Nelson v. Nassau Cnty. Sheriff Dep't

LEROY MOSES NELSON, #11008979, Plaintiff,

v. NASSAU COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, SHERIFF MICHAEL SPOSATO,ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH, INC., NASSAU COUNTY CORRECTIONS FACILITYand all JOHN DOE and JANE DOE who work there, Defendant.

13-CV-00477(SJF)(GRB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: May 15, 2013

ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, District Judge:

I. Introduction

On January 24, 2013, incarcerated pro se plaintiff Leroy Moses Nelson ("plaintiff") filed a civil rights complaint in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") against the defendants, the Nassau County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Michael Sposato ("Sposato"), Armor Correctional Health, Inc. ("Armor"), the Nassau County Corrections Facility ("NCCF") and all John/Jane Does who work there (collectively, "defendants"), accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Since plaintiff's financial status, as set forth in his declaration in support of his application to proceed in forma pauperis, qualifies him to file the complaint without prepayment of the filing fees, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. However, for the reasons set forth below, the complaint is sua sponte dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

II. The Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that, on or about March 1, 2012, he fell asleep while being transported from court to the NCCF in the Sheriff's van when he felt an "[i]mpact like someone hit us,"causing him to hit his head and bang his right knee on a metal plate inside the van. (Compl., ¶ IV). According to plaintiff, he was not wearing a seatbelt "because they were removed to put the metal plates inside." (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he was denied "outside medical attention" and instead was treated at the NCCF's medical unit, which is operated by Armor. (Id.) According to plaintiff, he was provided a knee brace and pain medication, but his request for an MRI was denied. (Compl., at ¶ IV.A). Plaintiff claims to suffer pain in both knees, his back and his neck as a result of the "deni[al] [of] proper medical attention" and seeks compensatory damages in the amount of four million dollars ($4,000,000.00). (Compl. at ¶¶ IV.A-V).

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Under both the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the in forma pauperis statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and I915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding both Section 1915 and Section 1915A to be applicable to a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis).

It is axiomatic that district courts are obliged to read pro se complaints plaintiff liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976)); Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), and to construe them "to raise the strongest arguments [that they] suggest[]." Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations, alterations and citations omitted). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of "all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint." Harrington v. County ofSuffolk, 607 F.3d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2010): see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

Nevertheless, a complaint must plead sufficient facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The pleading of specific facts is not required; rather a complaint need only give the defendant "fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. at 2200 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Anderson News. LLC v. American Media. Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 182 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 846, 184 L. Ed. 2d 655 (Jan. 7, 2013) (accord). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. 19551: see also Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011) (accord). The plausibility standard requires "more that a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949: see also Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011) (accord). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. 1949 (citations omitted). While "detailed factual allegations" are not required, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955). The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; see also Wilson, 671 F.3d at 128 (accord).

B. Section 1983

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides, in relevant part:

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the challenged conduct was "committed by a person acting under color of state law," and (2) that such conduct "deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)): see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501-02, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012).

1. Nassau County Sheriff's Department and NCCF

"Under New York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and therefore, cannot sue or be sued." Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 224 F. Supp.2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Robischung-Walsh v. Nassau County Police Dep't, 699 F. Supp.2d 563, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 2010, aff'd, 421 F. App'x. 38 (2d Cir. 2011). Since the Nassau County Sheriff's Department and NCCF are administrative arms of the County of Nassau ("the County"), they lack the capacity to be sued. See, e.g., Burton v. Nassau County Sheriff Dept., No. 13-cv-1119, 2013 WL 1833265, at * 3 (E.D.N.Y. May 1. 2013): Miller v. County of Nassau, No. 10-cv-3358, 2013 WL 1172833, at* 4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19. 2013): Hawkins v. Nassau County Correctional Facility, 781 F. Supp. 2d 107, 109 n. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Varricchio v. County of Nassau, 702 F. Supp. 2d 40, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice as against the NassauCounty Sheriff's Department and NCCF. However, since plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his complaint will be construed as being brought against the County.

2. Municipal Liability

"[A] municipality [or municipal entity] can be held liable under Section 1983 if the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the municipality [or municipal entity]." Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). "Absent such a custom, policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis for the tort of its employee." Id.; see also Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011) (holding that under Section 1983, governmental bodies are not vicariously liable for their employees' actions); Los Angeles County. California v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 452, 178 L. Ed. 2d 460 (2010) ("[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely for the acts of others, e.g., solely because it employs a tortfeasor." (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation omitted)); Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim against a municipal entity, a plaintiff must show: "(1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury." Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008): see also Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359 ("Plaintiff's who seek to impose liability on local governments under Section 1983 must prove that 'action pursuant to official municipal policy' caused their injury." (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691,98 S. Ct. 2018)); Humphries, 131 S. Ct. at 452 ("[A] municipality may be held liable when execution of a government's policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury." (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation omitted)). "A municipal policy may be pronounced or tacit and reflected in either action or inaction." Cash v.County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2010. cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1741, 182 L.Ed. 2d 528 (2012). "Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts...