Newton v. City of N.Y., 07 Civ. 6211 (SAS)

ALAN NEWTON, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK; SERGEANT PATRICK J. McGUIRE,POLICE OFFICER STACY HASKINS, GERALDINE KIELY,AND INSPECTOR JACK J. TRABITZ,INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES ASEMPLOYEES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendants.

07 Civ. 6211 (SAS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 4, 2016

OPINION AND ORDER

SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, U.S.D.J.:

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2007, Alan Newton sued the City of New York (the "City") and certain of its employees (with the City, "defendants"), alleging a federal civil rights claim and pendent state claims for defendants' failure to produce a rape kit that, when finally located in 2005, overturned his 1985 conviction for rape, robbery and assault.¹ In bringing this action, Newton sought, inter alia, to impose liabilityunder Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code ("Section 1983") and for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") under state law.

At trial, which began in September 2010, the jury returned a verdict in Newton's favor on both claims — awarding him eighteen million dollars on the Section 1983 claim and $92,500 on the IIED claim. After trial, defendants moved to set aside both verdicts pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alternatively, defendants moved for a new trial or remittitur under Rules 59(a) and (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respectively.

On May 12, 2011, this Court granted defendants' Rule 50(b) motion in full, setting aside both verdicts and declining to reach the merits of defendants' Rule 59 motions (the "May 12, 2011 Decision").² Newton appealed only the setting aside of the Section 1983 verdict. On February 26, 2015, the Second Circuit found for Newton and reinstated that award.³ The Second Circuit mandate issued on May 22, 2015 (the "Mandate"), remanding this case for further proceedings.

On remand, defendants now seek a ruling on their outstanding Rule 59 motions. Newton objects, however, to this Court's authority to decide thesemotions at this stage — arguing that defendants have abandoned them and that the Mandate precludes their adjudication.⁴

For the following reasons, I find that this Court retains jurisdiction to decide defendants' pending Rule 59(a) and (e) motions. The Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial is DENIED and the Rule 59(e) motion for remittitur is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND⁵

A. The V.J. and E.G. Convictions

In May 1985, Newton was convicted on charges relating to two separate sexual assault incidents. The first conviction — of which Newton was ultimately exonerated — was for rape, robbery, and assault (the "V.J. Conviction"). This conviction was based primarily on eyewitness testimony. No DNA evidence was offered at trial, as the science of DNA testing was not yet adequately advanced. On this conviction, Newton was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of thirteen and one-third to forty years.

Also in May 1985, Newton was convicted of First Degree AttemptedRape, a Class C felony, and Endangering the Welfare of a Minor, a misdemeanor (the "E.G. Conviction"). The victim was a nine-year-old girl. On this conviction, Newton was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of three and one-third to ten years. Newton was to serve the V.J. and E.G. sentences consecutively.

B. Exoneration from the V.J. Conviction

In 1994, approximately eleven years into Newton's incarceration, New York State enacted legislation allowing post-conviction defendants to request and obtain DNA testing under certain circumstances.⁶ Between 1994 and 2002, Newton thrice requested and received permission from a New York State court to conduct DNA testing on evidence from the V.J. crime scene. In each instance, the City was unable to locate the rape kit containing the relevant biological evidence.

V.J.'s rape kit was finally located in 2005, and DNA testing excluded Newton as the source of the sperm collected from the victim. Accordingly, in 2006, the New York Supreme Court vacated the V.J. Conviction and Newton was released from prison. Despite Newton's efforts, the E.G. Conviction was not overturned.⁷By the time of his release, however, Newton had served the maximum ten-year sentence for that conviction.⁸

C. Trial

In 2007, Newton brought this action seeking recovery for his wrongful V.J. Conviction. This case was tried by a jury in September 2010, with bifurcation of the Section 1983 claim's liability and damages phases.

1. Evidentiary Rulings

Among the pre-trial evidentiary rulings, this Court ruled on the admissibility of the E.G. Conviction (i.e., the attempted rape conviction that was not overturned). The Court admitted the following details about the E.G. Conviction: date of conviction, length of sentence, and that the conviction was for a Class C felony. The Court excluded the nature of the E.G. Conviction (attempted rape) and the fact that the victim was a minor. In accordance with these rulings, Newton stipulated at trial that he would have served the maximum ten-year sentence for the E.G. Conviction and thus, that he served twelve years for the V.J. Conviction.

2. Liability Phase

At the close of the Section 1983 liability phase, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court denied that motion, with the exception of granting defendants' motion to dismiss a negligence claim.

Newton's Section 1983 and IIED claims were submitted to the jury, who returned their liability verdicts on October 18, 2010. The jury found the City liable on the Section 1983 claim and two of the four individual defendants liable on the IIED claim.

3. Damages Phase

On the Section 1983 claim, Newton sought to recover only for his pain and suffering during the twelve years of his wrongful incarceration.⁹ Newton served as the only witness on the issue of damages. On direct examination, Newton testified, inter alia:

Plaintiff's Counsel: Can you describe those feelings of fear that you experienced during those last twelve years of incarceration?

Newton: I was charged with a sexual assault in a penitentiary which is considered the lowest level. You're considered the lowest prisoner in there. You could have a prisoner that walksaround with twenty-seven homicides and [is] a serial killer and you're still considered worse than him because of the nature of the offense. . . . [A]nd I['ve] seen a lot of people that had sexual assault crimes become a victim in there because of the nature of the offense. And so you always had to — that was a consideration in the back of my mind and it was something that I had to live with every day.¹⁰

Newton also testified that he "really never suffered [any] physical injuries" while incarcerated and had not sought medical assistance for feelings of depression after his release.¹¹ He also explained that his conditions of confinement during his latter twelve years of confinement (for the V.J. Conviction) — while difficult and marked by severe limitations on his freedom, comfort, and privacy — did not differ significantly from those during his first ten years (for the E.G. Conviction).¹²

After Newton's direct examination, defendants again sought permission to disclose the nature of the E.G. Conviction to the jury. In support of this request, defendants argued that Newton's damages testimony had "opened the door toadmission of the nature of [the E.G. Conviction], also a sexual offense."¹³ Adhering to its original ruling, the Court denied defendants' request because "[t]he prejudice [of admission] outweigh[ed] the probative value."¹⁴

During summations, Newton's attorney suggested to the jury that Newton be awarded two million dollars per year of wrongful incarceration. Thereafter, the Court instructed the jury that Newton's attorney was "allowed to suggest [that amount] but you are in no way bound to follow it."¹⁵

The jury reached its damages verdicts on October 19, 2010. On the Section 1983 claim, the jury awarded a compensatory award of eighteen million dollars — which, allocated evenly across Newton's stipulated twelve years of wrongful incarceration, amounted to $1.5 million per year.¹⁶ On the IIED claim, the jury awarded $92,500.¹⁷

D. Defendants' Post-Trial Motions

After trial, in November 2010, defendants renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). Defendants also moved, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur under Rules 59(a) and (e). Defendants' Rule 50 and 59 motions were briefed together.

On May 12, 2011, this Court granted defendants' Rule 50(b) motion and set aside both the Section 1983 and IIED awards — holding, inter alia, that defendants' "delay in producing the DNA evidence resulted from the City's poor or non-existent evidence management system is indicative of negligence, but does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation."¹⁸ In so ruling, the May 12, 2011 Decision declined to reach the Rule 59 motions, explaining: "alternatively, defendants move for a new trial or remittitur. . . . Because I grant defendants' Rule 50(b) motion in its entirety, I do not consider these other claims."¹⁹ Neither party moved for reconsideration of the May 12, 2011 Decision.

E. Newton's Appeal

On June 23, 2011, Newton filed a Notice of Appeal from the portion of the May 12, 2011 Decision overturning the Section 1983 award.²⁰ In his OpeningBrief, filed November 4, 2011, Newton appealed only the grant of defendants' Rule 50(b) motion and did not mention the undecided Rule 59 motions.²¹ Defendants' Opposition Brief, filed on February 14, 2012, contained the following reference to the Rule 59 motions: "[a]lternatively, defendants moved for a new trial or remittitur of the damages award."²² Newton's Reply Brief, filed March 14, 2012, again did not mention the Rule 59 motions.²³ This Court's May 12, 2011 Decision was included in the appellate record at Dkt. No. 3.

Appellate argument was held on October 3, 2012. On February 26, 2015, the Second Circuit issued an...