Nikel v. 5287 Transit Rd.

2023 NY Slip Op 02201

RICKY NIKEL, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. 5287 TRANSIT ROAD, LLC, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

No. 82 CA 22-00484

Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department

April 28, 2023

CHELUS, HERDZIK, SPEYER & MONTE, P.C., BUFFALO (THOMAS J SPEYER OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DOLCE PANEPINTO, P.C., BUFFALO (JONATHAN M. GORSKI OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CURRAN, BANNISTER, AND OGDEN JJ.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Mark A Montour, J.), entered March 16, 2022. The order, inter alia, granted the motion of plaintiff insofar as it sought a protective order limiting the scope of defendant's independent medical examination of plaintiff's lumbar spine.

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal from the order insofar as it precluded defendant's expert from testifying at trial about the issue of causation with respect to the first surgery is unanimously dismissed and the order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this Labor Law action seeking damages for injuries he sustained while working on a construction project on property owned by defendant. Defendant appeals from an order that, inter alia, granted plaintiff's motion insofar as it sought a protective order limiting the scope of defendant's independent medical examination (IME) of plaintiff's lumbar spine to plaintiff's second spinal surgery and whether that surgery was caused by the accident.

We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of the IME of plaintiff's lumbar spine to the second spinal surgery and its causal relationship to the underlying accident. "[T]rial courts have broad discretion in supervising disclosure and, absent a clear abuse of that discretion, a trial court's exercise of such authority should not be disturbed" (Hann v Black, 96 A.D.3d 1503, 1504 [4th Dept 2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Peterson v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 174 A.D.3d 1386, 1387-1388 [4th Dept 2019]; see generally CPLR 3103 [a]). The parties do not dispute that, after plaintiff's first lumbar spine surgery, defendant expressly waived its right to conduct an IME of that body part. At the time it made the waiver, defendant knew that plaintiff might undergo another surgery at the direction of his doctor, and thus we reject defendant's assertion that the second surgery constituted an unusual or unanticipated circumstance that would justify setting aside defendant's waiver of the IME (see generally Lewis v City of New York, 206 A.D.3d 896, 898 [2d Dept 2022]; Everhardt v Klotzbach, 306 A.D.2d 869, 870 [4th Dept 2003]). Further, this is not a situation in which defendant inadvertently waived the IME of the spine or was requesting reexamination of a body part that had already been the subject of an IME (cf. Vargas v City of New York, 4 A.D.3d 524, 525 [2d Dept 2004]; Everhardt, 306 A.D.2d at 870; McDowell v Eagle Trans. Corp., 303 A.D.2d 655, 656 [2d Dept 2003]). Indeed, despite defendant's waiver, the court allowed defendant to conduct an IME of plaintiff's spine, only limiting the scope of the exam to the second spinal surgery and its causal relationship to the accident. We cannot say that, in fashioning such a compromise, the court abused its broad discretion in supervising disclosure.

Finally we...