Nester v. Princeton

ANDREA NESTER, Plaintiff, v. THE HAMPTON INN PRINCETON, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-03336

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA AT BLUEFIELD

ORDERED: June 7, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 5. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Factual and Procedural Background

On February 1, 2013, plaintiff filed the instant suit in the Circuit Court of Mercer County, West Virginia, alleging several claims against defendants, each related to events surrounding her pregnancy and employment termination. See generally Doc. No. 1-2. The complaint named a total of five defendants. The first three defendants are business entities, namely The Hampton Inn Princeton, SWV Hotel Limited Partnership, and VIM, Inc. Doc. No. 1-2, at 1. The last two defendants are individual defendants, both of whom are sued in their individual capacities as well as their capacities as agents of the corporate defendants. See id. Regarding the individual defendants, and at all times relevant to the instant motion,Clarence Kerr, Jr. was the President of each of the corporate defendants. See Doc. No. 1-2, at ¶ 11; Doc. No. 3, at ¶ 11. Similarly, Melissa Dye was, at all times relevant to the instant motion, general manager of the Hampton Inn Princeton. See Doc. No. 1-2, at ¶ 11; Doc. No. 3, at ¶ 11.

On February 22, 2013, defendants removed this case to this court, alleging federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, based on the complaint's allegations of two distinct federal causes of action, namely counts under the Family and Medical Leave Act as well as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See Doc. No. 1, at 2, ¶ 5. On March 15, 2013, defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with an accompanying memorandum of law. Doc. Nos. 5, 6. On March 28, 2013, plaintiff responded to defendants' motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 8. On April 5, 2013, defendants replied to plaintiff's response. Doc. No. 9.

Discussion

I. Count One - Pregnancy Discrimination Act,¹ Title VII Claim

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to assert the defense of "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction" by pre-answer motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Relatedly, Rule 12(h)(3) states that "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). In Title VII cases, when a plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative remedies, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim. See Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009).

According to defendants, they seek dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII claim under 12(b)(1) because plaintiff has failed toexhaust her administrative remedies by, among other things, failing to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Doc. No. 6, at 3. In her response, plaintiff concedes that she has not yet "pursue[d] an EEOC claim," but insists she still has time to do so. Doc. No. 8, at 5. Accordingly, plaintiff asks that any dismissal of her Title VII claim be without prejudice. Id. Defendants argue that any dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII claim should be with prejudice because "principles applicable to splitting a cause of action" would prevent plaintiff from asserting essentially the same claim in a future EEOC proceeding. See Doc. No. 9, at 2 (citing Jang v. United Tech. Corp., 206 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2000)).

It is clear this court currently lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's Title VII claim because plaintiff has, thus far, failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See Jones, 551 F.3d at 300. On the other hand, precisely because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's Title VII claim, the court cannot dismiss that claim with prejudice since the court "has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits." S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013).

Moreover, Jang is distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case attempted to bring a previously-dismissed Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim after the remainder of his suit had been decided on the merits.² See Jang, 206 F.3d at 1148. In other words, Jang consisted of Jang I and Jang II, where Jang II was an entirely separate suit, but involved essentially the same ADA claim from Jang I. In that situation, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the resurrected ADA claim in Jang II was barred by res judicata because the remainder of the action in Jang I had been decided on the merits. Here, there remain at least two claims, the validity of which defendants do not contest in their instant motion to dismiss. In other words, no claim has yet beendecided on its merits in this case, unlike in Jang and the cases Jang cites for the proposition that a cause of action may not be split. Therefore, defendants' argument based on Jang does not apply to the disposition of this motion.

Accordingly, defendants' 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII claim is GRANTED, and plaintiff's Title VII claim is dismissed without prejudice.

II. Applicable Law — Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Fundamentally, a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests whether a plaintiff's complaint satisfies Rule 8(a)'s liberal pleading requirements. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."[ ] Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Rule 8(a)'s "short and plain statement" requirement indicates that one of the objectives of Rule 8(a) is to avoid technicalities. See Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1999). Moreover, the Supreme Court has reiterated that, for purposes of Rule 8, pleading "[s]pecific facts [is] not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))(internalquotations omitted); see also Ostrzenski, 177 F.3d at 251 (explaining that a claim satisfies Rule 8's requirements if a plaintiff "colorably states facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief.")(quoting Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1216 (4th Cir.1982))(internal quotations omitted).

Nevertheless, while a complaint "need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests," Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, the complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. More specifically, a complaint must "permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct" based upon "its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); see also Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2009)(adding that a "complaint's factual allegations must produce an inference of liability strong enough to nudge the plaintiff's claims across the line from conceivable to plausible."). As a general matter, if a complaint could not satisfy the minimal requirements outlined above, it could not survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See 5B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1356 (3d ed.)(noting that "[o]nly when the plaintiff's complaint fails to meet [Rule 8's] liberal pleading standard is it subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).").

However, what satisfies Rule 8's liberal pleading requirements depends largely on individual pleadings and their respective wording. In at least some cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that listing the elements that make out a prima facie claim is unnecessary. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002)(noting, in the Title VII context, that "[t]his Court has never indicated that the requirements for establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas also apply to the pleading standard that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a motion to dismiss.")(overruled on other grounds). However, the Fourth Circuit has not read Swierkiewicz to remove "the burden of a plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003)(emphasis added). In sum, "[w]hile a plaintiff is not charged with pleading facts sufficient to prove her case, as an evidentiary matter, in her complaint, a plaintiff is required to allege facts that support a claim for relief."³ Id. (emphasis added).

Finally, when applying the 12(b)(6) standard, a court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true. SeeTwombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. Moreover, a court considering a 12(b)(6) motion must also "draw[] all reasonable . . . inferences" from the facts alleged in the Complaint in the plaintiff's favor. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir.1999).

III. Count Three - West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act

Defendants move pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiff's West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act (WV Wage Payment Act) claim as it pertains to the individual defendants, specifically Clarence Kerr, Jr. and Melissa Dye in their individual capacities. Doc. No. 6, at 8. Defendants argue that the WV Wage Payment Act claim against these two defendants must be dismissed because plaintiff's complaint alleged neither actual nor constructive knowledge on the part of defendants Kerr or Dye. Plaintiff responds that she "does not seek to hold the individual Defendants responsible for violations of the [WV Wage Payment Act], except to the extent that it is revealed that the individuals were...