Nguyen v. Foley

James Van Nguyen, Plaintiff, v. Patricia Foley, Jody Alholinna, Nancy Martin, Charli R. Vig, Keith B. Anderson, Rebecca Crooks-Stratton, and Cole W. Miller, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.

No. 21-cv-991 (ECT/TNL)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

April 6, 2022

Jason Scott Juran and Robert R. Hopper, Robert R. Hopper &amp Associates, LLC, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff James Van Nguyen.

Richard A. Duncan, Joshua Todd Peterson, and Sarah Vandelist Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants Patricia Foley, Nancy Martin, Charli R. Vig, Keith B. Anderson, Rebecca Crooks-Stratton, and Cole W. Miller.

OPINION AND ORDER

Eric C. Tostrud United States District Court Judge

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), the Community Defendants^[1] seek $21, 510.50 in attorneys' fees spent obtaining dismissal of Plaintiff James Van Nguyen's § 1983 claim. ECF No. 44. The motion will be granted because Nguyen's § 1983 claim was frivolous, and the requested fees are reasonable.

This case. Nguyen brought this case against the Community Defendants and an independent guardian ad litem, Jody Alholina, essentially to challenge actions taken during Tribal Court child welfare proceedings concerning Nguyen's daughter and no-trespass orders issued by the Community's Business Council. Nguyen asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., and the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., and claims under Minnesota law for abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants moved to dismiss Nguyen's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and Defendants' motions were granted. Nguyen v. Foley, No. 21-cv-991 (ECT/TNL), 2021 WL 4993412 (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 2021).^[2]

The dismissal of Nguyen's § 1983 claims. Nguyen's § 1983 claims were dismissed essentially because Nguyen did not allege facts plausibly showing that the Community Defendants acted under color of state law. Because the Community Defendants' attorneys'-fees motion implicates this aspect of the dismissal order, the relevant section of the order deserves repeating here:

The Community Defendants argue that Nguyen's § 1983 claims against them must be dismissed because Nguyen has not alleged that they acted under color of state law. Cmty. Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 19-21. “To survive dismissal of [a] section 1983 cause of action, [a plaintiff] must have sufficiently alleged the [defendant] deprived them of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States, and the deprivation was caused by a person or persons acting under color of state law.” Creason v. City of Washington, 435 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Flagg Bros, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978)). It is settled law that a defendant acting under tribal authority is not acting under color of state law and that “[n]o action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be maintained in federal court for persons alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.” Coleman v. Duluth Police Dept., No. 07-cv-473 (DWF/RLE), 2009 WL 921145, at *23-24 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2009) (quoting R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983)) (collecting cases); Charland v. Little Six, Inc., 112 F.Supp.2d 858, 866 (D. Minn. 2000), aff'd 13 Fed.Appx. 451 (8th Cir. 2001); see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (recognizing that Indian tribes are separate sovereigns predating the Constitution, and therefore, are “unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority”).

Nguyen does not allege that the Community Defendants are state actors, that they ever acted pursuant to any state authority, or that they ever acted in concert with any state actors. To the contrary, he alleges that the Business Council is a panel of the Tribal Government that “is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the tribe, and for implementing the decisions of the General Council” and that the Family and Children Services Department is an agency of the Tribal Government that “provides case management services for Community Member clients in tribal court.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-5. Nguyen further alleges that the Community Defendants are all either members of the Business Council or employed by the Family and Children Services Department and that they deprived him of his constitutional rights while acting in those roles. The only plausible inference is that the Community Defendants acted under the color of tribal law. Nguyen alleges that some Community Defendants “have authority conferred under color of federal and state law” as a result of “the federal, state and local policy of transferring custody cases to the SMSC Tribal Court.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 137, 150; see Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Cmty. Defs. [ECF No. 33] at 13. This argument is not persuasive. Nguyen's reference to a “policy” is too vague to be plausible. If that weren't so, Nguyen does not plausibly allege how such a “policy” could have authorized or guided any action taken in Tribal Court after such a transfer. Nguyen cannot maintain his § 1983 claims.

Nguyen, 2021 WL 4993412 at *6-7.

Law governing the fee-entitlement question. “The statute involved here, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, allows the award of ‘a reasonable attorney's fee' to ‘the prevailing party' in various kinds of civil rights cases, including suits brought under § 1983.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 832-33 (2011). Under § 1988(b), a federal district court may “award attorney's fees to a defendant ‘upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.'” Id. at 833 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); see also Flowers v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 49 F.3d 391, 392 (8th Cir. 1995) (same). “The Supreme Court has cautioned that ‘a district court [must] resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.'” Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 944 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421-22). “So long as the plaintiff has ‘some basis' for the discrimination claim, a prevailing defendant may not recover attorneys' fees.” Id. (citation omitted). There is no question the Community Defendants are the prevailing party. The question is whether Nguyen's § 1983 claims were “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” within the meaning of § 1988(b).

Nguyen's § 1983 claims against the Community Defendants were frivolous. “Only state actors can be held liable under Section 1983.” Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001). If this rule weren't conspicuous from § 1983's text, it is manifest from innumerable federal cases. The rule is about as black letter as law gets. And (as noted) it is settled that a defendant acting under tribal authority does not act under color of state law. Nguyen, 2021 WL 4993412, at *6. Nguyen did not allege facts plausibly showing that the Community Defendants were state actors. He did the opposite. He alleged facts making it clear that the Community Defendants acted under color of tribal law. See id. at *7. Nguyen's only allegation that might be understood differently was that some Community Defendants “have authority conferred under color of federal and state law” as a result of “the federal, state and local policy of transferring custody cases to the SMSC Tribal Court.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 137, 150. This allegation cannot rationally be understood to establish a reasonable factual basis for the state-actor element of Nguyen's § 1983 claims. The allegation concerns only some Community Defendants-those involved with the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community Tribal Court. It does not answer the state-actor question as to the Community Defendants who served only on the Business Council. Regardless, the fact that a state court might generally defer to the Tribal Court's custody determinations (either by staying proceedings or transferring a case to the Tribal Court) does not make the Tribal Court “a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Nguyen cites no case or other authority that might support a “joint action” finding in these or similar circumstances.

Nguyen's defense of the reasonableness of his § 1983 claim's merits is neither robust nor persuasive. In response to the Community Defendants' attorneys'-fees motion Nguyen asserts that he “stated a plausible claim that the Community Defendants were acting under state law when they deprived Mr. Nguyen of his constitutional rights.” Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n at 5 [ECF No. 52]. He doesn't explain how. His argument in support of this assertion does not address § 1983's state-actor requirement but focuses instead on his allegations that the Community Defendants violated Nguyen's rights. Id. at 4-6 (“Nguyen alleged that the Community Defendants abused powers granted by state and federal law ....”). That misses the dispositive issue. Nguyen also argues: “The Community Defendants themselves highlight the interplay between tribal and state authorities in its reference to the Minnesota Department of Human Services Indian Child Welfare Manual[.]” Id. at 5-6. There are two problems with this argument. First, allegations regarding this Manual appear nowhere in Nguyen's Amended Complaint. Second, if they did, Nguyen does not explain how the Manual's contents...