Neves v. State

316 A.3d 1197

Joao NEVES

v.STATE of Rhode Island.

Keith Nunes

v.State of Rhode Island.

Pablo Ortega

v.State of Rhode Island.

Mario Monteiro

v.State of Rhode Island.

No. 2022-92-M.P.

(PM 22-259)

No. 2022-93-M.P.

(PM 22-901)

No. 2022-94-M.P.

(PM 22-260)

No. 2023-167-M.P.

(PM 23-921)

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 2, 2024

Providence County Superior Court, Associate Justice Stephen P. Nugent

Christopher R. Bush, Department of Attorney General, for Petitioner

Lynette J. Labinger, Esq., for Respondents.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Goldberg, for the Court.

The United States Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional to impose upon individuals who were under eighteen years old at the time of their crimes: sentences of death, life imprisonment without parole for a nonhomicide offense, or man- datory life imprisonment without parole.¹ In arriving at these decisions, the Supreme Court "relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults"; namely, individuals under eighteen years of age possess a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," which often leads "to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking"; younger persons "are more vulnerable * * * to negative influences and outside pressures," including peer pressure, "have limited ‘control over their own environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings"; and a juvenile’s "character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s[,] his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievable depravity.’" Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (brackets omitted) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)). As explained, "[t]hese salient characteristics mean that 'it is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’" Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (brackets omitted) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183).

Here, we are confronted with a different dynamic as set forth in G.L. 1956 § 13-8-13(e) (Subsection (e) or the amendment), but it embodies many of the same principles discussed in Miller, Graham, and Roper—"the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes." Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Enacted in 2021, notably as part of the FY 2022 state budget, Subsection (e) states in full:

"Any person sentenced for any offense committed prior to his or her twenty-second birthday, other than a person serving life without parole, shall be eligible for parole review and a parole permit may be issued after the person has served no fewer than twenty (20) years’ imprisonment unless the person is entitled to earlier parole eligibility pursuant to any other provisions of law. This subsection shall be given prospective and retroactive effect for all offenses occurring on or after January 1, 1991." (Emphasis added.)

The parties—the State of Rhode Island (petitioner or state) and Joao Neves, Keith Nunes, Pablo Ortega, and Mario Monteiro (collectively, respondents)—offer conflicting interpretations of Subsection (e). The state contends that because Subsection (e) employs the phrase "any offense"—in the singular—Subsection (e) is intended to reduce parole eligibility for a single sentence and that qualified offenders serving multiple sentences, such as respondents, are not eligible for a reduction in parole eligibility pursuant to the amendment’s terms. (Emphasis added.) The respondents counter that Subsection (e) applies to "any offense," and thus submit that based upon the meaning and breadth of the term "any," the amendment requires aggregating (or combining) multiple sentences for qualified offenders, including consecutive sentences. (Emphasis added.)

For the reasons discussed below, we hold that Subsection (e) mandates the aggregation of a qualified offender’s sentences, including consecutive sentences, and the Court further concludes that Subsection (e), as interpreted, does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. However, the Court declares that although Subsection (e) applies to respondents, the trial justice erred when he ordered each respondent immediately paroled to the community. We explain herein.²

Facts and Travel

We first consider the aggregation of prison sentences for parole eligibility. For those incarcerated and serving multiple terms, whether or not the sentences are aggregated can mean the difference between serving a sentence in prison and serving a sentence outside the prison walls, such as on parole. In this context, aggregation means combining the sum total of all pending sentences. To illustrate, an offender receiving three consecutive ten-year terms would be sentenced to imprisonment for thirty years, but in accordance with § 13-8-10(a), the offender is eligible for parole after serving "a term equal to one-third (?) of the aggregate time which he or she shall be liable to serve under his or her several sentences," in other words, ten years.

The parties agree that the prerequisites to Subsection (e) are satisfied: Each respondent committed his crimes after January 1, 1991, the crimes were committed before each respondent was twenty-two years old, none of the respondents were sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, and each respondent has served at least twenty years at the Adult Correctional Institutions. They also agree that three respondents (Neves, Ortega, and Nunes) have been sentenced to life imprisonment, and a specified term (a number of years) of incarceration, to be served consecutively to the life sentence; and that Monteiro is serving two consecutive life sentences. The parties disagree whether Subsection (e) requires these sentences to be aggregated, thus resulting in the determination of a single parole eligibility date for each respondent on all sentences; or whether Subsection (e) prohibits aggregation, thus resulting in each respondent receiving a parole eligibility date on the controlling sentence only, i.e., the life sentence. The difference is self-evident: If the sentences are aggregated, each respondent may be paroled to the community; if the sentences are nonaggregated and a respondent is granted parole on the life sentence (whenever that may occur), he must begin serving the consecutive sentence. Only after becoming eligible for parole on the consecutive sentence—and being granted parole on that sentence—may each respondent be paroled to the community. We note at the outset that based on the dates these crimes were committed, parole eligibility for each life sentence was twenty years. See § 13-8-13(a)(3).

A Joao Neves

On February 4, 2000, Neves entered a plea of guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison. In five separate cases, Neves later pled guilty to seven counts of robbery and one count of assault with intent to commit robbery. He received ten-year sentences on the convictions for robbery and assault with intent to commit robbery, with all ten-year sentences to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the life sentence. Effectively, Neves was sentenced to life in prison, and a ten-year consecutive sentence. Neves committed all offenses in January 1999, when he was sixteen years old.

Neves appeared before the parole board on August 21, 2019, nearly two years before Subsection (e) was enacted. The parole board minutes set forth a thoughtful analysis and provide, in relevant part:

"[T]he Board unanimously votes to parole him August 2021 to his next consecutive sentence. * * * The reason for the staggered date is the amount of time the Board believes Mr. Neves should serve on the LIFE sentence. We will consider him when he is next eligible on his ten year consecutive sentence and we will also schedule a review date in August 2021 to review and assign any special conditions of parole for his Life sentence."

On August 23, 2021, approximately two months after the enactment of Subsection (e), Neves again appeared before the parole board. The parole board minutes indicate, in relevant part:

"This is a Review as requested in Mr. Neves[’s] August 2019 parole decision so the Board can check in with him and discuss conditions of parole for his Life Sentence. We commend Mr. Neves for staying positive and on track. We would like to see him participate in programming to address anger management and mindfulness during the next year."

A parole permit issued for Neves in August 2021, which included the special condition that Neves be "Parole[d] to Consecutive Sentence." The Department of Corrections (DOC) subsequently determined that Neves would be eligible for parole from his consecutive sentence and to the community in December 2024.³

B Keith Nunes

A jury convicted Nunes of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, three counts of felony assault, carrying a pistol without a license, and a drive-by shooting. Nunes was sentenced to life in prison on the first-degree murder conviction and ten-year concurrent sentences on the remaining counts, to be served consecutively to the life sentence. This Court affirmed the conviction. See State v. Nunes, 788 A.2d 460, 465 (R.I. 2002). Effectively, Nunes was sentenced to life in prison, and a ten-year consecutive term. Nunes committed his crimes on June 13, 1999, when he was eighteen years old.

On June 17, 2019, approximately two years before the enactment of Subsection (e), Nunes appeared before the parole board. The parole board minutes state, in relevant part:

"[T]he Board votes to parole him from this Life Sentence to his next Consecutive Sentence of

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