Nichols v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

Page 413

180 F.Supp.2d 413

Donald L. NICHOLS, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Eastman Kodak, Company, Defendants.

No. 00-CV-6576L.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

September 14, 2001.

Donald L. Nichols, Attica, NY, Pro se.

Lowell D. Kass, New York City, Eugene D. Ulterino, Christian D. Hancey, Nixon Peabody LLP, Rochester, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

LARIMER, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, Donald Nichols, appearing pro se, commenced this action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Monroe County, against defendants Metropolitan Life Insurance Corp. ("MetLife") and Eastman Kodak Corp. ("Kodak"). Kodak removed the action to this court on November 28, 2000, on the ground that plaintiff's claim is governed exclusively by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Both defendants have moved for summary judgment. The motions are granted and the complaint is dismissed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The complaint alleges that in 1995, plaintiff married Doris Heric ("Heric-Nichols"), who at the time was receiving pension benefits as a Kodak retiree. The benefits were paid by the Kodak Retirement Income Plan ("KRIP" or "the Plan"), which was administered by the Kodak Retirement Income Plan Committee ("KRIPCO").

Heric-Nichols died in April 1997. By letter dated July 21, 1997, plaintiff was informed by Kodak that as a survivor of a former Kodak employee, plaintiff was eligible to receive a monthly survivor income benefit. Complaint Ex. B. In accordance with the instructions in the letter, plaintiff supplied Kodak with certain documents (such as a copy of his marriage license), and he began receiving monthly checks shortly thereafter.

In another letter dated November 21, 1997, Kodak advised plaintiff that it had discovered that at the time that Heric- Nichols retired, she should have been credited with a greater amount of service for use in calculating the amount of her own KRIP benefit. The letter stated that as a result of the recalculation, "[t]he former employee's estate will receive a one-time payment for all retroactive payments, plus interest, regarding the pension payments made prior to his/her death." Complaint Ex. C.

On March 26, 1998, MetLife, as paying agent for KRIP, issued a check on KRIP's behalf in the amount of $3630.30, payable to "Donald Nichols — Executor for the Estate of Doris Heric-Nichols." Complaint Ex. D. At the time the check was mailed, however, plaintiff was (as he remains today) an inmate at the Attica Correctional Facility.¹ The check, which was mailed to what the complaint describes as "Mr. and Mrs. Nichols home address," Complaint ¶ 12, was apparently received by plaintiff's stepdaughter, Barbara Sandman, who was the actual executrix of Heric-Nichols's estate. Affidavit of Pamela R. Cromp (Docket Item 8) Ex. K.

Sandman turned the check over to John Mansour, Esq., the lawyer for the estate. Mansour returned the check to MetLife, explaining in a cover letter dated April 6, 1998 that Sandman was the executrix, and that Nichols was the surviving spouse of Heric-Nichols. Mansour stated that "[i]f this benefit is payable to the Estate of Doris Heric-Nichols, it should be reissued in that form," but that "[i]f this benefit is payable to Donald Nichols as the surviving spouse of the deceased, then it should be re-issued in that form." Complaint Ex. E.

On April 30, 1998, MetLife reissued the check, again for $3630.30, payable to "Barbara A. Sandman as Executrix for the Estate of Doris B. Heric." Complaint Ex. F. Pursuant to Heric-Nichols's will, which she made prior to her second marriage-i.e., prior to her marriage to plaintiff-she left her entire estate to her children. Complaint Ex. A.

Plaintiff then began writing letters to both Kodak and MetLife, inquiring about his survivor benefit checks, and asserting that the $3630.30 check should have been issued directly to him. Kodak treated one of those letters, dated April 2, 2000, as a claim for benefits, and in a response dated April 25, 2000, Kathleen Borzilleri, a para-legal in Kodak's legal department, informed plaintiff that his request for additional benefits in the amount of $3630.30 was denied, because that amount was owed not to plaintiff but to Heric-Nichols's estate. The letter added, "According to our records you have been receiving a Survivor Income Benefit in the sum of $92.35 per month since May, 1997 which is exactly what you are entitled to." Cromp Aff. Ex. E. The letter concluded, "You will continue to receive the sum of $92.35 as the surviving spouse of Doris Heric-Nichols." Id.

In an undated letter marked received by the Kodak legal department on May 25, 2000, plaintiff appealed from the denial of his claim. Plaintiff's letter complains only about the denial of his claim for $3630.30. He stated, "Kodak unquestionably acknowledges that I am the surviving spouse of Ms. Heric-Nichols, and I am receiving her survivors benefit from the plan." Cromp Aff. Ex. F (emphasis added).

On July 10, 2000, Pamela R. Cromp, a fiduciary of KRIP to whom KRIPCO had delegated authority to review and decide appeals from claim denials, wrote to plaintiff to advise him that the decision denying plaintiff's claim for benefits in the amount of $3630.30 had been affirmed. Cromp explained, "Since your spouse should have received the higher annuity payments during her life, the amount at issue became payable to her estate upon her death. Accordingly, the amount was not a benefit remaining at the time of your spouse's death ... subject to ERISA's beneficiary rules ...." Cromp Aff. Ex. G. Cromp concluded:

Therefore the $3,630.30 was properly paid to your spouse's estate. However, in reviewing your situation, we have identified that the spousal benefit that you are receiving of $92.35 should have been adjusted accordingly when the annuity was corrected. You will receive a one time lump sum payment of $221.77 (which includes interest), and starting in July 2000, your monthly survivor benefit will be $97.58.

Id. Plaintiff does not contest receiving this lump sum check and the monthly survivor benefit checks in the increased amount.

Plaintiff's pro se complaint purports to set forth five causes of action. The first four all allege, in one form or another, that defendants have wrongfully failed to provide survivor benefits to plaintiff. The fifth alleges that defendants unlawfully paid the lump sum of $3630.30 to Sandman, and that they should have paid that sum to plaintiff instead.

DISCUSSION

I. Nature of Plaintiff's Claims

Although, as stated, the complaint purports to set forth five separate causes of action, they are not all artfully pled, and on their face some of them do not set forth a legally cognizable claim.² Because plaintiff appears pro se, however, the court will give his pleadings a liberal construction, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), and "interpret them `to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994)). Nevertheless, proceeding pro se does not otherwise relieve a litigant of the usual requirements of summary judgment, and a pro se party's bald assertions, unsupported by evidence, are insufficient to overcome a well-founded motion for summary judgment. Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir.1991); Parkinson v. Goord, 116 F.Supp.2d 390, 393 (W.D.N.Y.2000). I note that both defendants' motions in this case adequately put plaintiff on notice of the requirements of Rule 56, and the consequences of complying with those requirements. See Irby v. New York City Trans. Auth., 262 F.3d 412 (2d Cir.2001).

Essentially, plaintiff seeks two things: an order directing defendants to pay him the $3630.30 that he alleges was wrongfully paid to Heric-Nichols's estate; and an order directing defendants to pay him, or resume paying him, his monthly survivor benefit. I therefore construe his complaint as asserting two claims for benefits allegedly due to plaintiff under KRIP, brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).

II. MetLife's Motion

MetLife asserts that plaintiff's claims against MetLife should be dismissed because MetLife, in its capacity as KRIPCO's paying agent, performed only the ministerial tasks of issuing checks at the direction of KRIPCO. MetLife contends that this renders it an improper defendant in this action. I agree.

"In a recovery of benefits claim [under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)], only the plan and the administrators and trustees of the plan in their capacity as such may be held liable." Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Leonelli v. Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d 1195, 1199 (2d Cir.1989)); accord Edwards v. Akzo Nobel, Inc., 103 F.Supp.2d 214, 220 (W.D.N.Y.2000); Dittman v. Dyno Nobel, Inc., No. 97-CV-1724, 1998 WL 865603 *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1998); Brannon v. Tarlov, 986 F.Supp. 146, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 164 F.3d 617 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 99, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999); Greater Blouse, Skirt, & Undergarment Ass'n, Inc. v. Morris, No. 93-1257, 1996 WL 325595 *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1996). See also Kyle Railways, Inc. v. Pacific Admin. Services, Inc., 990 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir.1993) (third party administrators not fiduciaries when they merely perform ministerial duties or process claims); Pohl v. National Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir.1992) (plan administrator not a fiduciary where its function was clerical, mechanical, ministerial, and not discretionary); Baker v. Big Star Division, 893 F.2d 288, 290 n. 2 (11th Cir.1989) ("An insurance company does not become an ERISA `fiduciary' simply by performing administrative functions and claims processing within framework of rules established by employer"); Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir.1985) (insurance company hired by employer to...