Nicklin v. Stonesdale Unit Owners' Ass'n

307 A.3d 477

Steven W.NICKLIN, Appellant,

v.The STONESDALE UNIT OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, et at., Appellees.

No. 22-CV-0644

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted October 19, 2023

Decided January 11, 2024

Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2020-CA-002486-B), (Hon. Robert R. Rigsby, Trial Judge)

Robert C. Gill, Washington, Matthew J. Antonelli, Houston, TX, and Zachary L. Jacobs were on the brief for appellant.

Anne K. Howard was on the brief for appellees.

Before McLeese and Shanker, Associate Judges, and Thompson, Senior Judge.

Thompson, Senior Judge:

Plaintiff/appellant Steven Nicklin brought suit against defendants/appellees the Stonesdale Condominium Unit Owners’ Association (the "Association"), the Association’s Board of Directors, and individual condominium unit owners (collectively, "Stonesdale"), seeking, damages and declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of the District of Columbia Condominium Act (the "Act"),¹ breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. Mr. Nicklin now appeals from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants/appellees. He contends that the Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment on the grounds that his claims were time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and/or the doctrine of laches. He argues more specifically that the Superior Court erred in its legal determination about his claims’ accrual dates and that the record does not support a finding of laches as to his request for equitable relief. Stonesdale defends the Superior Court’s ruling and also argues, as to some of Mr. Nicklin’s claims, that this court can uphold the summary judgment ruling on the alternative ground that Mr. Nicklin rather than the Association is responsible for maintenance and remediation of the items in question. Mr. Nicklin responds that material factual issues exist relating to which party bears responsibility for certain repairs that preclude summary judgment on that alternative basis.

We agree with Mr. Nicklin’s time-of-accrual argument as to his claim that the Association breached its contractual and statutory duties, and with his laches argument as to his claim for equitable relief. We further agree with him that there remain material factual disputes, regarding both when the causes of action accrued for Mr. Nicklin’s various breach of contract claims and which party is responsible for remediation of certain of the complained-of problems (and we therefore reject Stonesdale’s position that we can affirm the Superior Court’s summary judgment ruling on the ground that the Association is not the responsible party), We do not disturb the Superior Court’s dismissal of Mr. Nicklin’s tort, (breach of fiduciary duty and negligence) claims.² Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Mr. Nicklin owns and resides in a unit that the parties refer to as the Carriage House, one of fifteen units in the Stonesdale Condominium, which he purchased on May 19, 2015. The condominium is governed by the Association’s Board of Directors and is subject to a Declaration and By-Laws recorded in 1982. The Carriage House is a stand-alone building and is the only unit that is separated from the condominium’s main building, where the rest of the units are located.

According to the allegations of Mr. Nicklin’s second amended complaint, he has experienced several problems with the Carriage House. In various emails to the Association and in correspondence to the Association through its counsel, Mr. Nicklin has complained of and demanded repairs to address various issues. He asserts that the issues, and his claims in this litigation, "can be generally grouped into eight categories: the foundation, sanitary sewer, grading/drainage around the exterior perimeter of the [C]arriage [H]ouse building, scuppers and gutters, stucco/brick mortar, roof of the [C]arriage [H]ouse building, windows, and mold infiltration to Mr. Nicklin’s unit." In responses to the letters to counsel, the Association contested Mr. Nicklin’s allegations that it had failed to perform adequate maintenance and repairs, and further asserted that it was Mr. Nicklin’s duty to repair certain elements, including the Carriage House’s windows, doors, and roofs, and to resolve leaks, mold, and structural damage.

Mr. Nicklin commenced this lawsuit on May 12, 2020. After Stonesdale moved to dismiss the original complaint, the Superior Court entered an order, on October 2, 2020; dismissing as time-barred Mr. Nicklin’s claims related to fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, but denied the motion as to Mr. Nicklin’s other , claims pending discovery. Mr. Nicklin filed his Second Amended Complaint on October 27, 2021. On March 3, 2022, Stonesdale filed an Opposed Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that summary judgment was proper because Mr. Nicklin knew of each issue "no later than March 10, 2017," and thus his claims were time-barred under the applicable three-year statute of limitations.

On July 24, 2022, the Superior Court denied Mr. Nicklin’s motion and granted summary judgment in favor of Stonesdale. The court found that each of Mr. Nicklin’s causes of action was subject to the "three-year statute of limitations … and/or the doctrine of laches," and essentially agreed with the defendants that Mr. Nicklin’s claims were time-barred because "each of the ‘problem areas’ … were [sic], in fact, well known to Plaintiff no later than March 10, 2017" (and thus more than three years before Mr. Nicklin filed suit). The court highlighted the evidence that Mr. Nicklin was aware of the sanitary sewer-line problem since 2015 and experienced its effects in 2016; that Mr. Nicklin was "on notice" of drainage issues in the courtyard when he purchased his property in May 2015 and discussed them with Stonesdale’s President in July 2014 and July 2015; that Mr. Nicklin reported the problem with the scuppers and gutters "between January 2016 and March 2017"; that even assuming the Association was responsible for repairing Mr. Nicklin’s windows, he had known of the leaking windows since April 2015; that even if the lower roofs (i.e., the Carriage House’s balcony roofs) were the responsibility of the Association, Mr. Nicklin knew the roofs needed repair as early as July 2014 and April 2015, as evidenced by emails he sent and documents he received (and that , Mr. Nicklin’s claim for damages "associated with water intrusion from the lower roofs accrued when he purchased the property"); and that Mr. Nicklin knew about the mold problems as early as March 2015. Regarding Mr. Nicklin’s claims for equitable relief, the court reasoned that "[i]n equitable matters the courts of the District of Columbia will apply the analogous statute of limitations that exists had the claim been brought at law." This appeal followed.

I. Standard of Review

"Our review of the trial court’s summary judgment decision is de novo, and hence, we conduct an independent review of the record, construing it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Saucier v. Countrywide Home Loans, 64 A.3d 428, 437 (D.C. 2013). The moving party has the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists; once that initial showing has been made, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show such an issue exists. Kalorama Citizens Ass’n v. SunTrust Bank Co., 286 A.3d 525, 531 (D.C. 2022) (quoting Smith v. Swick & Shapiro, P.C., 75 A.3d 898, 901 (D.C. 2013)). "A genuine issue of material fact exists if the record contains some significant probative evidence … so that a reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 1836 S St. Tenants Ass’n, Inc. v. Estate of Battle, 965 A.2d 832, 836 (D.C. 2009)).

II. Analysis

Mr. Nicklin makes several arguments, as to why we should reverse the trial court’s determination that the statute of limitations bars his claims. We agree with his argument as to how the time of accrual of his claims should be determined. We also conclude that, while the Association indisputably was assigned repair-or-replace responsibility as to some of the problem items, there remain issues of fact regarding the Association’s responsibility as to other items. Upon that conclusion, we decline Stonesdale’s invitation to affirm the summary judgment ruling in their favor on the ground that Mr. Nicklin as the unit owner, and not the Association, is responsible for maintenance and remediation of the items in question.

A The Condominium Act and the Stonesdale Condominium Instruments

The District of Columbia Condominium Act (the "Act") provides that:

Except to the extent otherwise provided by the condominium instruments, all powers and responsibilities with regard to maintenance, repair, renovation, restoration, and replacement of a condominium shall belong to:

(A) The unit owners’ association in the case of the common elements; and

(B) The individual unit owner in the case of any unit or any part of a unit.

D.C. Code, § 424903.07(a)(1). The term "condominium instruments" refers to "the declaration, bylaws, and plats and plans, recorded pursuant to the provisions of [the Act]," including "[a]ny amendment or certification of any condominium instrument … so long as such amendment or certification was made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." D.C. Code § 42-1901.02(5).

[1–4] This court strictly construes and interprets the "clear, simple, and unambiguous" language of condominium instruments, including bylaws, as "a contract that governs the legal rights between the Association and unit owners." Johnson v. Fairfax Vill. Condo. IV Unit Owners Ass’n, 548 A.2d 87, 91 (D.C. 1988). With respect to condominium instruments, as with all contracts, we adhere to the objective theory of contracts, "which means that the written...