Newlin v. Adamar

363 Ga.App. 456

871 S.E.2d 458

NEWLIN et al.

v.ADAMAR et al.

A22A0497

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 25, 2022

Benjamin Dave Driggers, for Appellant.

T. Rabb Wilkerson III, Warner Robins, Nyonnohweah Seekie, for Appellee.

Brown, Judge.

Orville and Holly Newlin appeal from the trial court's denial of their petition to adopt their great-nephew, A. D. They contend that the trial court erred in finding that it would not be in A. D.’s best interest for the adoption to be granted. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

"[I]n an adoption case, the trial judge sits as both judge and jury[.]" (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hooper v. Hedgepath , 340 Ga. App. 163, 165, 796 S.E.2d 779 (2017). "[T]he trial court has a very broad discretion which will not be controlled by the appellate courts except in cases of plain abuse. Thus, if there is any evidence to support the judgment entered in an adoption proceeding, it must be affirmed by this Court." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Price v. Grehofsky , 349 Ga. App. 214, 215, 825 S.E.2d 594 (2019). On appeal, we construe the evidence to uphold the trial court's findings and judgment, but as to questions of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. Hooper , 340 Ga. App. at 165, 796 S.E.2d 779.

So viewed, the record shows that A. D. was born to Hayley Adamar and William Denny in August 2016. After the birth, Adamar and the child lived with Adamar's maternal grandmother, who financially supported A. D. Sometime in 2018, the grandmother kicked Adamar out of the house, and Adamar moved to Texas, leaving A. D. behind with the grandmother. While Adamar was out-of-state, the grandmother had multiple strokes. Orville Newlin, the son of the grandmother, and his wife, Holly, agreed to care for A. D., beginning in August 2018. Adamar returned from Texas after a month and agreed that the Newlins should be A. D.’s temporary guardians until Adamar could complete rehabilitation for her methamphetamine addiction. In October 2018, the Newlins were appointed temporary guardians of A. D.

Adamar entered the rehabilitation center, but left after a few days. Shortly after, the Newlins and Adamar arranged that she would see A. D. every Wednesday. Adamar and her dad visited with A. D., but at some point the visitations stopped, and the last time Adamar saw A. D. was December 25, 2018. On the first two Wednesdays of 2019, Adamar informed the Newlins that she was unable to see A. D. On the third Wednesday, Adamar texted Orville Newlin to visit A. D., but Newlin declined, explaining that Adamar had contacted them too late in the day for a visit.

At some point in early 2019, Adamar relapsed and did not attempt to contact the Newlins to see A. D. until August 2019, when she asked Orville if she could come over and bring A. D. birthday gifts. The Newlins declined her visit. In February 2020, Orville Newlin called Adamar to ask her permission to adopt A. D. Adamar asked that they meet in person to discuss the issue, but they never worked out a time to meet. Adamar texted Orville in March, April, and May 2020, asking to visit A. D. The Newlins either declined or did not respond. Shortly before the Newlins filed their petition, Adamar sent them a letter, detailing her frustration that they had not let her see A. D. and her intention to gradually re-introduce herself into A. D.’s life and eventually regain full custody.

On May 6, 2020, the Newlins filed a petition in the Superior Court of Houston County for the adoption of A. D., seeking to terminate the parental rights of Adamar and A. D.’s biological father, William Denny, pursuant to OCGA §§ 19-8-7 and 19-8-10 (b). Adamar filed a response and a counterclaim for visitation, objecting to the adoption. Adamar asserted that she intended to "gradually restore her rights as the primary physical custodian and legal custodian of [A. D.]" On April 13, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the petition for adoption. The Newlins, Adamar, and Denny were present and represented by counsel.¹

During the hearing, Adamar testified that she had been sober for nearly two years, completed her GED, been employed full-time for a year, and remarried. She testified that she and her husband, who also was employed, had another child and that the three of them lived in her mother-in-law's home. Adamar also testified that she was able to provide for A. D. and that she wanted to "repair the bond with [her child]"; her ultimate goal was to have custody of A. D., but she recognized it needed to be a gradual transition for him. After hearing testimony from the Newlins, Adamar, Adamar's dad, Adamar's mother-in-law, and William Denny, the trial court orally ruled that it was denying the petition because it did not find that the Newlins had shown by clear and convincing evidence that the adoption would be in the best interest of A. D.² The Newlins appeal, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the best interest of A. D. would be served by denying their petition to adopt.

Pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-7,

[a] child may be adopted by a relative who is related by blood or marriage to the child as a ... great aunt, [or] great uncle ... only if each living parent and guardian of such child has voluntarily and in writing surrendered to that relative and any spouse of such relative all of his or her rights to the child for the purpose of enabling that relative and any such spouse to adopt the child.

OCGA § 19-8-7 (a). However,

[a] surrender of rights of a living parent pursuant to Code Section ... 19-8-7 shall not be required as a prerequisite to the granting of a petition for adoption ..., when the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the parent, for a period of one year or longer immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, without justifiable cause, has significantly failed:

(1) To communicate or to make a bona fide attempt to communicate with that child in a meaningful, supportive, parental manner; or

(2) To provide for the care and support of that child as required by law or judicial decree, and the court is of the opinion that the adoption is in the best interests of that child, after considering the physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and needs of the child who is the subject of the proceeding, including the need for a secure and stable home.

OCGA § 19-8-10 (b). See also Hooper , 340 Ga. App. at 165-166 (1), 796 S.E.2d 779. "It is the petitioner's burden to prove that termination of the parental rights is warranted, including the lack of justifiable cause. If the petitioner meets that burden of...