Newton v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.

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TERRENCE K. NEWTON, SR. v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY

Civil Action No. 21-373-SDD-RLB

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana

September 15, 2023

RULING

SHELLY D. DICK CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE.

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by Defendant Illinois Central Railroad Company (“IC”).^[1]Plaintiff, Terrance K. Newton, Sr. (“Newton”), filed an Opposition,^[2] to which IC filed a Reply.^[3] For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss shall be granted.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

IC operates a railroad and employed Newton. Newton alleges he was working as a foreman for IC when he was denied advancement opportunities as a result of writing a statement about “a noose that he witnessed hanging on the company's premises”^[4] and was later terminated after “an error with respect to cancelling his authority” to operate a locomotive.^[5] After the error IC took Newton out of service without pay while it conducted an investigation into the error and, ultimately, terminated Newton.^[6] Newton sues IC for “injury,”^[7] “racial discrimination,” “disparate treatment,”^[8] “retaliatory tactics,”^[9] that Newton allegedly suffered when he was denied advancement opportunities and ultimately terminated from his employment as a foreman for IC.^[10]

Newton alleges that similarly situated IC foremen who are not in a protected class and held “a more substantial disciplinary history” committed “more detrimental” “infractions” but were not subject to the same discipline.^[11] Newton identified two foremen who committed infractions and were investigated but compensated while on leave pending investigations and not ultimately terminated by IC.^[12] Specifically, Newton alleges Wendell Moak (“Moak”) was a white man employed as a foreman who “committed a major derailment” and received a lower disciplinary level infraction, was not drug tested, and was compensated while investigated.^[13] Newton also alleges that another white man employed as a foreman, Miles Moreman (“Moreman”), “caused a work related accident but did not receive any disciplinary action and was not discharged.”^[14]

Newton alleges that he is “a member of a protected class,”^[15] however Newton fails to identify this class in any of his three complaints.

IC seeks dismissal of Newton's state law and federal law retaliation and discrimination claims.^[16] Newton concedes his retaliation claims and state law claims in his opposition to IC's Motion to Dismiss,^[17] the Court will only address the sufficiency of Newton's Title VII disparate treatment claims.

IC argues that Newton's alleged comparators identified in the Second Amended Complaint were not similarly situated employees that must be identified to state a disparate treatment claim because their employer's actions must take place in nearly identical circumstances, including the same job titles, same supervisor, and same actions giving rise to the discipline challenged by Newton.^[18] Specifically, IC challenges Newton's identification of Moak as a comparator because, according to Newton's own allegations, Moak committed a different infraction than Newton and is not alleged to have reported to the same supervisor as Newton.^[19] IC also challenges Moreman's classification as a comparator because he is not alleged to have committed the same or similar workplace conduct.^[20] Moreman was involved in an “accident” while Newton committed an “infraction” relative to his operating authority.^[21]

Newton counters that, by requiring him to identify comparators exactly similar to Newton, IC is attempting to hold Newton to a higher pleading standard that is not legally required. Newton also argues that IC's motion must be denied because he has established a prima facie case of discrimination, and IC has not presented any evidence to refute Newton's allegations.^[22]

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. 12(b)(6) Standard

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the standard to state a claim for relief requiring a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to seek dismissal of a complaint based on the “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”^[23]

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'”^[24] The court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”^[25] “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”^[26] In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”^[27] A complaint is also insufficient if it merely “tenders ‘naked assertions]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'”^[28] However, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”^[29] In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility that [the] defendant has acted unlawfully.”^[30] “Furthermore, while the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.'”^[31] On a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”^[32]Rather, the inquiry is whether the allegations in the complaint plausibly states a claim for relief. If the well-pleaded factual allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” then “the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ”^[33]

To the extent that Newton's arguments regarding IC's lack of contradictory evidence invite this Court to convert the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss to one for summary judgment, the Court declines.

B. State Law Claims & Retaliation Claims

IC seeks dismissal of Newton's state law claims as prescribed as well as his retaliation claims as not administratively exhausted prior to filing suit.^[34] In response, Newton “does not oppose Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion with respect to the Petitioners State Law Claims and/or the Petitioners Retaliation Claim.”^[35] Based on this concession, Newton's state law claims and retaliation claim are dismissed with prejudice as waived.

C. Title VII Disparate Treatment Claim

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from “discriminating]” against any individual with respect to employment “because of such individual's race.”^[36]“Disparate-treatment discrimination addresses employment actions that treat an employee worse than others based on the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In such disparate-treatment cases, proof and finding of discriminatory motive is required.”^[37]

i. Applicable Pleading Standard

The parties disagree about the standard applicable to Title VII disparate treatment claims under Rule 12(b)(6).^[38] IC challenges the sufficiency of Newton's factual allegations, and Newton counters that he has met his evidentiary burden by “satisfactorily establishing] a prima facie case of discrimination based upon the pertinent facts which have been plead” and “satisfied] the McDonnell Douglas framework.”^[39] The Fifth Circuit has explained that “[a]t the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, our analysis of the Title VII claim is governed... not [by] the evidentiary standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.”^[40] The Fifth Circuit instructs:

At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, our analysis of the Title VII claim is governed by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)-and not the evidentiary standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under Swierkiewicz, we have explained, “there are two ultimate elements a plaintiff must plead to support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII: (1) an adverse employment action, (2) taken against a plaintiff because of her protected status.” Cicalese v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted) (citing Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013)).

But “[a]lthough [a plaintiff does] not have to submit evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination [under McDonnell Douglas] at this stage, he [must] plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim to make his case plausible.” Chhim v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016). And when a plaintiff's Title VII disparate treatment discrimination claim depends on circumstantial evidence ..., the plaintiff “will ‘ultimately have to show' that he can satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework.” Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767 (quoting Chhim, 836 F.3d at 470). “In such cases, we have said that it can be ‘helpful to reference' that framework when the court is determining whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged the ultimate elements of the disparate treatment claim.” Id. (quoting Chhim, 836 F.3d at

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