Nelson v. Sunbeam Prods., Inc.

579 F.Supp.3d 857

Debra NELSON, Plaintiff,

v.SUNBEAM PRODUCTS, INC. d/b/a Jarden Consumer Solutions, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:19-CV-263

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division.

Signed January 7, 2022

Michael Stephen Callahan, Casey Michael Brown, The Callahan Law Firm, Mario E. de la Garza, Garcia de la Garza, LLP, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Darby Vincent Doan, Kyle Randall Akin, Haltom & Doan, Texarkana, TX, David J. O'Connell, Goldberg Segalla, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMOS L. MAZZANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant Sunbeam Products, Inc.’s Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for a New Trial (Dkt. #75). Having considered the motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the motion should be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises from a severe injury that Plaintiff Debra Nelson ("Nelson") received when she fell on a space heater manufactured by Defendant SUNBEAM PRODUCTS, INC. d/b/a Jarden Consumer Solutions ("Sunbeam"). On January 30, 2018, Nelson was asleep in her mobile home with a Sunbeam Space Heater Model No. SQH310 (the "Sunbeam Heater") powered on and heating her sleeping area. In the early morning, she awoke. She stood up and began to walk toward her bathroom. As she took several steps, she became light-headed, fainted, and fell. As she fell, she tipped the Sunbeam Heater over and came to rest with her back on top of the heater's grill. Although the heater tipped over, Nelson claims it did not turn off. Nelson became immobilized for some period of time as the bare skin on her back maintained contact with the grill of the heater. The extended contact with the hot surface caused third-degree burns to Nelson's body.

On April 10, 2019, Nelson filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas against Sunbeam, bringing claims for strict liability based on theories of manufacturing defect, failure to warn, and design defect, as well as breach of warranty and negligence claims (Dkt. #1). Nelson subsequently elected not to pursue her products liability claims for manufacturing defect and failure to warn, as well as her breach of warranty claim (Dkt. #27 ¶ 3). On August 30, 2021, the case went to trial (Dkt. #57). During trial, Nelson dropped her negligence claim. As such, the sole claim left for the jury to decide was Nelson's design defect claim. On September 2, 2021, the jury returned a verdict, finding that the Sunbeam Heater was defectively designed and that the design defect was a producing cause of Nelson's injuries and damages (Dkt. #67). The jury attributed no negligence to Nelson (Dkt. #67). On September 7, 2021, the Court entered final judgment for Nelson, awarding her a total judgment of $1,100,000, plus pre-and post-judgment interest (Dkt. #70).

On October 6, 2021, Sunbeam filed the present Renewed Rule 50(d) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and in the Alternative Motion for New Trial (Dkt. #75). On November 1, 2021, Nelson filed a response (Dkt. #78). On November 16, 2021, Sunbeam filed a reply (Dkt. #79).

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Upon a party's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following a jury verdict, the Court should properly ask whether "the state of proof is such that reasonable and impartial minds could reach the conclusion the jury expressed in its verdict." FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) ; see also Am. Home Assurance Co. v. United Space All. , 378 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2004). "A JMOL may only be granted when, ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that reasonable jurors could not arrive at any contrary conclusion.’ " Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc. , 717 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Dresser-Rand Co. v. Virtual Automation, Inc. , 361 F.3d 831, 838 (5th Cir. 2004) ).

Under Fifth Circuit law, a court should be "especially deferential" to a jury's verdict and must not reverse the jury's findings unless substantial evidence does not support the findings. Baisden v. I'm Ready Prods., Inc. , 693 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2012). "Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions." Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc. , 211 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 2000). A motion for judgment as a matter of law must be denied "unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelming in the movant's favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion." Baisden , 693 F.3d at 498 (citation omitted). However, "[t]here must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence in the record to prevent judgment as a matter of law in favor of the movant." Arismendez v. Nightingale Home Health Care, Inc. , 493 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 2007).

In evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court must "draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict and cannot substitute other inferences that [the court] might regard as more reasonable." E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co. , 731 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). However, "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). "[T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that ‘evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that the evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.’ " Id. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (citation omitted).

Although the federal standards of review apply, a court sitting in diversity, as here, "refers to state law for the kind of evidence that must be produced to support a verdict." Goodner v. Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd. , 650 F.3d 1034, 1040 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, Texas law will be used to determine the evidence that Nelson must produce to support her design defect claim.

II. Motion for New Trial

Under Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a new trial can be granted to any party to a jury trial on any or all issues "for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a). "A new trial may be granted, for example, if the district court finds the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course." Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co. , 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985). However, "[u]nless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence – or any other error by the court or a party – is grounds for granting a new trial ... At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights." FED. R. CIV. P. 61.

To be entitled to a new trial, Plaintiff must show that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, not merely against the preponderance of the evidence. Taylor v. Seton Healthcare , No. A-10-CV-650 AWA, 2012 WL 2396880, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2012) (citing Dresser–Rand Co. v. Virtual Automation, Inc. , 361 F.3d 831, 838–39 (5th Cir. 2004) ; Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc. , 671 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1982) ). A jury verdict is entitled to great deference. Dresser–Rand Co. , 361 F.3d at 839. "Weighing the conflicting evidence and the inferences to be drawn from that evidence, and determining the relative credibility of the witnesses, are the province of the jury, and its decision must be accepted if the record contains any competent and substantial evidence tending fairly to support the verdict." Gibraltar Savings v. LDBrinkman Corp. , 860 F.2d 1275, 1297 (5th Cir. 1988).

ANALYSIS

Sunbeam renews its motion for judgment as a matter of law on Nelson's strict liability design defect claim, arguing Nelson failed to establish that the Sunbeam Heater was unreasonably dangerous or that a safer alternative design existed (Dkt. #75 at p. 6). Further, Sunbeam contends that even if this Court accepts the design defect offered by Nelson, her design defect theory nevertheless fails because there was no evidence of causation (Dkt. #75 at p. 16). Finally, as part of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, Sunbeam argues that the Court erred when it denied Sunbeam's pre-trial motion to exclude Dr. McClellan's testimony (Dkt. #75 at p. 6).

Alternatively, Sunbeam moves for a new trial on both liability and damages (Dkt. #75 at p. 6). Sunbeam contends a new trial on liability is warranted because the jury should have been instructed on the five relevant factors used to determine if a design defect in a product renders it unreasonably dangerous, taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use (Dkt. #75 at p. 6). Sunbeam also argues a new trial on damages is warranted because the admission of a skin graft video was prejudicial error (Dkt. #75 at p. 6). The Court will address each of Sunbeam's arguments in turn.

I. Sunbeam's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Under Texas law, "to recover for a products liability claim alleging a design defect, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the product was defectively designed so as to render it unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the defect was a producing cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks recovery." Goodner , 650 F.3d at 1040. In its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, Sunbeam asserts that Nelson failed to prove each of these elements (Dkt. #75 at p. 6).

A. Whether the Product was Defectively Designed so as to Render it Unreasonably...