Nguyen v. Karag Ford of Pittsburgh, LLC

HONG NGUYEN, Plaintiff, v. KARAG FORD OF PITTSBURGH, LLC,and KENNY ROSS FORD SOUTH, INC., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-986

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

October 14, 2020

Judge Cathy Bissoon

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. MEMORANDUM

On August 16, 2019, pro se Plaintiff Hong Nguyen (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed his Complaint (hereinafter "Complaint," Doc. 3) against Defendants KARAG Ford of Pittsburgh, LLC and Kenny Ross Ford South, Inc.¹ (hereinafter collectively "Defendants"). On March 6, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint without certifying that they had met and conferred with Plaintiff about whether the deficiencies could be cured by amendment. (Doc. 19.) On March 9, 2020, Defendants again moved to dismiss the Complaint, this time with the certification. (Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, hereinafter "Motion to Dismiss," Doc. 22.) On March 12, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Plaintiff's Response and the Plaintiff's Second Response. (Doc. 27; Doc. 29.)

After consideration of all briefing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

A. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff worked as an auto technician for Defendants for approximately two months in 2019. (Complaint at ¶ before A²; Earnings Statement, Doc. 3-2.³) Plaintiff asserts that he was not paid for all the hours of labor he performed for Defendants. (Complaint at ¶ A.) Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants did not pay him for overtime worked and that, prior to his hire, Defendants promised him that he would work a full 40 hours a week. (Id. at ¶¶ B and C.)

Plaintiff says he complained several times about not getting paid properly but that Defendants "still did not pay." (Id. at ¶ B.) As a result, on July 29, 2019, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' general manager and service manager retaliated by forcing him to agree to a suspension in lieu of termination. (Id. at ¶ E.) Using best efforts to understand the Complaint, Plaintiff claims that the reasons he was given for being suspended were unjustified or pretextual because he disagrees with Defendants' stated performance issues. (Id. at ¶ E.)

B. ANALYSIS

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Defendants advance four arguments in their Motion to Dismiss: (1) Plaintiff's Complaint fails to comport with pleading standards by failing to clearly articulate grounds for jurisdiction and/or cause of action, (2) Plaintiff is exempt from overtime pay pursuant to the FLSA, (3) Plaintiff is unable to assert a federal minimum wage claim and (4) Plaintiff cannot state a claim for denial of full-time work because Defendants were not under a statutory obligation to guarantee full-time work nor has Plaintiff referenced or attached any employment contract or agreement. (Motion to Dismiss at 1-2.) Each will be addressed in turn.

1. Articulation of jurisdiction and/or cause of action

"[P]ro se pleadings, 'however inartfully pleaded,' must be held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Chambers v. Hathaway, 2010 WL 2804516, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 14, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). If the pleadings can be reasonably read "to state a valid claim on which the litigant can prevail," then a court "should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements." Chambers, 2010 WL 2804516, at *2 (citing Boag v. McDonald, 454 U.S. 364, 364-65 (1982)).

Defendants argue that their Motion to Dismiss should be granted because "Plaintiff does not provide any basis for this Court's jurisdictional powers or identify any federal statutes pursuant to which he seeks relief." (Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, hereinafter "Brief in Support," Doc. 23 at 5-6.) The Court disagrees because these are not justifications to grant a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss against a pro se plaintiff. See Chambers, 2010 WL 2804516, at *2 (citing Boag, 454 U.S. at 364-65); see also Wonders v. Crutchfield, 2013 WL 2453535, at *3 (M.D. Ala. June 4, 2013) ("The court will not dismiss the complaint on the basis of the pro se plaintiff's failure to include a jurisdictional statement...if the complaint otherwise reveals a basis for this court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction").⁴

Additionally, Defendants argue Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because "Plaintiff's Complaint, even liberally construed, lacks clarity," thereby failing "to assert any clear cause of action against Defendants..." (Brief in Support at 6.) Again, the Court disagrees, as it can discern two federal causes of action in Plaintiff's Complaint, for overtime wages and retaliation, and two other non-federal causes of action, for breach of contract and unpaid wages.

2. Federal causes of action

a. Exemption from overtime pay

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is exempt from overtime wages as a matter of law and therefore his claim for overtime pay should be dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 7-8.) While the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter "FLSA") requires overtime payments for many employees, it has an exemption for "any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers." 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2018). Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (hereinafter "PMWA") incorporates this exemption at the state level as well by using almost identical language.⁵ 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 333.105. The burden of proving that an employee is covered by an FLSA exemption falls upon the employer, and these exemptions are to be "narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit." Arnold v. Ben Kanowitz, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960) (citing Mitchell v. Kentucky Fin. Co., 359 U.S. 290, 295 (1959)).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim for overtime wages is barred because "there is no dispute that Plaintiff worked for KRAG Ford South, which is a Kenny Ross dealership selling Ford vehicles" and, furthermore, "there is no dispute that Plaintiff worked for KRAG Ford South as a mechanic with the responsibility of servicing automobiles." (Brief in Support at 7.) Regarding being a mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, Plaintiff's allegations are consistent with Defendants' stance; he states he worked for Defendants as an auto technician. (Complaint at ¶ before A.)⁶ Additionally, Plaintiff submitted to the Court thirty-eight pages of Kenny Ross Ford South's "Technician Payroll Report" that describe the mechanical jobs he performed for Defendants. (Technician Payroll Report, Doc. 3-1 at 2-39.)

However, with respect to Defendants being considered a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers, Defendants have not provided a sufficient showing. Rather they simply state that "there is no dispute" that "KRAG Ford South...is a Kenny Ross dealership." (Brief in Support at 7.)⁷ As such, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of proving the applicability of an FLSA exemption for overtime wages, and therefore this aspect of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be denied.

b. Federal minimum wage

Plaintiff has not brought a federal minimum wage cause of action. Nevertheless, in arguing that Plaintiff has no possible FLSA claim, Defendants state that "Plaintiff does not allege that his wages are for less than federal minimum wage" nor can he allege this because "even accepting his calculations of his hours asserted in the Complaint as true" Plaintiff was still "paid more than the federal minimum wage." (Brief in Support at 8-9.)⁸ As such, Defendants argue that "Plaintiff cannot state a violation of the wage protections afforded to workers pursuant to the FLSA" and his Complaint should therefore be dismissed with prejudice." (Id. at 9.)

"Importantly, the FLSA does not create liability for unpaid non-overtime compensation for an employee who was paid at least the minimum wage, even if the employee was paid less than his hourly rate." Lopez v. Tri-State Drywall, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2012) (citing Brothers v. Portage Nat'l Bank, 2007 WL 965835, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007)). Accepting the approach of other circuits, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled, "we agree with the clear weight of authority and hold that pure gap time claims—straight time wages for unpaid work during pay periods without overtime—are not cognizable under the FLSA, which requires payment of minimum wages and overtime wages only." Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 244 (3d Cir. 2014).

Defendants are correct that Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for unpaid gap-time wages under the FLSA nor do the circumstances here allow him to bring a minimum wage claim as a matter of law. Even accepting Plaintiff's account of hours worked as true, he still received pay in excess of federal minimum wage requirements. Thus, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be granted as to any FLSA minimum wage claims.

c. FLSA retaliation claim

At this juncture, the Court...