Nicdao v. Two Rivers Pub. Charter Sch., Inc.

275 A.3d 1287

Ruby NICDAO, Larry Cirignano, and Jonathan Darnel, Appellants,

v.TWO RIVERS PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL, INC., Appellee.

Nos. 16-CV-458

16-CV-459

& 16-CV-500

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued March 11, 2020

Decided June 9, 2022

Stephen M. Crampton, Tupelo, MS, of the bar of the States of Mississippi, Tennessee, New Mexico, and Texas, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Patrick G. Senftle was on the brief, for appellant Ruby Nicdao.

Mathew D. Staver, Orlando, FL, with whom Horatio G. Mihet, of the bar of the States of Florida and Ohio, pro hac vice, by special leave of court and Roger K. Gannam, Jacksonville, FL, of the bar of the State of Florida, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, were on the brief, for appellant Larry Cirignano.

John R. Garza, Rockville, MD, for appellant Jonathan Darnel.

Michael L. Murphy, Washington, with whom Cary Joshi was on the brief, for appellee.

Before Glickman, Associate Judge, and Washington and Fisher,^* Senior Judges.

Washington, Senior Judge:

Appellants Ruby Nicdao, Larry Cirignano, and Jonathan Darnel appeal a judgment denying their special motions to dismiss under the District of Columbia Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation ("Anti-SLAPP") Act. For the reasons that follow, we reverse because appellee Two Rivers Public Charter School lacked third-party standing to assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"), and its other claims cannot succeed on their own.

I. Facts and Proceedings

On August 27, 2015, three individuals arrived and occupied the sidewalk in front of Two Rivers Public Charter School ("Two Rivers"). The individuals were protesting the Planned Parenthood facility being built next to the school and each held graphic signs of aborted fetuses and shouted at students and parents entering the school. On November 1, 2015, Appellant Jonathan Darnel sent an email to several school administrators in which he asked them what they would do to prevent the Planned Parenthood facility from opening and implied that the school would face more protests if it did not act. On the morning of November 16, 2015, four individuals, including appellant Darnel, protested on the sidewalk in front of the school, where they held graphic signs. The individuals allegedly followed students onto school property to hand them brochures that said things like "[t]ell your parents they're going to kill kids next door!" and "[t]he school will have a lot of problems if you ignore the problem!" According to Two Rivers, "[m]any parents and students felt they were being chased and threatened by [appellant] Darnel ...." On November 23, 2015, more protesters returned to the school with graphic signs and shouted at students and parents; the group included appellants Darnel, Ruby Nicdao, and Larry Cirignano. Two Rivers claimed that as school officials redirected students to a side entrance of the school, appellant Nicdao "followed the students into the alley and continued shouting at them, making parents and students feel threatened and unsafe." Finally, appellant Darnel and other individuals returned to the school on December 7, 2015, and handed out leaflets to students and parents protesting the Planned Parenthood facility being built; appellant Darnel apparently followed one parent and student towards the metro saying the parent was "in denial" and also jogged after a group of students who had ignored him and forced the leaflets into their hands. In addition to the ways appellants’ conduct allegedly impacted the students and their families, Two Rivers claimed that the protests prevented administrators and teachers from being able to plan for the school day, forced them to make "extraordinary efforts" to protect students, inhibited the "core educational goals of the school," and threatened the charter school's funding, which depends on enrollment.

Two Rivers filed its complaint on December 9, 2015, asserting claims for IIED, private nuisance, and conspiracy to create a private nuisance. Appellants filed motions to dismiss under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(1), lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim. Appellants also filed a special motion to dismiss under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act, D.C. Code § 16-5501 et seq. (2021 Supp.). The trial court held a hearing on the motions on April 29, 2016. At the hearing, the trial court held that Two Rivers had standing to bring its claims¹ and denied appellants’ 12(b) motions to dismiss. Regarding the special motion to dismiss under the Anti-SLAPP Act, the trial court found that while appellants made a prima facie showing that Two Rivers’ claims stemmed from their protests on an issue of public interest, abortion, Two Rivers was likely to succeed on the merits of its claims. Thus, it denied appellants’ special motions to dismiss under the Anti-SLAPP Act. Appellants timely appealed. Only the trial court's ruling on the Anti-SLAPP special motions to dismiss is properly before us on this appeal.

II. Third-Party Standing to Bring IIED Claim

Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting Two Rivers standing to proceed in the case. In its ruling from the bench on the IIED claim, the trial court held that Two Rivers was bringing the claim on behalf of its students and parents, and that the school had third-party standing because they "could not financially afford to litigate the case" and because "they were fearful."² We review the trial court's standing decision de novo. UMC Dev., LLC v. District of Columbia , 120 A.3d 37, 42 (D.C. 2015). "Although Congress did not establish this court under Article III of the Constitution, we generally adhere to the case and controversy requirement of Article III as well as prudential principles of standing." Riverside Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Health , 944 A.2d 1098, 1103-04 (D.C. 2008). Standing requires "an actual or imminently threatened injury that is attributable to the defendant and capable of redress by the court." Friends of Tilden Park, Inc. v. District of Columbia , 806 A.2d 1201, 1206-07 (D.C. 2002). "Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and independent of the merits of a party's claims." Grayson v. AT&T Corp. , 15 A.3d 219, 229 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).³

In addition to constitutional standing requirements, "courts have developed ‘prudential principles’ that function as self-imposed restrictions on jurisdiction." Riverside Hosp. , 944 A.2d at 1104. Third-party standing is one such prudential principle and an "alternative threshold question" we must also address. Kowalski v. Tesmer , 543 U.S. 125, 129, 125 S.Ct. 564, 160 L.Ed.2d 519 (2004). "As a prudential matter, the Supreme Court generally has required a litigant to ‘assert his own legal rights and interests; he cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’ " Riverside Hosp. , 944 A.2d at 1104 (quoting Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ). "Enforcement of the prohibition [against third-party standing] reduces the likelihood that courts will ‘adjudicate [a third party's] rights unnecessarily, [when] it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not wish to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is successful or not.’ " Id. at 1105 (alterations in original) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff , 428 U.S. 106, 113-14, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) ). To be successful, a claim brought on behalf of a third party requires (1) an injury in fact to the litigant bringing the claim, (2) a close relationship between the litigant and the third party, and (3) some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests. See id. ; Powers v. Ohio , 499 U.S. 400, 410-11, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). "The plaintiff bears the burden to establish standing." UMC Dev. , 120 A.3d at 43.

After considering these principles, we hold that the trial court erred in ruling that Two Rivers had standing to proceed with the IIED claim. We assume, without deciding, that Two Rivers has met the Article III standing requirements,⁴ as well as step (1) of third-party standing, which is an injury in fact to the litigant. Schools suffer injury from "arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful interference with their patrons." Pierce v. Society of Sisters , 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925).⁵ Under this broad standard, Two Rivers can plausibly claim it is injured by potentially unlawful interference with their students’ right not to be harassed by abortion protesters. As a school, Two Rivers also has a close relationship with its students and their parents, and thus meets the second requirement for third-party standing. See District of Columbia v. Doe , 524 A.2d 30, 32 (D.C. 1987) (discussing a school's "obligation to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the protection of pupils to whom it provides an education").

Two Rivers’ challenge falters, however, because it has not "demonstrate[d] ‘some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests.’ " Riverside Hosp. , 944 A.2d at 1105 (quoting Powers , 499 U.S. at 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364 ). Two Rivers claims, and the trial court held, that the students and parents face a financial hindrance to bringing suit themselves. Arguments focused on financial limitations as the primary hindrance for third-party standing face a high bar at the Supreme Court, where the Court has rejected criminal defense lawyers’ third-party suits on behalf of indigent defendants because "the lack of an attorney here is [not] the type of hindrance necessary to allow another to assert the indigent defendants’ rights." Kowalski , 543 U.S. at 132, 125 S.Ct. 564. On this record, we do not see any reason financial considerations are a sufficient hindrance for Two Rivers to assert third-party standing. We...