Neth. Ins. Co. v. HP, Inc.

646 F.Supp.3d 139

The NETHERLANDS INSURANCE COMPANY as subrogee of GCP Crown Colony, LLCand Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company as subrogee of Onex York Holdings Corp.d/b/a Care Works Managed Care Services f/k/a MCMC LLC, Plaintiffs, v. HP, INC. and Insight Direct USA, Inc., Defendants.

No. 18-cv-12136-DLC

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

Signed December 5, 2022

John F. Brosnan, O'Malley, Harvey and Brosnan LLC, Waltham, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Christopher G. Betke, Elizabeth A. Doubleday, Emily A. Chadbourne, Coughlin & Betke, LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Cabell, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction

This is a products liability case stemming from a printer fire. The Netherlands Insurance Company ("Netherlands") is the subrogee of GCP Crown Colony 1031 LLC and MF Crown Colony 1031 LLC, the owners of the building in which the fire took place. (Dkt. No. 8-1, pp. 1-2). Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual") is the subrogee of Onex York Holdings Corporation ("Onex"), the tenant in whose office the fire took place. (Dkt. No. 8-1, p. 2). HP Inc. ("HP") is a company in the business of designing, distributing, selling, and supplying personal computer technology products. (Dkt. No. 8-1, p. 2). Insight Direct USA, Inc. "Insight" is a company in the business of selling hardware and software products. Dkt. No. 8-1. Netherlands and Liberty Mutual (collectively, "the plaintiffs") raise three sets of claims against HP and Insight (collectively, "the defendants"): (1) each defendant was negligent as a result of design, manufacture, and/or distribution defects in the printer that is alleged to have caught fire; (2) each defendant breached warranties, both express and implied; and (3) each defendant violated Massachusetts General Laws ch. 93A. (Dkt. No. 8-1). The defendants move for summary judgment on all three claims; the plaintiffs oppose the motion.¹ (Dkt. Nos. 64, 81). For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

II. Factual Background

On April 25, 2017, at approximately 1:00 a.m., a fire broke out at 300 Crown Colony Drive in Quincy, MA, in office space leased by Onex. (Dkt. No. 78, ¶ 1). Shortly thereafter, Quincy firefighter Keith Lentini arrived on the scene. (Dkt. No. 67-4, p. 3). Lentini first checked the building's fire alarm panel, which indicated that a smoke detector had been activated on the fifth floor of the building, where Onex's office was located, and that the sprinkler system was running. (Dkt. No. 67-4, p. 4). He then proceeded to the fifth floor to find Onex's office filled with smoke, and ultimately discovered a printer on fire at the source of the smoke. (Dkt. No. 67-5, p. 4). Lentini unplugged the printer and extinguished the fire with the help of another firefighter. (Dkt. No. 67-5, p. 4). This printer was later identified as an HP LaserJet 4250n model printer (hereinafter, the "4250n printer"). (Dkt. No. 67-8, p. 2).

The previous evening, Onex IT technician Jin Lem had moved the 4250n printer into a cubicle in Onex's office to repurpose it for a new department. (Dkt. No. 67-2, p. 5). Lem plugged the 4250n printer into a power source, ran a test print, and left the printer in standby mode when he left for the night. (Dkt. No. 67-2, pp. 5-6, 12). The fire took place in that cubicle approximately five hours later. (Dkt. No. 78, ¶ 9). At the time of the fire, there was a second printer also located in that cubicle, later identified as an HP LaserJet p3015n printer (hereinafter, the "p3015 printer") (Dkt. No. 67-11, p. 7).²

HP designed and manufactured both printers and Insight sold them to Onex's predecessor. (Dkt. No. 78, ¶ 3). Onex's predecessor purchased the 4250n printer in 2007 and the p3015 printer in 2013. (Dkt. No. 78, ¶ 4). Neither printer had a known history of issues or repairs in the years leading up to the fire. (Dkt. No. 78, ¶ 5).

The parties dispute how the fire ignited, drawing their theories from the testimony and reports of first responders, Onex IT technician Jin Lem, and their own respective expert witnesses. Both parties rely to varying degrees on the deposition testimony of Lem and Quincy firefighter Keith Lentini. The plaintiffs additionally rely on expert witnesses Edward Noonan and Matthew Elliott to support their account of the fire, while the defendants rely on expert witnesses Timothy Myers and Donald Galler.

Liberty Mutual retained Edward Noonan, a certified fire investigator as well as a firefighter in Foxborough, MA, to investigate and determine the cause and origin of the fire. (Dkt. No. 79, pp. 34-35). Noonan conducted his on-site investigation on April 28, 2017, three days after the fire took place. (Dkt. No. 67-8, p. 2). During his investigation, Noonan interviewed Lem, reviewed Lentini's deposition, observed the two printers, and took photos of the printers and the cubicle where the fire took place. (Dkt. No. 79, pp. 37-40, 43; Dkt. No. 67-8, pp. 15-19). Based on all the evidence he observed, Noonan concluded the fire originated within the 4250n printer.

Matthew Elliott, a certified fire and explosion investigator, serves as the plaintiffs' electrical engineering expert. (Dkt. No. 67-13, p. 11). Based on multiple examinations of the damaged printers, tests performed on exemplar HP 4250 series printers, additional research, and a review of available testimony and other court filings (including Noonan's report), Elliott concluded that a fault within the 4250n printer's power supply, namely in and around the printed circuit board (or "PCB"), resulted in an "electrical arcing" event within the 4250n printer that then caused the fire.³ (Dkt. No. 67-13, pp. 3-9). On his way to that conclusion, Elliott determined that the p3015 printer and its power cord sustained damage from an external "fire attack," rejecting the theory that any part of the p3015 printer, including its power cord, was the cause of the fire. (Dkt. No. 67-13, pp. 8-9). Finally, although Elliott concluded that some fault related to the 4250n printer's PCB caused the fire, the degree of damage to the circuit board rendered it impossible to identify the exact cause. (Dkt. No. 67-13, p. 9).

The defendants offer a competing theory of the fire based on the reports and testimony of their expert witnesses. In short, the defendants argue the fire was caused by an electrical arcing event in the power cord of the p3015 printer, which then spread to consume significant portions of the 4250n printer. The defendants theorize that the power cord of the p3015 printer had previously sustained mechanical damage, and that this mechanical damage created conditions that could support the type of electrical arcing capable of starting a fire. (Dkt. No. 67-11, p. 20). The defendants further suggest that, considering the years both printers functioned without issue, the relocation of one or both printers the evening before the fire may have dealt the decisive mechanical damage to the p3015 printer's power cord that ultimately caused the fire. (Dkt. No. 67-12, p. 16).

III. Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The role of summary judgment is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Carrozza v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 992 F.3d 44, 56 (1st Cir. 2021) (internal quotation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lima v. City of E. Providence, 17 F.4th 202, 206 (1st Cir. 2021). The moving party has the initial burden to prove the absence of such a genuine dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine, triable dispute. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The Court must view the entire record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and indulge all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Friends of Merrymeeting Bay v. Hydro Kennebec, LLC, 759 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2014).

B. Daubert in the Context of Summary Judgment

The defendants combine much of their summary judgment argument with the separate but conceptually related argument that the court should exclude the plaintiffs' expert witnesses as unreliable. Under the familiar Daubert standard, the court weighs reliability and relevance in assessing "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying [expert scientific] testimony is scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (clarifying that Daubert applies to all expert testimony). That assessment may consider factors including whether the theory or technique has been tested; whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; in the case of a technique, its known or potential rate of error as well as the existence and maintenance of any standards controlling its operation; and the extent of its acceptance within the relevant scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786. In a motion to exclude pursuant to Daubert, the burden on the party who proffers expert testimony is not to prove that an expert's conclusion is correct but rather that the expert reached their conclusion in a scientifically sound and methodologically reliable way. Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998). Moreover, as Daubert is careful to underscore, "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of...