Newtown Estates Cmty. Ass'n v. Kaaihue

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NEWTOWN ESTATES COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, BY ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant-Appellee, v. ANGELA SUE KAAIHUE, Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellant, YONG NAM FRYER, Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellee, and JOHN DOES 1-50; JANE DOES 1-50; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-50; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-15; DOE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 1-50; and DOE ENTITIES 1-50, Defendants.

No. CAAP-19-0000357, CAAP-19-0000805, CAAP-19-0000806

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii

May 31, 2023

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (CIVIL NO 1CC13-1-002161)

On the briefs:

Angela Sue Kaaihue, Defendant/Counterclaimant- Appellant, pro se.

Phillip A. Li, Tyler A. Tsukazaki, (Li & Tsukazai), and Carol A.L. Rosenberg, (Motooka Rosenberg Lau & Oyama) for Plaintiff/Counterclaim- Defendant-Appellee.

Leonard, Presiding Judge, Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellant Angela S. Kaaihue (Kaaihue), self-represented, appeals from the December 4, 2019 Judgment (Judgment) entered by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court) .^[1] Kaaihue also challenges the Circuit Court's October 18, 2019 Order Granting Plaintiff[/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee] Newtown Estates Community Association's [(Newtown's)] Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs Against [Kaaihue] and [Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellee Yong Nam Fryer (Fryer)^[2], as well as the Circuit Court's October 17, 2019 Order Granting [Newtown's] Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs Against [Kaaihue] and [Fryer]. (Orders Granting Attorneys' Fees).

This consolidated appeal stems from a dispute about whether Kaaihue and Fryer's 82-acre property (Property) was subject to the restrictions and conditions of Newtown Estates. Newtown requires the homes in its community to comply with its Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for the Newtown Estates at Waimalu, Hawai#i (MDCCR). Newtown had not enforced the MDCCR against previous owners of the Property. In 2013, Newtown filed suit to compel Kaaihue and Fryer (Kaaihue's mother) to bring the Property into compliance with the MDCCR. Kaaihue and Fryer brought various counterclaims alleging, inter alia, that they had detrimentally relied on Newtown's representations to Kaaihue that the Property was not subject to the MDCCR. On January 30, 2019, a jury determined, inter alia, that the Property was part of Newtown Estates and that the Property was subject to the MDCCR.

In the Opening Brief, Kaaihue did not identify her points of error or specify where in the record the alleged errors occurred and where the alleged errors were objected to and preserved, as required by the appellate court rules. See Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b)(4). Nevertheless, we interpret self-represented claims liberally and will address Kaaihue's arguments to the extent we are able to discern them. See, e.g., Erum v. Llego, 147 Hawai#i 368, 380, 465 P.3d 815, 827 (2020).

It appears that Kaaihue makes six arguments on appeal, contending that: (1) the Circuit Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the litigation; (2) the jury erred in concluding that the Property was subject to the MDCCR, at least in part because Newtown did not act fairly in imposing the MDCCR on the Property; (3) the jury erred in failing to conclude that Kaaihue detrimentally relied upon the communications from Newtown indicating that the Property was not part of Newtown Estates; (4) the jury erred in failing to conclude that Kaaihue suffered Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress at the hands of Newtown; (5) Newtown was required to defend Kaaihue in a separate lawsuit involving the Property; and (6) the Circuit Court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees.

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we resolve Kaaihue's appeal as follows:

(1) Kaaihue argues that the Circuit Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the litigation. The Hawai#i Supreme Court has held:

Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of a cause of action. When reviewing a case where the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court retains jurisdiction, not on the merits, but for the purpose of correcting the error in jurisdiction. A judgment rendered by a circuit court without subject matter jurisdiction is void.

Kellberg v. Yuen, 131 Hawai#i 513, 526, 319 P.3d 432, 445 (2014) (quoting Lingle v. Haw. Gov't Emps. Ass'n, 107 Hawai#i 178, 182, 111 P.3d 587, 591 (2005)).

Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 603-21.5(a)(3) (2016) provides the circuit courts with subject matter jurisdiction over "[c]ivil actions and proceedings". HRS § 501-1 (2018) establishes the Land Court and states, in pertinent part:

§501-1 Court; jurisdiction; proceedings; location; rules; practice, etc. A court is established, called the land court, which shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all applications for the registration of title to land and easements or rights in land held and possessed in fee simple within the State, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications, and also have jurisdiction over such questions as may come before it under this chapter, subject to the rights of appeal under this chapter.

(Emphasis added.)

The supreme court has stated that "[t]he circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction[.] Thus, the circuit court has jurisdiction over all civil causes of action unless precluded by the State Constitution or by statute." Sherman v. Sawyer, 63 Haw. 55, 57-58, 621 P.2d 346, 348-49 (1980) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). Similarly, this Court has previously held that,

[R]egardless of whether the land court enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over amendments or alterations to a certificate of title, the circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction under HRS § 501-1 to determine matters regarding title to land court property as recognized by [Iaea v. Iaea, 59 Haw. 648, 586 P.2d 1015 (1978)]. As such, the Circuit Court had jurisdiction . . . to determine the scope of [the easement at issue in that case], but did not have jurisdiction to order an amendment to the . . . certificates of title.

Childs v. Harada, 130 Hawai#i 387, 405, 311 P.3d 710, 728 (App. 2013) (footnote omitted); see also Waimea Falls Park, Inc. v. Brown, 6 Haw.App. 83, 85 n.5, 712 P.2d 1136, 1138 n.5 (1985) (holding that "[HRS] chapter 501 does not contemplate that, after registration, every controversy involving registered land must be decided by the land court[]" and noting that "[w]e find nothing in the statutes or our case law indicating that the land court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting registered land.") (internal citations omitted).

As properly determined by the Land Court and the Circuit Court, the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to determine whether the Property was subject to the MDCCR. The only relief that would exclusively lay within the jurisdiction of the Land Court would be a request to modify the certificate of title.

Newtown did not seek to amend the certificate of title. Kaaihue's Counterclaim prayed for general, special, and punitive damages, equitable relief, and costs and attorneys' fees; it did not request that the Circuit Court modify the certificate of title. Accordingly, the Land Court's exclusive jurisdiction was not invoked, and the Circuit Court had jurisdiction over this litigation.

(2)...