Nelson v. Health Servs., Inc.

LISA NELSON, Plaintiff, v. HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

CASE NO.: 2:17-cv-00590-ECM (WO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

April 19, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiff, Lisa Nelson ("Nelson" or "the Plaintiff"), filed this suit against her employer, Health Services, Inc. ("HSI" or "the Defendant"), on September 1, 2017, claiming one count of retaliation pursuant to Title VII and two counts of disparate treatment due to her race pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Now pending before the Court is HSI's motion for summary judgment filed on January 15, 2021. (Doc. 69). Nelson has filed a response in opposition to the motion, (doc. 73), and the motion is ripe for review.

For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED.

II. JURISDICTION

The Court exercises federal subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A reviewing court shall grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence demonstrating there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing that the non-moving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of his case on which he bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23. Only disputes about material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). "An issue of fact is 'genuine' if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. . . . An issue is 'material' if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law." Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-movant must support his assertions "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed" by"citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B).

In determining whether a genuine issue for trial exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). Likewise, the reviewing court must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, "mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

A reviewing court is constrained during summary judgment proceedings from making the sort of determinations ordinarily reserved for the finder of fact at a trial. See Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012). After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

IV. FACTS

Nelson, a Black female, began working for HSI in the 1990's, and her undisputed work history suggests that she was a dependable employee. Over the years, Nelson waspromoted numerous times, with regular increases in her salary. (Doc. 70 at 8-9).¹ The Parties discuss these promotions and raises in detail, but there are two key material facts from her early employment history: (1) Nelson began filling in as the interim Human Resources Director as early as 1998, (doc. 71-2 at 18), and (2) she was promoted to Executive Administrative Assistant to the CEO in 2000, (doc. 70 at 8). After 1998, Nelson either acted as the interim Human Resources Director or assisted the Human Resources Director as needed. For example, she acted as the interim Human Resources Director during "vacations, pregnancies, [and] maternity leave" of the Human Resources Director, and she "maintained the department" when the position was vacant. (Doc. 71-2 at 19). Even when there was a Human Resources Director, Nelson sometimes was asked to take on the role anyway: in her deposition, she stated that she handled the firing of forty-one people when the then Human Resources Director "couldn't handle it." (Id. at 20).

A. The sexual harassment report

It is undisputed that in June 2015, Nelson served in three roles: she was (1) the Executive Administrative Assistant to the CEO, (2) the Facilities Supervisor, and (3) the interim Human Resources Director. (Docs. 70 at 9; 71-1 at 23). On or about June 25, 2015, Nelson was acting in those roles when the then-COO, Bianca Granger ("Granger"), came to Nelson with a sexual harassment complaint. Specifically, Granger reported that she had attended a business trip with a member of HSI's Board of Directors, Gilbert Darrington ("Darrington"), a Black male. According to Granger, Darrington had asked her to visit hisroom during the trip. Granger stated that when she visited Darrington's room, he began running his fingers through her hair. When Granger made the allegation, both Darrington and Granger were under consideration to become HSI's new CEO. (Doc. 70 at 11).

It is also undisputed that Nelson brought Granger's report to management's attention in her capacity as interim Human Resources Director. In her deposition, Nelson stated, "I told [Granger] as the acting HR director that I was going to have to report it." (Doc. 71-2 at 32). Nelson reported the complaint to the vice chair of the Board of Directors, who told her not to bring the complaint to the CEO at that time. Nelson then reported the incident to two other Board members. One of the Board members "gave [her] permission" to report the complaint to the CEO, and he offered to make the report himself. Nelson explained, "I asked him to let me report it so that I didn't look weak, like I could not do my job." (Id. at 33). Nelson also reported the incident to HSI's attorney, who told her that she was required to report it. Nelson reported the incident to the CEO. (Id.). And from there, the CEO and Nelson interviewed Granger, and some investigation took place. (Id. at 33-35). After the investigation ended, Darrington was hired as the new CEO.

B. The Plaintiff's employment changes

On October 19, 2015, Darrington became the new CEO of HSI. (Docs. 42 at 3; 70 at 9). Darrington undertook a "corporate reorganization" at that time. Nelson expressed to him her desire to become the permanent Human Resources Director. Darrington previously had worked as the Human Resources Director of Jackson Hospital, and, according to HSI, Darrington's experience made him believe the position of Human Resources Director was no longer necessary—he could fulfill the obligations himself.

Thus, on November 16, 2015, Nelson arrived to work and learned of several changes: (1) the position of Human Resources Director had been eliminated—it had been replaced with a subordinate, lower-paying role, called the "Human Resources Manager;"² (2) she was being re-assigned to be the Executive Assistant to the COO instead of the CEO; and (3) her annual pay had been cut by around twenty thousand dollars per year. (Doc. 55 at 3). Furthermore, "Health Services eliminated . . . six positions (resulting in the termination of eight employees), HSI "transitioned two positions to different titles with reduced pay," and "Health Services realigned, reorganized and renamed other positions during the reorganization." (Doc. 70 at 11-12).

Nelson filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in 2016, claiming that the employment actions affecting her were taken in retaliation for her having reported Granger's sexual harassment complaint. (Doc. 71-2 at 306-07). She supplemented her EEOC charge in 2016, alleging race discrimination and retaliation. (Id. at 313-14). Next, she filed this lawsuit in 2017, alleging race discrimination and retaliation. (Doc. 1).

On April 23, 2018, HSI fired the then-COO, Granger, for whom Nelson worked as the Executive Administrative Assistant. (Doc. 70 at 15). Nelson consequently had no one to assist. That same day, Nelson was temporarily assigned to work as the Executive Assistant to the Director of Nursing. It is undisputed that Nelson's temporary role requiredher to report to a different HSI facility. Nelson claims that, initially, she did not have a work station, telephone, computer, or office furniture. (Doc. 73 at 6). Further, she asserts that she worked on a new set of administrative tasks, particularly ones for which she was not trained or qualified to perform. Nelson filed another charge with the EEOC in May 2018, alleging that she was transferred...