Nelson v. State

683 S.W.3d 177

2024 Ark. 24

William NELSON, Appellant

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee

No. CR-23-603

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: February 22, 2024

APPEAL FROM THE LONOKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 43CR-20-410], HONORABLE BARBARA ELMORE, JUDGE

Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Lauren Elizabeth Heil, Ass’t Att’y Gen.; and by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

CODY HILAND, Associate Justice

₁William Nelson was convicted by a Lonoke County jury of first-degree domestic battery, for which he was sentenced to eight years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On direct appeal, Nelson argues (1) substantial evidence does not support his conviction; (2) the circuit court’s refusal to recuse was an abuse of discretion; (3) the circuit court improperly denied his Batson objection; (4) the circuit court abused its discretion by limiting questions regarding sentencing during voir dire; (5) the circuit court allowed inadmissible prior-bad-acts evidence to be introduced; (6) refusal to dismiss a juror for-cause during trial was an abuse of discretion; and (7) the circuit court improperly restricted expert-witness testimony or, alternatively, erred by denying a motion for a continuance to obtain a new expert. On cross-appeal, the State argues the circuit court misinterpreted the statutory requirement to support a sentencing enhancement and improperly granted Nelson’s directed-verdict motion on the issue. We affirm on direct appeal and dismiss the cross-appeal.

₂I. Facts

On May 21, 2020, Chelsea Spedowski (Chelsea) left her two-year-old son, Minor Child 1 (MC1), in the sole care and custody of her fiancé, William Nelson (Nelson). Chelsea and Nelson lived together with Chelsea’s son, MC1, and Nelson’s one-year-old daughter, Minor Child 2 (MC2).

At some point that morning, Nelson allegedly heard a noise from MC1’s bedroom and found MC1 lying on the carpet unresponsive. Nelson called Chelsea’s mother, Tina Ognoskie (Tina), who lived next door. Tina rushed to assist and found Nelson holding MC1’s unconscious body at his back door. In the midst of trying to determine whether MC1 was breathing, she asked Nelson if he had called 911, to which he responded he had not. While waiting on emergency personnel, Tina told Nelson to rush MC1 to a neighboring nurse’s home in hopes she could help. While Nelson was running with MC1 in his arms, a former police officer, Matthew Thomas (Thomas), saw MC1’s limp and lethargic body and immediately knew something was wrong. Thomas took MC1 from Nelson, rendered first aid as MC1 seized, and waited with the family until the authorities arrived.

MC1 was taken by ambulance to Arkansas Children’s Hospital (ACH). Upon arrival, MC1 was quickly evaluated and promptly sent for a CT scan, wherein the doctors discovered he was suffering from a severe brain bleed, or subdural hematoma, that required immediate emergency surgery. Chelsea arrived at the hospital mere minutes before surgery but in enough time to observe MC1 prior to his transfer to the operating room. She noted his eyes were fixed to one side, and he did not acknowledge or recognize her due to his ₃continued state of unresponsiveness. Chelsea observed MC1’s apparent facial injuries and testified that her son was unharmed when she left for work earlier that morning.

Because MC1 was taken to ACH with an "altered mental status," or abnormal level of consciousness, the emergency room physician notified Dr. Rachel Clingenpeel, a pediatrician who specializes in "child abuse pediatrics." According to Dr. Clingenpeel’s testimony, it is her job to evaluate for possible child abuse or neglect by "applying the most current [scientific] evidence and knowledge to [a] diagnostic process to come up with the most accurate diagnosis that [she] can."

Dr. Clingenpeel observed "fresh" bruises on MC1’s forehead, redness on the back of his left thigh, and bleeding from his mouth due to a superior labial frenulum tear. Once in surgery, the neurosurgeon, Dr. Tomoko Tanka, found that a major tear in a branch of the large venous system was the source of the bleeding that caused the "acute, organized clot."¹ Both Dr. Tanka and Dr. Clingenpeel confirmed, without hesitation, that MC1 would have died, rather quickly, without the emergency surgery. In Tanka’s expert opinion, the cause of the injury was "something very – forceful trauma."

Dr. Clingenpeel’s medical opinion on causation was significantly more detailed, as was justified by her unique expertise in the field. She testified that when a child has such a life-threatening head injury, as MC1 did, "usually the cause is very obvious"—a car accident, a high-force trauma event, a fall from a substantial height, such as a multistory fall, but not from tripping and falling at home. Ultimately, the complete lack of explanation from ₄Nelson as to how MC1 incurred such traumatic brain damage, combined with the fact that the subdural hemorrhage was not MC1’s only injury—a variety of other injuries on multiple body surfaces existed with "each separate bruise or laceration representing a separate site of blunt-force trauma to [MC1’s] body"—all contributed to her conclusive diagnosis of physical child abuse, including "abusive head trauma."

The State charged Nelson with one count of first-degree domestic battery and sought an enhanced sentence because the battering was committed in the presence of a child. After a two-day jury trial,² at the conclusion of the evidence, the circuit court granted a directed verdict and dismissed the sentencing enhancement sought by the State. The case was submitted to the jury, which found Nelson guilty of domestic battery as charged. Both Nelson and the State timely filed their corresponding appeals.

II. Direct Appeal by Nelson

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[1–5] In Nelson’s first point on appeal, he argues that substantial evidence does not support his domestic-battery conviction. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only the evidence that supports the verdict. McCray v. State, 2020 Ark. 172, 598 S.W.3d 509. This court will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence to support it. Hinton v. State, 2015 Ark. 479, at 2, 477 S.W.3d 517, 520. "Substantial evidence is evidence which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting ₅to speculation or conjecture." Id., 477 S.W.3d at 520. Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 309, 607 S.W.3d 491. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to decide. Id. at 6, 607 S.W.3d at 496.

[6] A person commits domestic battery in the first degree when the person knowingly causes serious physical injury to a household member he knows to be twelve years of age or younger. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-303(a)(4) (Supp. 2019). There is no dispute that MC1 was a household member under the age of twelve. Nelson, however, argues there was insufficient circumstantial evidence that Nelson knowingly caused serious physical injury to MC1. Specifically, Nelson believes that there are three potential "reasonable" conclusions as to the causation of MC1’s injuries: (1) William Nelson; (2) Chelsea Spedowski; or (3) "No one"—as it was an accident. He is mistaken.

Here, the State presented substantial evidence for the jury to conclude that Nelson knowingly caused serious physical injury to MC1. It was undisputed that MC1 was left alone in Nelson’s care. Chelsea testified that she awakened MC1 on the morning in question, he was responsive and alert, "jabbering" to himself in bed before she took him into the living room to watch cartoons, and he did not have the visible injuries to his face when she left the house. It is further undisputed that MC1’s injuries were not only serious, but also life-threatening. Both of the State’s medical experts, Dr. Tanka and Dr. Clingenpeel, concluded the injuries were recent and would have been fatal without medical intervention. As stated supra, Dr. Clingenpeel opined in great detail that the cause of MC1’s ₆head trauma was something "exceptional to match the exceptional nature of [his] injury." She stated it is common for ACH to treat children with simple, uncomplicated head injuries resulting from accidents like short-distance falls or "things that kids can do at home" like "climbing on the furniture" but reiterated that MC1’s injury was anything but common. In combination with MC1’s other injuries with "predictive value"—injuries with some association with child abuse— Dr. Clingenpeel’s clinical diagnosis was that of nonaccidental, physical abuse.

As a result, the jury reasonably concluded that MC1’s injuries were not accidental or committed by MC1’s mother but by Nelson—a theory offered by Nelson himself. Accordingly, as substantial evidence supports the verdict, we affirm.

B. Recusal of Circuit Judge

[7] Nelson’s second argument is the circuit judge, Barbara Elmore (Judge Elmore), was required to recuse herself from the criminal proceeding because she had "presided over" the termination of Nelson’s parental rights of MC2 in juvenile court. We review a circuit judge’s denial of a motion to recuse under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Irvin v. State, 345 Ark. 541, 49 S.W.3d 635 (2001).

[8] In his written motion filed April 30, 2023, just two days before the jury trial was set to begin, Nelson cites both the Code of Judicial Conduct and the concurring, notably not the majority, opinion in a previous case decided by this court.³ Rule 2.11(A)(6)(d) of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might...