Nigel Dedieece Carter v. Pa. Parole Bd.

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Nigel Dedieece Carter, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania Parole Board, Respondent

No. 980 C.D. 2022

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

January 16, 2024

OPINION NOT REPORTED

Submitted: November 9, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, JUDGE HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER JUDGE HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, JUDGE

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

Nigel Dedieece Carter (Carter) has pro se petitioned this Court to review a decision entered by the Pennsylvania Parole Board (the Board), denying his request for administrative relief following his recommitment as a technical parole violator (TPV). After careful review, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND^[1]

A complete recitation of Carter's criminal and supervisory history is unnecessary to the instant appeal.^[2] The present matter begins on December 14, 2017, when Carter was released on reparole. See Order to Release on Parole, 8/28/17. On February 25, 2021, Carter was instructed to report to his parole officer but did not report. On March 1, 2021, Carter was declared delinquent by the Board, which issued a detainer warrant. See Admin. Action, 3/1/21; Warrant to Commit and Detain, 5/28/21. Carter was arrested on May 28, 2021,^[3] and on June 16, 2021, the Board detained him pending disposition of new criminal charges. See Not. of Bd. Dec., 6/16/21.

On July 12, 2021, the Board held a parole violation hearing. Parole Agent Gemm Christie testified that she had instructed Carter verbally over the phone to report that day, by 4:00 p.m., to the Philadelphia District Office. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 7/12/21, at 13-15. Agent Christie testified that she told Carter the office had relocated, that she was in the office the entire day, and that Carter did not report. See id. at 13-15, 18-19.

Carter testified in his own defense. According to Carter, his sentence was illegal, and he had been committed under an incorrect birthdate and social security number. See id. at 20-21. Carter further claimed that the new charges were baseless. See id. at 22. Carter admitted to receiving a phone call from Agent Christie on February 25, 2021, but disputed the details. According to Carter, Agent Christie did not inform him that the district office had relocated to a new address. See id. at 23-24. Further, according to Carter, he informed Agent Christie that he had just had a son, that his family members had been diagnosed with COVID-19, and he could potentially be a carrier. See id. at 22-27.

On July 14, 2017, the Board executed its decision to recommit Carter as a TPV due to his failure to report as instructed. See Violation Hr'g Rep., 7/14/21, at 1-12; see Order to Recommit, 7/20/21. The Board determined that Carter owed 1965 days of backtime and recalculated his maximum sentence date as October 14, 2026. See id.

Carter timely filed an administrative appeal, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support the revocation. See Admin. Appeal, 8/10/21, at 1-3. According to Carter, Agent Christie had committed perjury and had not told him that the office had relocated. See id. Additionally, Carter claimed the Board had erred by recommitting him under an incorrect birthdate and social security number. See id. Carter also baldly asserted violations of article I, sections 13 and 15 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. I, §§ 13, 15. See id. Finally, he claimed that the Board did not have the jurisdiction to "recompute sentences" imposed by a judge. See id.

On August 12, 2021, the Board mailed Carter notice of its decision denying his administrative appeal. The appeal panel found substantial evidence to support the recommitment, namely, the credible testimony of Agent Christie. Further, the appeal panel noted that the Board had the ability to recalculate a maximum sentence date to reflect that a parole violator is not entitled to credit for time spent in delinquency. See id.

Carter timely petitioned this Court for review.^[4]

II. ISSUES

Carter raises two issues. First, he contends that the Board acted fraudulently, and in bad faith, and committed an abuse of its power. See Carter's Br. at 7. Second, Carter contends that the Board's recommitment order violated several of his constitutional rights. See id.

III. DISCUSSION^[5]

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Carter first asserts that the Board committed an abuse of its power by finding his testimony incredible. See Carter's Br. at 11. In support of this assertion, he contends that he was unaware that the Philadelphia District Office was no longer located at 5828-38 Market Street. See id. at 13-14. Additionally, Carter presents a convoluted argument, stating that he was committed under an incorrect birthdate and social security number that does not belong to him. See id. at 14-15. According to Carter, this error renders his sentence illegal. See id. at 18.

In response, the Board asserts that substantial evidence supports Carter's parole revocation. See Board's Br. at 9. According to the Board, the record reflects that Carter was informed of the correct address of the District Office but did not report. See id. at 9-12. Sitting as fact-finder, the Board is empowered to make credibility determinations, and its determination that Agent Christie testified credibly was not an abuse of discretion. See id. at 10-11. The Board does not address Carter's claims regarding his birthdate, social security number, or sentence. See generally id.

Generally, we note that the Board has various powers and duties related to the implementation and supervision of parole. See, e.g., 61 Pa.C.S. § 6131. The Board also has specific powers involving offenders, including the exclusive power to parole and reparole, to commit and recommit for violations of parole, and to discharge from parole all persons sentenced by a court to imprisonment in a state correctional institution. See 61 Pa.C.S. § 6132.

However, the Board does not have the power to alter a judicially imposed sentence. Hawkins v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 490 A.2d 942, 947 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985); see also Gundy v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 478 A.2d 139, 140 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). This is because revocation proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution but, instead, are administrative proceedings to which the principles of administrative due process and administrative law apply. See Gundy, 478 A.2d at 140. In any event, the Board may only direct a parole violator to complete the remainder of an existing, judicially imposed sentence. See Hawkins, 490 A.2d at 947. Beyond a timely direct appeal, Section 9542 of the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S. § 9542, provides that the PCRA is the sole means of obtaining collateral relief from an illegal sentence. See Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 256 A.3d 483, 491 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021), aff'd, 284 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2022) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542).

Further, the Board serves as the fact-finder in parole violation proceedings and is entitled to make its own credibility determinations. Falasco v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 521 A.2d 991, 995 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987); Gregory v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 530 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). The mere fact that there is conflicting evidence or testimony in the record does not mean the Board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Harper v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 520 A.2d 518, 523 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). This Court may not alter findings or credibility determinations by the Board provided they are supported by substantial evidence. Falasco, 521 A.2d at 995; Gregory, 530 A.2d at 1050.

Initially, we reject Carter's claim alleging an illegal sentence rooted in an erroneous birthdate and social security number. While Carter presented this argument to the Board, it is not within the Board's purview to consider such claims. See Hawkins, 490 A.2d at 947; 61 Pa.C.S. § 6132. The Board cannot alter a sentence: if Carter believes that his sentence is illegal, the appropriate method to challenge the sentence is through a timely direct appeal or petition seeking post-conviction relief. See Scott, 256 A.3d at 491; Hawkins, 490 A.2d at 947.

Further, there is no merit to Carter's claim that the Board abused its power or otherwise acted inappropriately. As the fact-finder, the Board is empowered to make credibility determinations and resolve conflicting evidence. See Falasco, 521 A.2d at 995; Gregory, 530 A.2d at 1050; Harper, 520 A.2d at 523. Here, the Board credited Agent Christie's testimony that she had informed Carter of the correct address to which he should report. The record supports these findings. N.T., 7/12/21, at 13-15. Accordingly, the Board did not abuse its discretion, because substantial evidence supported its decision. Fisher, 62 A.3d at 1075 n.1.

B. Constitutional Claims

In his second issue, Carter raises a number of alleged constitutional violations, claiming that: (1) his recommitment under a false birthdate and social security number has violated his Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches or seizures; (2) the Board's recalculation of his maximum sentence date was a double jeopardy violation of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. V; (3) Carter's prison work assignments constitute slavery or involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIII; (4) Carter's denial of bail is a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 2, 14, 25, 26; and (5) general violations of Carter's right to liberty under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. See Carter's Br. at 18-24. The Board did not address these claims in its decision denying Carter's administrative appeal, nor did the Board address these claims in its brief to this Court.

The "law is well settled that issues not raised before the...