Newton v. Pa. State Police, Civil Action No. 18-1639

ROBERT M. NEWTON, Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 18-1639

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 21, 2020

Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

Re: ECF No. 39

OPINION AND ORDER

KELLY, Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Robert M. Newton ("Newton") initiated this action against Defendant Pennsylvania State Police (the "PSP"), alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Count I) and violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (the "PHRA"), 43 Pa. Conn. Stat. § 955(a) (Count II). ECF No. 1. Newton alleges that the PSP discriminated against him because of a disability when it failed to promote him from the rank of Trooper to Corporal. Newton also alleges claims for harassment and retaliation. Id.

Presently before the Court is Newton's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment wherein he seeks judgment as a matter of law on the Rehabilitation Act claim (Count I) and part of the PHRA claims (Count II). ECF No. 39. For the reasons that follow, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied as to the Rehabilitation Act claim, however, the PHRA claims must be dismissed based on Eleventh Amendment immunity.¹

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Newton has worked for the PSP since September 25, 1995. ECF No. 38 ¶ 1. In March 1996, after Newton successfully completed the PSP Academy training program, the PSP promoted him to the rank of Trooper. Id. ¶ 2. In 2001, Newton was diagnosed with an osteosarcoma in his left shoulder that metastasized to his lung. Id. ¶ 3. In February 2002, Newton underwent surgery to remove part of his shoulder, which resulted in him experiencing limitations with the use of his left arm. Id. ¶ 4. In August 2002, Newton was selected for the position of Procurement and Supply Officer in the PSP Staff Services Unit. Id. ¶ 5. In April 2003, the PSP placed Newton on permanent limited duty status. Id. ¶ 6.

In the fall of 2015, Newton took the written and oral tests for promotion to the rank of Corporal. Id. ¶ 8. PSP bases promotions on the member's rank on the promotion list, which is determined by his/her score on the tests and then by seniority. Id. ¶ 9. Newton ranked 373 overall on the 2015-2016 PSP Corporal Promotion Examination Final Score Report. Id. ¶ 10.

The PSP Operations Manual states that members on (permanent or temporary) limited duty status may be ineligible for promotion unless the member is able to return to fully duty status within 90 calendar days. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Newton has never submitted medical documentation indicating he can return to full duty within 90 calendar days. Id. ¶ 23.

The PSP also has a practice of promoting individuals "in place." A promotion-in-place is a promotion from one rank to another while still performing the same job function the member has already been performing in the lower rank. Id. ¶ 11. PSP does not have a policy or written procedure regarding promotions in place, but the Commissioner's office reviews the promotion eligibility list and determines if anyone is eligible for promotion-in-place. Id. ¶¶ 12-14.

PSP asserts that it did not promote Newton from the rank of Trooper to Corporal because he did not submit medical documentation indicating that he could return to full duty. Id. ¶ 24.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Newton commenced this action on December 7, 2018 with the filing of a Complaint. ECF No. 1. In Count I of the Complaint, Newton alleges violations of the Rehabilitation Act based on the PSP's refusal to promote him to the position of Corporal because of his disability, record of disability and/or perceived disability. Id. ¶¶ 28-34. In Count II, Newton alleges that he was subjected to harassment, discrimination and retaliation by the PSP based on his disability in violation of the PHRA. Id. ¶¶ 35-37.

The PSP filed Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint on February 25, 2019. ECF No. 12. Thereafter, the parties conducted discovery. Discovery closed on January 31, 2020. ECF No. 26.

On March 16, 2020, Newton filed the instant Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in Support. ECF Nos. 39 and 40. Newton seeks judgment as a matter of law as to Count I, discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, and as to part of Count II, discrimination in violation of the PHRA. ECF No. 39 ¶ 5. The PSP filed a Response to Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Response in Opposition") on April 20, 2020. ECF No. 48.² Newton filed a Reply Brief. ECF No. 49.

The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is now ripe for consideration.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue of material fact is in genuine dispute if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) ("A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof"). Thus, summary judgment is warranted where, "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... a party ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004). "[W]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted).

In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Matreale v. N.J. Dep't of Military & Veterans Affairs, 487 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2007); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Rehabilitation Act Discrimination - Count I

Newton argues that summary judgment as to his Rehabilitation Act discrimination claim is proper because the PSP has admitted that it did not promote Newton because of his disability. ECF No. 40 at 3-7. Specifically, Newton asserts that the only explanation offered by the PSP for the failure to promote Newton is that he was unable to provide documentation that he could return to full duty within 90 days. Newton contends that this reason establishes that the PSP did not promote him because of his disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act and, as such, there are no remaining material issues of fact. Id. at 3.

In its Response in Opposition to Newton's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 48, the PSP states that it is not disputed that Newton had limited use of his left arm and was on limited duty status. However, it argues that to be promoted "in place," an employee must meet the eligibility requirements provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania State Troopers Association.³ Accordingly, the PSP's primary argument in opposition as to the Rehabilitation Act discriminationclaim, as well as the PHRA claim, is that the PSP had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting Newton "in place." The PSP states that Newton failed to produce documentation that he could return to full duty within 90 days, and so was not otherwise eligible for promotion. Id. at 2-5.

In considering Newton's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I, we begin by looking to the statute. Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq., applies to federal employers or employers who receive federal funding and "forbids employers from discriminating against persons with disabilities in matters of hiring, placement, or advancement." Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F. 3d 827, 830 (3d. Cir. 1996); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (providing, in pertinent part, that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ..."). Further, Section 504 adopts the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq. and 12201-12204 and 12210. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d). As such, "[t]he standards used to determine whether the [Rehabilitation] Act has been violated are the same standards applied under the ADA." Coleman v. Pa. State Police, 561 F. App'x. 138, 143 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F. 3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002)).

"[T]he familiar framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793-94, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), for Title VII cases is equally applicable to discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act." Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F. 3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2007). The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework requires a plaintiff first to makea prima facie...