Nestlè United States, Inc. v. John Doe

141 S.Ct. 1931

210 L.Ed.2d 207

NESTLÈ USA, INC., Petitioner

v.John DOE, et al.;

Cargill, Inc., Petitioner

v.John Doe I, et al.

No. 19-416

No. 19-453

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued December 1, 2020

Decided June 17, 2021

Neal K. Katyal, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioners.

Paul L. Hoffman, Culver City, CA, for Respondents.

Cleland B. Welton II, Mayer Brown, Mexico, S.C., Andrew J. Pincus, Kevin S. Ranlett, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner Cargill, Incorporated.

Theodore J. Boutrous Jr., Perlette Michele Jura, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Neal Kumar Katyal, Craig A. Hoover, Sean Marotta, Benjamin A. Field, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner Nestle USA, Inc.

Paul L. Hoffman, Counsel of Record, John C. Washington, Helen Zeldes, Schonbrun Seplow Harris Hoffman & Zeldes LLP, Hermosa Beach, CA, Terrence P. Collingsworth International Rights Advocates, Washington, DC, Catherine Sweetser, Human Rights, Litigation Clinic, Ucla Law Clinics, Los Angeles, CA, Erwin Chemerinsky University of California, Berkeley School of Law, Berkeley, CA, Melanie Partow, Mary H. Hansel, UCI School of Law Civil, Rights Litigation, Clinic; International, Human Rights Clinic, and International, Justice Clinic., UCI School of Law, Irvine, CA, for Respondents.

Justice THOMAS announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice GORSUCH and Justice KAVANAUGH join.

The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear certain civil actions filed by aliens. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Although this jurisdictional statute does not create a cause of action, our precedents have stated that courts may exercise common-law authority under this statute to create private rights of action in very limited circumstances. See, e.g. , Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain , 542 U.S. 692, 724, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004) ; Hernández v. Mesa , 589 U.S. ––––, ––––, ––––, 140 S.Ct. 735, 206 L.Ed.2d 29 (2020) (slip op., at 6, 14). Respondents here seek a judicially created cause of action to recover damages from American corporations that allegedly aided and abetted slavery abroad. Although respondents’ injuries occurred entirely overseas, the Ninth Circuit held that respondents could sue in federal court because the defendant corporations allegedly made "major operational decisions" in the United States. The Ninth Circuit erred by allowing this suit to proceed.

I

According to the operative complaint, Ivory Coast—a West-African country also known as Côte d'Ivoire—is responsible for the majority of the global cocoa supply. Respondents are six individuals from Mali who allege that they were trafficked into Ivory Coast as child slaves to produce cocoa.

Petitioners Nestlé USA and Cargill are U.S.-based companies that purchase, process, and sell cocoa. They did not own or operate farms in Ivory Coast. But they did buy cocoa from farms located there. They also provided those farms with technical and financial resources—such as training, fertilizer, tools, and cash—in exchange for the exclusive right to purchase cocoa. Respondents allege that they were enslaved on some of those farms.

Respondents sued Nestlé, Cargill, and other entities, contending that this arrangement aided and abetted child slavery. Respondents argue that petitioners "knew or should have known" that the farms were exploiting enslaved children yet continued to provide those farms with resources. App. 319. They further contend that petitioners had economic leverage over the farms but failed to exercise it to eliminate child slavery. And although the resource distribution and respondents’ injuries occurred outside the United States, respondents contend that they can sue in federal court because petitioners allegedly made all major operational decisions from within the United States.

The District Court dismissed this suit after we held that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. , 569 U.S. 108, 133 S.Ct. 1659, 185 L.Ed.2d 671 (2013). It reasoned that respondents sought to apply the ATS extraterritorially because the only domestic conduct alleged was general corporate activity. While this suit was on appeal, we held that courts cannot create new causes of action against foreign corporations under the ATS.

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC , 584 U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1386, 200 L.Ed.2d 612 (2018). The Ninth Circuit then reversed the District Court in part. Although the Ninth Circuit determined that Jesner compelled dismissal of all foreign corporate defendants, it concluded that the opinion did not foreclose judicial creation of causes of action against domestic corporations. The Ninth Circuit also held that respondents had pleaded a domestic application of the ATS, as required by Kiobel , because the "financing decisions ... originated" in the United States. Doe v. Nestlé, S. A. , 906 F.3d 1120, 1124–1126 (2018) ; see also 929 F.3d 623 (2019). We granted certiorari, 591 U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 184, 207 L.Ed.2d 1114 (2020), and now reverse.

II

Petitioners and the United States argue that respondents improperly seek extraterritorial application of the ATS. We agree.

Our precedents "reflect a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues." RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community , 579 U.S. 325, 337, 136 S.Ct. 2090 (2016). First, we presume that a statute applies only domestically, and we ask "whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication" that rebuts this presumption. Ibid. For the ATS, Kiobel answered that question in the negative. 569 U.S., at 124, 133 S.Ct. 1659. Although we have interpreted its purely jurisdictional text to implicitly enable courts to create causes of action, the ATS does not expressly "regulate conduct" at all, much less "evince a ‘clear indication of extraterritoriality.’ " Id. , at 115–118, 133 S.Ct. 1659. Courts thus cannot give "extraterritorial reach" to any cause of action judicially created under the ATS. Id. , at 117–118, 133 S.Ct. 1659. Second, where the statute, as here, does not apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish that "the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the United States." RJR Nabisco , 579 U.S., at 337, 136 S.Ct. 2090. "[T]hen the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred abroad." Ibid.

The parties dispute what conduct is relevant to the "focus" of the ATS. Respondents seek a judicially created cause of action to sue petitioners for aiding and abetting forced labor overseas. Arguing that aiding and abetting is not even a tort, but merely secondary liability for a tort, petitioners and the United States contend that "the conduct relevant to the [ATS's] focus" is the conduct that directly caused the injury. See id. , at 346, 136 S.Ct. 2090 (a plaintiff who "does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality ... therefore must allege and prove a domestic injury"). All of that alleged conduct occurred overseas in this suit. The United States also argues that the "focus" inquiry is beside the point; courts should not create an aiding-and-abetting cause of action under the ATS at all. See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A. , 511 U.S. 164, 182–183, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) ("[W]hen Congress enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant ..., there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors" because that would create a "vast expansion of federal law"). For their part, respondents argue that aiding and abetting is a freestanding tort and that courts may create a private right of action to enforce it under the ATS. They also contend that the "focus" of the ATS is conduct that violates international law, that aiding and abetting forced labor is a violation of international law, and that domestic conduct can aid and abet an injury that occurs overseas.

Even if we resolved all these disputes in respondents’ favor, their complaint would impermissibly seek extraterritorial application of the ATS. Nearly all the conduct that they say aided and abetted forced labor—providing training, fertilizer, tools, and cash to overseas farms—occurred in Ivory Coast. The Ninth Circuit nonetheless let this suit proceed because respondents pleaded as a general matter that "every major operational decision by both companies is made in or approved in the U.S." App. 314. But allegations of general corporate activity—like decisionmaking—cannot alone establish domestic application of the ATS.

As we made clear in Kiobel , a plaintiff does not plead facts sufficient to support domestic application of the ATS simply by alleging "mere corporate presence" of a defendant. 569 U.S., at 125, 133 S.Ct. 1659. Pleading general corporate activity is no better. Because making "operational decisions" is an activity common to most corporations, generic allegations of this sort do not draw a sufficient connection between the cause of action respondents seek—aiding and abetting forced labor overseas—and domestic conduct. "[T]he presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case." Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. , 561 U.S. 247, 266, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010). To plead facts sufficient to support a domestic application of the ATS, plaintiffs must allege more domestic conduct than general corporate activity. The Ninth Circuit erred when it held otherwise.

III

Respondents’ suit fails for another reason, which does not require parsing allegations about where conduct occurred: We cannot create a cause of action that would let them sue petit...