.)

Defendants dispute this version of events. Although Kazar agrees that he "manage[s] the operation and functionality of the machinery" at the plant, he avers that neither him nor his employees inspect the plant floor. (Kazar Aff. ¶¶ 4, 6, ECF No. 5-1.) Kazar further avers that on or before January 11, 2019, "[n]o one reported a spill on the floor" of the plant. (Id. ¶ 7.) He asserts, however, that "Maintenance Department employees attend to spills on the floor should they be made aware of them." (Id. ¶ 6.)

Following Plaintiffs slip and fall, Plaintiff sued Defendants for negligence in the Superior Court of New Jersey in Middlesex County. (See generally Compl.) Defendants removed the case to federal court on January 8, 2021. (ECF No. 1.) In their Notice of Removal, Defendants invoked the Court's diversity jurisdiction, notwithstanding that both Plaintiff and Kazar are New Jersey citizens. (See Id. ¶ 3.) Recognizing the lack of complete diversity, Defendants assert that Plaintiff fraudulently joined Kazar to this case. (Id. ¶ 3.) The instant Motion to Remand followed, and Defendants opposed. (ECF Nos. 4, 5.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction to hear the matter when first filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990). When the defendant premises subject matter jurisdiction on diversity jurisdiction, each defendant must be completely diverse from each plaintiff and the amount in controversy must exceed $75, 000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Grand Union Supermarkets of the V.I., Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003).

The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists, removal was timely filed, and removal was proper. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446, 1447; Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111. Once the case has been removed, a district court may remand the matter to state court if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). "[R]emoval statutes are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand." In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 217 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 1992)).

B. Fraudulent Joinder

"The doctrine of fraudulent joinder represents an exception to the requirement that removal be predicated solely upon complete diversity." In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 215-16 (citation omitted). "In a suit with named defendants who are not of diverse citizenship from the plaintiff, the diverse defendant may still remove the action if it can establish that the non-diverse defendants were 'fraudulently' named or joined solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 216. Joinder is fraudulent where "there is no reasonable basis in fact or colorable ground supporting the claim against the joined defendant, or no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action against the defendants or seek a joint judgment." Batoff, 977 F.2d at 851 (quoting Boyer, 913 F.2d at 911). A claim is not colorable if it is "wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Id. at 852 (citing Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1989)).

"Because a party who urges jurisdiction on a federal court bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists, a removing party who charges that a plaintiff has fraudulently joined a party to destroy diversity of jurisdiction has a 'heavy burden of persuasion.'" Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111 (quoting Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 & 1012 n.6 (3d Cir. 1987)). "In evaluating the alleged fraud, a district court must 'focus on the plaintiffs complaint at the time the petition for removal was filed.'" Batoff 977 F.2d at 851 (quoting Steel Valley Auth., 809 F.2d at 1010). "A district court must resolve all contested issues of substantive fact in favor of the plaintiff and must resolve any uncertainties as to the current state of controlling substantive law in favor of the plaintiff." Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111 (citations omitted). A district court may look beyond the "pleading allegations to identify indicia of fraudulent joinder" but "must not step 'from the threshold jurisdictional issue into a decision on the merits.'" In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 219 (quoting Boyer, 913 F.2d at 112). "[I]nquiry into the validity of a complaint triggered by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is more searching than that permissible when a party makes a claim of fraudulent joinder." Batoff, 977 F.2d at 852. Thus, a party is not necessarily fraudulently joined even where a court may ultimately dismiss that party for failure to state a claim. See Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants face a high bar in convincing this Court that remand is improper. Attempting to invoke this Court's jurisdiction, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fraudulently joined Kazar to this case. It is easy to see why: this Court otherwise lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiffs Complaint raises no federal question and the parties lack complete diversity. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a).

Defendants' Opposition thus assails the Complaint for not stating a colorable claim against Kazar. (See Defs.' Opp'n Br. 4, ECF No. 5.) Indeed, scattered throughout Defendants' Opposition are facts purportedly illustrating the frivolity of Plaintiffs claims against Kazar, including that "[n]one of Mr. Kazar's duties involve inspecting" the plant, that "Mr. Kazar did not maintain any control over how Plaintiff completed his work," and that "no one reported a spill on the floor." (Id. at 6.) These facts, according to Defendants, show that Plaintiffs Complaint "presents no colorable claim based in a real intent to prosecute and seek a joint judgment against Mr. Kazar." (Id. at 5.)

The problem, however, is that Defendants ask this Court to engage in an improper weighing of the merits. At this stage, a district court "must not step 'from the threshold jurisdictional issue into a decision on the merits.'" In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 219. Defendants' Opposition asks the Court to do just that. At bottom, Defendants argue that Kazar did not have actual or constructive notice of the oil spill-either because Kazar did not personally see the spill or because he was not responsible for inspecting the plant floor. (See Defs.' Opp'n Br. 6.) This is a merits issue. See, e.g., Romeo v. Harrah's Ail. City Propco, LLC, 168 F.Supp.3d 726, 732 (D.N.J. 2016) (denying summary judgment where "a jury could reasonably find that [the] [d]efendant had constructive notice of the spill"); Tammy v. Carnival Cruise Lines, No. 13-4716, 2015 WL 7069654, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2015) (denying summary judgment where "a reasonable jury could find that [the] [d]efendant had constructive or . . . actual notice of the spill that caused [the plaintiffs] injury"); Billado v. Freehold Raceway Mall, No. MON-L-2560-17, 2019 WL 11502560, at *3 (N.J.Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 8, 2019) (denying summary judgment where the court found "a question of fact on whether [the defendant] had actual and/or constructive notice of the spill").^[1]

Defendants also attempt to shore up their argument against remand by positing that Kazar owed no duty of care to Plaintiff. (Defs.' Opp'n Br 6-7.) Specifically, Defendants contend that "Mr. Kazar did not owe Plaintiff any duty" because "Mr. Kazar is not responsible for inspecting the floor" and "does not supervise any employees who are responsible for inspecting the floor." (Id. at 7-8.) But the Court is not persuaded. For one, Plaintiffs Complaint contests those facts, and this Court must "resolve all contested issues of substantive fact in favor of the plaintiff." Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111; (see Compl. ¶ 5 (noting that Kazar "had responsibilities to operate, control, maintain and/or inspect the premises" of the plant).) And, in all events, questions about the scope of duty are appropriately left for a ...