Nelson v. Mattern

844 F. Supp. 216

Charles NELSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Todd MATTERN, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 92-4585.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

January 14, 1994.

Roger B. Reynolds, Jr., Reynolds, McLaughlin, Josel & Reynolds, Norristown, PA, for plaintiffs.

Jane M. Shields, Siana & Shields, Exton, PA, Claudia M. Tesoro, Office of Atty. Gen., Philadelphia, PA, for defendants.

ORDER

ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge.

AND NOW, this 14th day of January 1994, I have considered the State Police Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Todd Mattern's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and plaintiffs' response and find that:

1. This civil rights suit is brought by plaintiffs Charles Nelson, Stephen Spangler and Jerry Berger under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs' civil rights claims include Fourth Amendment violations for arrest without probable cause, excessive force and unlawful search. State police defendants are Timothy Shay, Timothy Sprowls, Douglas Brose, and John Dell. Local police defendant is Todd Mattern.

2. In their motion for summary judgment, state police defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant Todd Mattern moves for summary judgment, and raises the defense of qualified immunity, only on the issue of probable cause for plaintiffs' arrests.

3. Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment only if no reasonable resolution of the conflicting evidence and the inferences that could be drawn from that evidence could result in a judgment for plaintiffs. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where there is a dispute or disagreement over what inferences reasonably could be drawn from the facts, even if those facts are undisputed, summary judgment is improper. See Nathanson v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3d Cir.1991).

4. For the purposes of summary judgment, plaintiffs' version of the facts is taken as true. All three plaintiffs are white males. Nelson is 38 years old, 5'10" and 175 lbs; Spangler is 25 years old, 6'2" and 170 lbs; and Berger is 27 years old, 6' and 225 lbs. On August 8, 1990, 2:30 p.m., after drinking some beers at a club, plaintiffs took a six pack of beer to a swimming hole near a covered bridge at West Seven Stars Road and Mill Road ("covered bridge area"). (Deposition of Jerry Berger at 22, 25.)

5. Later that afternoon at the covered bridge area, Berger saw police cars next to Nelson's van and policemen talking with some teens. Defendants Shay and Sprowls, standing with defendant Mattern, called Berger over to the group. When Berger came over, Shay and Sprowls immediately arrested him, put on tight handcuffs, and took him to defendant Brose in a car, where he was interrogated. (Berger Dep. at 31-33, 44.)

6. Mattern called to Nelson when he came looking for Berger. According to Nelson, Mattern "grabbed me by the arm, threw me on the hood of the car, put my arms behind me, and handcuffed me." (Deposition of Charles Nelson at 32-33, 35-36.) Mattern then held Nelson's face on the hood of the running car. (Nelson Dep. at 37.) Brose looked into Nelson's van, which Shay, Sprowls and Mattern then searched. (Nelson Dep. at 39.)

7. Spangler appeared from the bushes and started to sit under a tree. When Mattern called to him he walked away. Dell then began running after him, so Spangler ran. Dell tackled Spangler and Brose held him bending back his wrist, handcuffed him, and later placed him in the car with Nelson. (Deposition of Stephen Spangler at 28-37.)¹

8. Brose drove Berger to the East Vincent police station, questioned him, and handcuffed him to a chair. (Berger Dep. at 45, 50.)

9. Mattern drove Nelson and Spangler to the same station. When Nelson was getting out of the car, Mattern grabbed his leg and pulled him to the ground. Mattern also hit Spangler in the face. Inside the station Nelson and Spangler were handcuffed to the wall. (Nelson Dep. at 51; Spangler Dep. at 42.)

10. Plaintiffs finally were released after 10:00 p.m. and no charges were ever brought. Nelson and Spangler went to the hospital, where the doctor found that Nelson's hip was partially dislocated and that Spangler's rib was fractured.² Spangler could not work for the next three days due to soreness from the tight handcuffs. (Spangler Dep. at 61.)

11. Although not taken as true, defendants' version of the facts is included below to provide some context for the incident. On August 8, 1990, Dr. George Govette arrived at his home as it was being burglarized. As the burglars drove away, Dr. Govette chased them in his car to a field, where shots were fired and the burglars fled. Dr. Govette contacted the police and described the burglars as three white males, mid-20s to early 30s, driving a beige Chrysler sedan. Later that day, the suspect car was found and identified as belonging to a John Hess. The car had been reported as stolen from the covered bridge area. (State Def. Br. Exhibit O, hereinafter Rpt. at 5, 10-12.)

12. That afternoon defendants Shay and Sprowls happened to meet Hess at a store during their patrol. (Rpt. at 12.) Hess reiterated to them that his car had been stolen and Shay and Sprowls became suspicious when they realized it was the car involved in the shootout. They wanted Dr. Govette to do a "drive-by" to try to identify Hess. During the drive-by, Dr. Govette was unable to identify Hess as one of the burglars. (Rpt. at 13.)

13. Defendants' account of the subsequent events at the covered bridge area differs dramatically from plaintiffs' account. At 7:47 p.m., Mattern and Officer Scotty Blevins (not a defendant) were at the covered bridge area. (Deposition of Scotty Blevins at 6.) Mattern had heard of the Govette incident earlier. (Deposition of Todd Mattern at 26.) Shay and Sprowls arrived at the scene, saw Mattern and Blevins talking to people on the side of the road, and pulled over to touch base with the officers. (Deposition of Timothy Sprowls at 29-31.) At the same time, Corporal Alvaro Cordone (not a defendant) and defendant Dell were driving Dr. Govette home from the drive-by when they passed the covered bridge area. Police activity already in progress there caught Dr. Govette's eye. Dr. Govette saw Berger talking to police but not in handcuffs and said "he looks familiar. You're not going to let him go are you?" (Deposition of Dr. George Govette at 57; Dell Dep. at 27-29; Deposition of Alvaro Cordone at 31-33.) Defendants state that Berger was then arrested partially based on Dr. Govette's identification, but do not explain how the arresting officers on the street learned of Dr. Govette's ID in the car. According to defendants, it was not until after Berger and Nelson were arrested that Cordone pulled his car over and told the others about Dr. Govette's ID. Then Spangler appeared and Mattern called to him, thinking he might have been one of Dr. Govette's assailants. (Mattern Dep. at 41-44.) Spangler ran and Dell tackled him.

14. Defendants contend that defendants were drunk and disorderly the entire time. (Sprowls Dep. at 54; Shay Dep. at 31-32.)³

15. Plaintiffs bring the following claims:

a. Berger: Arrest without probable cause; and unlawful seizure of person and deprivation of liberty without due process

b. Nelson: Arrest without probable cause; unlawful seizure of person and deprivation of liberty without due process; excessive force against Mattern; unlawful search; and violation of the Eighth Amendment c. Spangler: Arrest without probable cause; unlawful seizure of person and deprivation of liberty without due process; excessive force against Brose, Dell and Mattern; and violation of the Eighth Amendment

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

16. State police defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity to the claims for arrest without probable cause, excessive force and unlawful search;⁴ Mattern raises the same defense to the claim for arrest without probable cause. Officials are entitled to qualified immunity if "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The court must focus on the "objective legal reasonableness" of the conduct and defendants bear the burden of demonstrating an entitlement. Id. at 815, 102 S.Ct. at 2736. Qualified immunity should be denied only if "a reasonable jury could find that the unlawfulness of defendants' actions was so `apparent' that no reasonable official could have believed his actions were lawful." Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 69 (3d Cir.1988).

17. Arrest without probable cause. Probable cause exists if "`at the moment the arrest was made ... the facts and circumstances within defendants' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing' that plaintiff had violated the law." Hunter v. Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 534, 537, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). Defendants' argument proceeds as follows: Even assuming plaintiffs were arrested immediately upon emerging from the swimming hole, there was probable cause to arrest plaintiffs at that time for the burglary. Alternatively, (1) the stop was an investigatory stop, not an arrest; (2) there was reasonable suspicion that plaintiffs had committed the burglary; and (3) reasonable suspicion developed into probable cause to arrest for the burglary before transportation to the police station. Alternatively, there...