Neroni v. Grannis

TATIANA NERONI; and FREDERICK J. NERONI, Plaintiffs,

v.ALEXANDER GRANNIS; et al., Defendants.

3:11-CV-1485 (LEK/DEP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DATED: March 21, 2013

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This case involves a dispute over a the legality of a pond constructed on the property of Plaintiffs Tatiana Neroni ("Mrs. Neroni")¹ and Frederick J. Neroni ("Mr. Neroni") (collectively, "Plaintiffs" or "the Neronis"). See generally Dkt. No. 4 ("Amended Complaint"). Presently before the Court are a Motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by a number of New York State officials (collectively, "Defendants") requesting that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint in its entirety and a Cross-Motion filed by Plaintiffs seeking to supplement their Amended Complaint. Dkt. Nos. 7 ("Motion"), 14 ("Cross-Motion"). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants' Motion and denies Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion as moot.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs' accounts of the factual allegations underlying this case in their various submissions are lengthy and convoluted, with Plaintiffs' facts dating back to Mr. Neroni's days as astudent at Albany Law School in the early 1970s. Given the extensive litigation history, the Court presumes the parties' familiarity with the relevant background and recounts Plaintiff's account here only to the extent necessary to resolve the instant Motions. For a more complete statement of the facts, reference is made to the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiffs are married and own a summer house in Hamden, New York. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2. The Hamden property that they bought in 1999 is the subject of the instant litigation. Id. ¶ 2. At some point between the time they purchased the property and the summer of 2001, Mr. Neroni constructed a pond behind the barn on their property. Id. ¶ 4. In the summer of 2001, two New York Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") officers, Mr. Young² and Defendant Fraine, visited the property and claimed that a protected stream was being disturbed. Id. ¶ 5. While Plaintiffs allege that the officers found evidence of no such disturbance and that the visit was generally pretextual and lacking in any basis, the officers issued criminal tickets against Mr. Neroni charging him with disturbance of the protected stream. Id. ¶¶ 6-9. The case against Mr. Neroni was eventually dismissed for failure to prosecute and because of insufficient evidence. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs allege that the ticketing and investigation were orchestrated by the DEC in retaliation for Mr. Neroni's refusal to allow "timbering conservation" on another property. Id. ¶ 10.

On April 25, 2006, the DEC initiated an administrative proceeding against Mr. Neroni arising from the alleged disturbance of the river in 2001 based on a complaint from Defendant Fraine. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16. Plaintiffs allege numerous legal and factual issues marred the legitimacy and lawfulness of this proceeding. See generally id. On August 17, 2006, administrative law judge("ALJ") Molly McBride granted in part and denied in part DEC's motion for summary judgment. Id. ¶ 43. After extensive administrative proceedings that Plaintiffs allege were hampered by repeated misfeasance and shady dealing by Defendants, on June 10, 2009, Defendant Grannis, former commissioner of the DEC, issued an order ("the 2009 Order") adopting the final hearing report of ALJ McBride. Id. ¶ 75. Plaintiffs subsequently "brought a timely Article 78 petition/declaratory judgment action in Delaware County Supreme Court." Id. ¶ 76.

Defendant Grannis moved to transfer the case to the New York State Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department, and Plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for severance of the declaratory judgment proceeding from the Article 78 proceeding. Id. ¶ 78. Defendant Grannis's motion was granted, and Plaintiffs' cross-motion was denied. Id. ¶ 79. The case was therefore transferred to the Appellate Division, and Plaintiffs appealed the transfer. Id. ¶ 80. Both the appeal and the underlying Article 78/declaratory judgment action itself were ultimately dismissed for failure to prosecute. Id. ¶ 81.

In April 2011, Defendant Martens brought an action to enforce the 2009 Order and included Mrs. Neroni as a necessary party. Id. ¶ 82. Plaintiffs filed numerous defenses and counterclaims. Id. ¶ 82. Plaintiffs also alleged extensive improprieties by the judge assigned to their case, the Honorable Carl F. Becker, Acting New York State Supreme Court Justice. Id. ¶¶ 86-107. On November 17, 2011, Judge Becker granted Defendant Martens's motion for summary judgment, struck Plaintiffs' affirmative defenses on grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata and ordered Mr. Neroni to pay $37,000.00 in penalties to the DEC. Id. ¶ 107. As of the filing of this action,Plaintiffs had not appealed that decision.³ Id. ¶ 108.

Based on these and other facts, Plaintiffs seek assorted relief and state a number of ill-defined causes of action. First, Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 on fifteen separate issues relating to the DEC investigation and the merits of the state court case. Id. ¶ 151. Next, Plaintiffs vaguely assert a wide range of claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.⁴ Id. ¶¶ 152-65. Pursuant to these constitutional claims against Defendants Martens and Grannis, Plaintiffs seek: (1) monetary damages; (2) injunctive relief; (3) "costs, disbursements and attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. [§] 1988"; and (3) "treble damages under New York State Judiciary Law 487." Id. ¶ 166. Plaintiffsalso seek monetary damages against Defendant Fraine for violating their constitutional rights.⁵ Id. ¶ 167. Plaintiffs also assert that Defendant Lapinski violated their "due process rights" and their right "to be free of unreasonable infringement of the government upon [their] real property." Id. ¶ 169. Plaintiffs also make a claim "[u]nder supplemental jurisdiction" for "fraud against the court" against Defendant Lapinski. Id. ¶ 170.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS⁶

A. Motion to Dismiss⁷

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Such a determination "requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). A court must accept as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Allaire Corp. v. Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2006). A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears that there are not "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plausibility requires "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct]." Id. at 556. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at555). Where a court is unable to infer more than the mere possibility of the alleged misconduct based on the pleaded facts, the pleader has not demonstrated that she is entitled to relief and the action is subject to dismissal. See Id. at 678-79.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court "must accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint, but [it is] not to draw inferences from the complaint favorable to plaintiffs." J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004). A court "may consider affidavits and other materials beyond the pleadings to resolve the jurisdictional issue, but [it] may not rely on conclusory or hearsay statements contained in the affidavits." Id. "Furthermore, 'jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting it.'" Gunst v. Seaga, No. 05 Civ. 2626, 2007 WL 1032265, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007) (quoting Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998)).

B. Motion to Supplement Complaint

Under Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[o]n motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d). "[A] Rule 15(d) motion may be appropriate when the movant seeks to add new parties or claims arising from the new events." Bracci v. Becker, No. 1:11-CV-1473, 2013 WL 123810, at *25 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2013) (citing Griffin v. City Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 226 (1964) ("[I]t follows, of course, that persons participating in these new events may be added if necessary. Such amendments are well within the basic aim of the rules to make pleadings a means to achievean orderly and fair administration of justice.") (alteration in original).

Further, "Rule 15(d) motions are evaluated by the court under the same standards used to evaluate motions to amend pleadings under Rule 15(a), with leave 'freely given when justice so requires.'" Id. at *26 (quoting N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Cuomo, 182 F.R.D. 30, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). Rule 15...