Newkirk v. Pezzelli Nursing Home, Inc.

1

DOMINIQUA NEWKIRK, Plaintiff, v. PEZZELLI NURSING HOME, INC. d/b/a GOLDEN CREST NURSING CENTRE and PAUL PEZZELLI Defendants.

C. A. No. PC-2022-04394

Superior Court of Rhode Island, Providence

March 28, 2023

For Plaintiff: Vicki J. Bejma, Esq.

For Defendant: Michael D. Chittick, Esq., Brendan F. Ryan, Esq.

DECISION

McHUGH, J.

Before this Court for decision is Defendants Paul Pezzelli (Mr Pezzelli) and Pezzelli Nursing Home, Inc. d/b/a Golden Crest Nursing Centre's (Golden Crest) Motion to Dismiss Paul Pezzelli as to All Counts and Both Defendants as to Count VIII (Mot. to Dismiss)),^[1]to which Plaintiff Dominiqua Newkirk (Plaintiff) objects. (Docket.) Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 8-2-14, 28-5-1, 28-48-1, 28-50-1, and 42-112-1.

I Facts and Travel

Plaintiff was employed by Golden Crest from 2013 to 2021. (Compl ¶¶ 1, 3, 56.) Mr. Pezzelli is the administrator of Golden Crest and President of Pezzelli Nursing Home, Inc. Id. ¶ 2.

Plaintiff-an African American female-alleges that during her employment with Golden Crest, "Pezzelli treated African-American employees differently than white employees." Id. ¶¶ 45. While the details of the alleged discrimination are irrelevant for purposes of deciding the present motion, it should be noted that Plaintiff describes at length actions taken by Mr Pezzelli-who supervised Plaintiff-that led her to this conclusion. See generally id. ¶¶ 6-43.

On March 6, 2021, while employed at Golden Crest, Plaintiff "went to an urgent care for chest and back pains, and was advised to take three days out of work, then follow up with her primary care doctor." Id. ¶ 44. Thereafter, at the direction of her primary care physician, Plaintiff took medical leave for one month and "promptly submitted her leave documentation to Golden Crest" before taking said leave. Id. ¶¶ 45-46. During her medical leave, Plaintiff learned that Mr. Pezzelli was telling co-workers that Plaintiff would not be coming back to work. Id. ¶ 47. "Plaintiff attempted to contact Pezzelli, but never got an answer." Id. ¶ 48. In addition, "Defendants posted Plaintiff's position online on or about March 21, 2021." Id. ¶ 49.

"On June 4, 2021, Plaintiff's physician cleared her to return to work on June 5, 2021, and provided a note reflecting that." Id. ¶ 52. Aware of the need to receive permission to return to work, Plaintiff "immediately delivered her doctor's note clearing her return to work on June 5, 2021." Id. ¶ 54. "Plaintiff made several attempts to call management regarding her clearance to return to work[,]" but Plaintiff received a letter from Golden Crest on June 8, 2021, informing her that she was terminated "purportedly for having used all of her FMLA time as of June 8, 2021[.]" Id. ¶¶ 55-56. Plaintiff submits that she "was terminated at the behest of Pezzelli." Id. ¶ 57.

On July 14, 2022, Plaintiff initiated the present action, alleging various state employment law discrimination claims against Defendants. Docket; see generally Compl. ¶¶ 58-120.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Golden Crest violated the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (RIFEPA), the Rhode Island Parental and Family Medical Leave Act (RIPFMLA), the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA), and the Whistleblowers' Protection Act. Id. ¶¶ 58-112. Plaintiff also avers that Mr. Pezzelli, in his individual capacity, is liable for violations under RIPFMLA and RICRA. Id. ¶¶ 58-75, 107-112. In addition, Plaintiff asserts Mr. Pezzelli is liable for "tortious interference with contract and economic advantage." Id. ¶¶ 113-120.

Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss with an accompanying memorandum on August 29, 2022. (Docket.) Plaintiff filed her Objection and a memorandum of law in support thereof on September 27, 2022. Id. Thereafter, Defendants filed a reply brief on October 7, 2022. Id. Following oral argument regarding the Motion to Dismiss heard on December 6, 2022, this Court now renders its Decision.

II Standard of Review

'"The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint."' EDC Investment, LLC v. UTGR, Inc., 275 A.3d 537, 542 (R.I. 2022) (quoting Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, 176 A.3d 472, 476 (R.I. 2018)). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial justice is "confined to the four corners of the complaint and must assume all allegations are true, resolving any doubts in plaintiff's favor." Narragansett Electric Co. v. Minardi, 21 A.3d 274, 278 (R.I. 2011). "A Rule 12(b)(6) motion 'does not deal with the likelihood of success on the merits, but rather with the viability of a plaintiff's bare-bones allegations and claims as they are set forth in the complaint.'" Ferreira v. Child and Family Services, 222 A.3d 69, 75 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Hyatt v. Village House Convalescent Home, Inc., 880 A.2d 821, 824 (R.I. 2005)). "'A motion to dismiss may be granted only when it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that a party would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of conceivable facts that could be proven in support of its claim.'" Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 160 A.3d 970, 973 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Tri-Town Construction Co. v. Commerce Park Associates 12, LLC, 139 A.3d 467, 478 (R.I. 2016)).

III

Analysis A

Counts III, IV, and VI: RIFEPA Claims

Defendants argue that Counts III, IV, and VI (the RIFEPA claims) should be dismissed as against Mr. Pezzelli because (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by not including Mr. Pezzelli as a respondent in the related proceedings before the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, and (2) the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159 (R.I. 2017) clearly precludes a finding of individual liability against Mr. Pezzelli under the RIFEPA. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Defs.' Mem.) 4-5; see also id. at 5 (citing and relying on Mancini, 155 A.3d at 165). However, as acknowledged by Plaintiff, the Complaint clearly limits Counts III, IV and VI-or the RIFEPA claims-to Golden Crest alone. See Compl. ¶¶ 76-91, 100-106; Mem. in Supp. of Obj. to Mot. to Dismiss (Pl.'s Mem.) 3-5. Ostensibly, those claims are solely directed at Golden Crest because the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in Mancini explicitly precludes individual liability claims under RIFEPA. Mancini, 155 A.3d at 165 ("It is our view that, if the General Assembly intended to authorize the imposition of individual liability, it would have done so by using language far clearer than that employed in § 28-5-7(6).")

Therefore, although Defendants argue for dismissal of Counts III, IV, and VI with respect to Mr. Pezzelli, the Court need not reach a decision on those requests because Plaintiff concedes that its RIFEPA claims do not seek to impose liability on Mr. Pezzelli under RIFEPA. See Pl.'s Mem. at 3-5; see also Compl. ¶¶ 76-91, 100-106.

B

Count V: Whistleblower Claim

Next, Defendants argue that any claim against Mr. Pezzelli for violation of Rhode Island's Whistleblowers' Protection Act (the RIWPA)-i.e., Count V-should be dismissed because the RIWPA does not allow for individual liability against supervisors for employment discrimination. (Defs.' Mem. 9-11.)

Here, the Complaint makes clear that Count V alleges violations of the RIWPA against Golden Crest and does not implicate Mr. Pezzelli in his individual capacity. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 99 ("Said actions of Defendant Golden Crest were wicked and wanton .... Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendant Golden Crest[.]"). Moreover, Plaintiff concedes that the RIWPA limits liability to "employers" and does not allow for individual liability. See Pl.'s Mem. at 4-5; §§ 28-50-2 to 28-50-3.

Accordingly, there is no basis for dismissal of claims under Count V-as argued by Defendants-because Mr. Pezzelli is not an individual defendant with respect to Count V. See Compl. ¶¶ 92-99.

C

Counts II and VII: Individual Liability Under RICRA

Plaintiff's claims under Counts II and VII-alleging violation of RICRA-are asserted against both Defendants. (Compl ¶¶ 67-75, 107-112.) With respect to these Counts, the sole issue for purposes of the instant Motion to Dismiss is whether, under RICRA, Mr. Pezzelli can be held individually liable for employment discrimination he allegedly committed in his capacity as Plaintiff's supervisor. See Defs.' Mem. at 5-8; Pl.'s Mem. at 7-11; see also generally Compl. ¶¶ 4-57 (containing Plaintiff's allegations of disparate treatment).

On that issue, Defendants contend that "[i]nterpreting the Rhode Island employment discrimination statutes, including RIFEPA and RICRA, consistently with Title VII, there is no individual liability under either RIFEPA or RICRA." (Defs.' Mem. 6.) Further, Defendants submit that pursuant to the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in Horn v. Southern Union Co., 927 A.2d 292 (R.I. 2007), RIFEPA and RICRA must be read in relation to each other to harmonize the two statutory schemes. See Defs.' Mem. at 5-8 (citing and quoting Horn, 927 A.2d at 295-96). Defendants submit that the harmonization of these statutory schemes means that the inability to pursue individual liability under RIFEPA should apply with equal force to RICRA. See id. Therefore, Defendants conclude that Plaintiff's claim against Mr. Pezzelli for violation of RICRA should be dismissed as a matter of law. Id. at 7-8.

In response, Plaintiff asserts that individual supervisors are subject to liability under RICRA because RICRA is broader than RIFEPA, and as such, the holding in Mancini should not be interpreted to prohibit RICRA claims against individual supervisors. See Pl.'s Mem. at 7-9. In support of that contention, Plaintiff details the contextual...