Newfeld v. Midwood Ambulance & Oxygen Serv., Inc.

204 A.D.3d 813

164 N.Y.S.3d 497 (Mem)

Shelly NEWFELD, etc., respondent,

v.MIDWOOD AMBULANCE & OXYGEN SERVICE, INC., et al., appellants.

2019–13509

Index No. 509889/15

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—February 1, 2022

April 13, 2022

Cascone & Kluepfel, LLP, Garden City, NY (Howard B. Altman of counsel), for appellants.

Burns & Harris, New York, NY (Judith F. Stempler of counsel), for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., COLLEEN D. DUFFY, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Loren Baily–Schiffman, J.), dated November 21, 2019. The order granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants’ affirmative defenses alleging comparative negligence.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On April 1, 2015, on a roadway in Brooklyn, a vehicle operated by the plaintiff, Shelly Newfeld, in which Eric Lewis was a passenger, was struck in the rear by an ambulance operated by the defendant Michael Gontar and owned by the defendant Midwood Ambulance & Oxygen Service, Inc. (hereinafter Midwood). In August 2015, Newfeld and Lewis commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries each allegedly sustained in the accident. In September 2015, the defendants interposed a verified answer, inter alia, denying the material allegations of the complaint and asserting 10 affirmative defenses. Lewis died in 2018, and the caption was amended to substitute Newfeld as the administrator of his estate. By notice of motion dated October 21, 2019, Newfeld moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the affirmative defenses alleging comparative negligence. In an order dated November 21, 2019, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The defendants appeal.

"A plaintiff is no longer required to show freedom from comparative fault to establish her or his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability" ( Xin Fang Xia v. Saft, 177 A.D.3d 823, 825, 113 N.Y.S.3d 249 ; see Rodriguez v. City of New York, 31 N.Y.3d 312, 323, 76 N.Y.S.3d 898, 101 N.E.3d 366 ). Nevertheless, a plaintiff moving for summary judgment dismissing a defendant's affirmative defense of comparative negligence may seek to establish freedom from comparative fault as a matter of law (see Poon v. Nisanov, 162 A.D.3d 804, 808, 79 N.Y.S.3d 227 ).

"A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle" ( Nsiah–Ababio v. Hunter, 78 A.D.3d 672, 672, 913 N.Y.S.2d 659 ; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a] ). As such, "a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a [non-negligent] explanation for the collision" ( Drakh v. Levin, 123 A.D.3d 1084, 1085, 1 N.Y.S.3d 202 ; see Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 908, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726 ; Lisetskiy v. Weiss, 123 A.D.3d 775, 776, 999 N.Y.S.2d 83 ).

Here, Newfeld established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. She demonstrated, prima facie, that Gontar was negligent in his operation of the Midwood vehicle by striking the rear of her vehicle while it was stopped and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident (see Pollet v. Charyn, 200 A.D.3d 728, 159 N.Y.S.3d 92 ; Perez v. Persad, 183 A.D.3d 771, 772, 123 N.Y.S.3d 683 ; Xin Fang Xia v. Saft, 177 A.D.3d at 826, 113 N.Y.S.3d 249 ; Poon v. Nisanov, 162 A.D.3d at 808, 79 N.Y.S.3d 227 ). Newfeld also established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the defendants’ affirmative defenses alleging that Newfeld and Lewis were comparatively negligent (see Higashi v. M & R Scarsdale Rest., LLC, 176 A.D.3d 788, 790, 111 N.Y.S.3d 92 ). The evidence Newfeld submitted in support of her motion included a split-screen video depicting the accident as recorded from the defendants’ vehicle. One screen depicted Gontar looking down at his cell phone and not looking ahead at the traffic in front of his moving vehicle. The second screen simultaneously depicted the Midwood vehicle strike the rear of Newfeld's...