Nelson v. Jackson, Civil Action 2:12-cv-1167

JOSHUA COPENHAVER NELSON, Plaintiff, v. WANZA JACKSON, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action 2:12-cv-1167

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

August 19, 2014

Judge Graham

Magistrate Judge King

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a former inmate at the London Correctional Institution ("LoCI") and current inmate at the Marion Correctional Institution ("MCI"),¹ brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming a denial of his rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in connection with the alleged denial of Kosher meals, service of non-Kosher food products and other alleged service problems with his meals at LoCI. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, ECF 32 ("Amended Complaint"). Plaintiff also asserts violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1988, 2000d and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc ("RLUIPA"). Id. This matter is before the Court on Defendants Wanza Jackson, Steven Cahill, and William Gallaer's Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 92 ("Motion for Summary Judgment"). For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED the Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has been deemed "sincerely Jewish" for purposes of participating in the Kosher meal program of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections ("ODRC") since February 25, 2010. Exhibit A ("Response to Request for Religious Accommodation," stating that "Mr. Copenhaver checks out as being sincerely Jewish. I talked with his Rabbi in Michigan.") (emphasis in original)), attached to Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 32.²

Plaintiff alleges that he was served meat and dairy products during the same meal and was required to cook or reheat his meal in a microwave on the Sabbath, all in violation of his religious beliefs. Id. at ¶¶ 24-27. Named as defendants in the action are William Gallaer, LoCI's former Food Service Manager,³ Wanza Jackson, the Religious Services Administrator for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections ("ODRC"), and Steven Cahill, LoCI's Chaplain, in their official and individual capacities. Id. at ¶¶ 10-16. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief. Id. at ¶¶ 45-49.⁴

On August 20, 2013, the Court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. Order, Doc. No. 48. More specifically, the Court denied the motion to dismiss as to the following claims: (1) plaintiff's claims against all defendants underthe Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1988 and 2000d; (2) plaintiff's claims under the First and Eighth Amendments and RLUIPA against defendants Gallaer and Jackson based on the service of meat and dairy at the same meal and requiring plaintiff to cook his meal on the Sabbath; (3) plaintiff's claims under the First and Eighth Amendments and RLUIPA against defendant Cahill based on requiring plaintiff to cook his meal on the Sabbath; and (4) claims against defendants in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief. Id. at 2. The Court later denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on these claims. Order, Doc. No. 88.

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the remaining claims. Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff opposes defendants' motion. Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 93 ("Plaintiff's Opposition"). With the filing of Defendants Wanza Jackson, Steven Cahill, and William Gallaer's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 94 ("Reply"), this matter is ripe for resolution.

II. STANDARD

The standard for summary judgment is well established. This standard is found in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part:

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this determination, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Summary judgmentwill not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). However, summary judgment is appropriate if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the opposing party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.

The party moving for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1995)("nonmoving party must present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial"). "Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on the pleadings or merely reassert the previous allegations. It is not sufficient to 'simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Glover v. SpeedwaySuper Am. LLC, 284 F. Supp.2d 858, 862 (S.D. Ohio 2003)(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the non-moving party must support the assertion that a fact is genuinely disputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment "[a] district court is not ... obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim." Glover, 284 F. Supp.2d at 862 (citing InteRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989)). Instead, a "court is entitled to rely, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on a particular issue, only upon those portions of the verified pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits submitted, specifically called to its attention by the parties." Id. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

III. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that he "has been denied fresh fruit other than apples[.]" Amended Complaint, ¶ 31. Defendants construe this allegation to mean that defendants violated plaintiff's rights under the Equal Protection Clause "because [plaintiff] was provided only apples to eat while other inmates were provided a variety of fresh fruit." Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 23. Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because (1) the Court has previously found that "there is no evidence that plaintiff was victimized because of his membership in a suspect class[,]" id. (quoting Report and Recommendation, Doc. No. 81, p. 6); (2) the Court has already concluded that an alleged failure to provide fresh fruitother than apples does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, id. (citing Order and Report and Recommendation, Doc. No. 45, p. 28); and (3) plaintiff had access to the same fruit as all inmates at LoCI, id. (citing Affidavit of William Gallaer, ¶ 13 ("Gallaer Affidavit"); Affidavit of Steven Cahill, ¶ 25 ("Cahill Affidavit"), attached as Exhibits 1 and 3 to Motion for Summary Judgment). Plaintiff concedes that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Plaintiff's Opposition, p. 16. Accordingly, as it relates to plaintiff's Equal Protection claim, the Motion for Summary Judgment is well-taken.

IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Gallaer and Jackson violated plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment by serving him meat and dairy products at the same meal and by requiring plaintiff to cook or reheat meals on plaintiff's Sabbath. Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 24-27.

The First Amendment, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. Const., Amend. 1. "Prisoners retain the First Amendment right to the free exercise of their religion." Hayes v. Tennessee, No. 09-5529, 424 F. App'x. 546, 549 (6th Cir. June 1, 2011) (citing Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 929 (6th Cir. 1985)). Under § 1983, "[a] prisoner alleging that the actions of prison officials violate his religious beliefs must [first] show that the belief or practice asserted is religious in the person's own scheme of things and is sincerely held." Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

"Only after a prison inmate shows a sincere belief that his or her religion requires the practice at issue does the court move on to determining whether the prison's actions restricting the practice are valid." Barhite v. Caruso, No. 09-1312, 377 F. App'x. 508, at *510 (6th Cir. May 14, 2010) (citing Boles v. Neet, 486 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007)). "It is well-settled that prisoners' rights under the Free Exercise Clause [of the First Amendment] may be subject to reasonable restrictions." Weinberger v. Grimes, No. 07-6461, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2693, at *9 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2009) (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987); ...