Nieveen v. TAX 106

1

317 Neb. 425

SANDRA K. NIEVEEN, APPELLANT, v. TAX 106, A NEBRASKA GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, ET AL., APPELLEES.

No. S-21-364

Supreme Court of Nebraska

August 23, 2024

1. Motions to Dismiss: Appeal and Error. A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo.

2. Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. When reviewing an order dismissing a complaint, the appellate court accepts as true all facts which are well pled and the proper and reasonable inferences of law and fact which may be drawn therefrom, but not the plaintiff's conclusion.

3. Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings. To prevail against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County, Kevin R McManaman, Judge.

Mark T. Bestul, Jennifer Gaughan, and Caitlin Cedfeldt, of Legal Aid of Nebraska, and Christina M. Martin and Deborah J. La Fetra, of Pacific Legal Foundation, pro hac vice, for appellant.

Christian R. Blunk, of Harris & Associates, P.C., L.L.O for appellees Tax 106 and Vintage Management, LLC.

Patrick F. Condon, Lancaster County Attorney, Daniel J. Zieg, and Eric Synowicki, for appellees Rachel Garver and Lancaster County.

Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Eric J. Hamilton, John J. Schoettle, and Lincoln J. Korell, for appellee State of Nebraska.

Timothy L. Moll, of Rembolt Ludtke, L.L.P., for amicus curiae Nebraska Association of County Officials.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Funke, Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ., and O'Gorman, District Judge.

PER CURIAM

In an earlier opinion in this case, we affirmed the district court's rejection of various claims Sandra K. Nieveen asserted concerning the issuance of a tax deed to her property. See Nieveen v. TAX 106, 311 Neb. 574, 974 N.W.2d 15 (2022) cert. granted and judgment vacated ___U.S. ___, 143 S.Ct. 2580, 216 L.Ed.2d 1191 (2023) (Nieveen I). One of her claims was that the issuance of the tax deed violated the Takings Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. One of Nieveen's theories was that the issuance of the tax deed effected a taking without just compensation because it deprived her of all interest in her property, which she alleged was worth substantially more than the amount of her underlying tax debt. Nieveen filed a petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. While that petition was pending, the Court held in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 143 S.Ct. 1369, 215 L.Ed.2d 564 (2023) (Tyler), that a Minnesota woman who alleged that a county sold her condominium for $40,000 to satisfy a $15,000 property tax bill had alleged a plausible takings claim. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in Nieveen's case, vacated our judgment, and remanded the cause to this court for further consideration in light of Tyler. See Nieveen v. TAX 106, ___U.S. ___, 143 S.Ct. 2580, 216 L.Ed.2d 1191 (2023).

Having now reconsidered our earlier opinion in light of Tyler, we conclude that the district court erred by dismissing Nieveen's takings claim against Vintage Management, LLC (Vintage). We therefore affirm in part, and in part reverse and remand the cause for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

In our initial opinion, we set forth a detailed summary of the entire factual and procedural history of this case. See Nieveen I, supra. We do not repeat all of that here, but instead summarize those details relevant to our opinion in this case.

1. NIEVEEN'S COMPLAINT

This case began when Nieveen filed a lawsuit naming several defendants: two private parties-TAX 106 and Vintage- as well as Lancaster County; the Lancaster County treasurer, in her official capacity; and the Attorney General of the State of Nebraska, in his official capacity. Unless more detail is required, we hereafter refer to the county and the county treasurer collectively as "the county."

According to Nieveen's operative complaint, she owned real property in Lincoln, Nebraska, free and clear of any encumbrances. Nieveen alleged that after she failed to pay her property taxes as they became due, TAX 106, pursuant to Nebraska law, purchased a tax certificate for her property from the county treasurer for the amount of the delinquent taxes. She alleged that TAX 106 continued to pay delinquent property taxes on Nieveen's property. A summary of Nebraska's tax certificate sale process and the statutes that governed at the time TAX 106 purchased the tax certificate are included in a similar case also released today. See Continental Resources v. Fair, ante p. 391,___ N.W.3d ___(2024) (Fair II).

Nieveen alleged that 3 years after the tax certificate was issued, TAX 106 sent notice to Nieveen that it would be applying for a tax deed. According to Nieveen, the county treasurer later issued a tax deed to Vintage, TAX 106's successor in interest, which Vintage recorded. Nieveen alleged that at the time the tax deed was issued, her property had an assessed value of $61,900, an amount far in excess of her tax debt, which she alleged to be under $4,000.

Based on these allegations, Nieveen asserted various claims for relief. First, she alleged that title should be quieted in her name because she suffered from a mental disorder and was therefore entitled to a 5-year redemption period under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1827 (Reissue 2018). She also alleged that the issuance of the tax deed violated several of her rights under the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. Relevant here, she alleged that the issuance of the tax deed violated her rights under the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, the Takings Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, and the Excessive Fines Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. With regard to her takings claims, Nieveen alleged that the issuance of the tax deed amounted to a taking for a private purpose and, in the alternative, that it was a taking for a public use without just compensation.

2. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

Early in the case, the district court dismissed the Attorney General as a party without objection from Nieveen. The district court later dismissed Nieveen's constitutional claims for failure to state a claim. TAX 106, Vintage, and the county subsequently moved for summary judgment on Nieveen's sole remaining claim that title should be quieted in her name because she was entitled to an extended redemption period. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment filed by TAX 106 and Vintage but granted the county's motion for summary judgment.

The matter then proceeded to trial on Nieveen's claim that title should be quieted in her name because she was entitled to an extended redemption period. Following trial, the district court entered an order finding that Nieveen was not entitled to the extended redemption period and dismissing the case.

Nieveen filed a timely appeal, and we moved the case to our docket.

3. THIS COURT'S INITIAL OPINION

On appeal, Nieveen assigned and argued that the district erred by finding that she did not suffer from a mental disorder and was therefore not entitled to an extended redemption period under § 77-1827. She also assigned and argued that the district court erred by dismissing her constitutional claims.

We found that the district court did not err in determining that Nieveen was not entitled to an extended redemption period. We also found that the district court did not err in dismissing her constitutional claims. With respect to Nieveen's takings claims, we relied on our decision in Continental Resources v. Fair, 311 Neb. 184, 971 N.W.2d 313 (2022), cert. granted and judgment vacated ____U.S.____, 143 S.Ct. 2580, 216 L.Ed.2d 1191 (2023) (Fair I), in which, just a few months before, we had rejected arguments essentially identical to Nieveen's.

After our decision was issued, Nieveen filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.

4. TYLER V. HENNEPIN COUNTY

While Nieveen's petition for certiorari was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 143 S.Ct. 1369, 215 L.Ed.2d 564 (2023). In that case, a plaintiff alleged that a Minnesota county had violated the Takings Clause and Excessive Fines Clause when it seized her condominium to satisfy a $15,000 tax debt, sold the property for $40,000, and kept the excess proceeds. The federal district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. See Tyler v. Hennepin County, 26 F.4th 789 (8th Cir. 2022). The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and then reversed, finding that the plaintiff had alleged a plausible takings claim.

A summary of the Court's opinion in Tyler appears in our opinion in Fair II released today. See Continental Resources v. Fair, ante p. 391, ___ N.W.3d___ (2024).

5. INITIAL OPINION VACATED; CAUSE REMANDED

After issuing its decision in Tyler, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Nieveen's petition for certiorari, vacated our prior decision, and remanded the cause for further consideration in light of Tyler. The U.S. Supreme Court took the same action in response to a petition for certiorari filed in response to our decision in Fair I. See Fair v. Continental Resources, ___ U.S. ___, 143 S.Ct. 2580, 216 L.Ed.2d 1191 (2023).

After remand, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the effect of Tyler on this appeal. After supplemental briefs were filed, we held oral argument.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Nieveen assigns, renumbered and restated, that the district court erred by (1) finding she did not suffer from a mental disorder under § 77-1827 at the time of the tax...