Nitti v. Cnty. of Tioga

VALERIE NITTI, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF TIOGA; GAIL BARTON, Deputy Comm'r of the Tioga Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.; REBECCA FETHERBAY,Senior Welfare Examiner for the Tioga Cty. Dep't. of Soc. Servs.; JULIE WHIPPLE,Senior Welfare Examiner for the Tioga Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.; and SHAWN YETTER,Comm'r of the Tioga Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Defendants.

3:14-CV-0954 (GTS/DEP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

September 28, 2015

APPEARANCES:

OFFICE OF RONALD R. BENJAMIN

Counsel for Plaintiff

P.O. Box 607

126 Riverside Drive

Binghamton, New York 13902

OFFICE OF FRANK W. MILLER

Counsel for Respondents/Defendants

6575 Kirkville Road

East Syracuse, New York 13057

OF COUNSEL:

RONALD R. BENJAMIN, ESQ.

CHARLES C. SPAGNOLI, ESQ.

FRANK W. MILLER, ESQ.

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge

DECISION and ORDER

Currently before the Court, in this civil rights employment action filed by Valerie Nitti ("Plaintiff") against the County of Tioga and four employees of the Tioga County Department of Social Services ("Defendants"), are three motions: (1) Defendants' motion to dismiss the actionfor failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (Dkt. No. 3); (2) Plaintiff's cross-motion to remand to state court those of her claims asserted pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("C.P.L.R.") Article 78, or, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment on those claims (Dkt. No. 9); and (3) Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's cross-motion and their supplementation of their motion to dismiss the action (Dkt. No. 11). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint is granted with regard to the fifth through ninth claims of Plaintiff's Complaint, and otherwise denied; Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's cross-motion is denied; and Plaintiff's cross-motion to remand the first four claims of her Complaint is granted.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff's Complaint

Plaintiff commenced this action in New York State Supreme Court, Tioga County, on July 2, 2014, by filing a Summons, Notice of Petition, and pleading styled "Verified Complaint/Article 78 Petition" ("Complaint"), asserting various causes of action related to the termination of her employment with the Tioga County Department of Social Services ("DSS"). (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 2 [Notice of Petition]; Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1 [Summons and Complaint].) Subsequently, Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441 because the Complaint contained causes of action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution. (Dkt. No. 1.)

Generally, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges as follows. Plaintiff was improperly terminated from her employment as DSS's Director of Employment and Transitional Supports, following charges that she completed and submitted a fraudulent Medicaid application on behalf of a friendand lied to other DSS employees about her actions. (See generally Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1, at ¶¶ 9-10, 23-49 [Plf.'s Compl.) Plaintiff was the target of an "unlawful conspiracy" between Defendants Rebecca Fetherbay ("Fetherbay") and Julie Whipple ("Whipple") to have Plaintiff fired. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.) These actions were motivated by the imminent elimination of at least one of the positions held by Fetherbay or Whipple, so that the position held by Plaintiff would become available. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.)

A disciplinary hearing pursuant to New York Civil Service Law § 75 was held. After evidence was taken and the hearing was closed, the appointed Impartial Hearing Officer, Jon S. Blechman ("Blechman"), recommended sustaining the majority of the charges and terminating Plaintiff's employment. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-36.) Thereafter, Plaintiff, through counsel, sought to submit additional evidence concerning the propriety of the Medicaid application and Blechman's alleged lack of impartiality. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-41.) Those efforts included demands for documents and information directed at Blechman himself. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-46.) Ultimately, Defendants opposed the introduction of any further evidence or the demands for information from Blechman, and no further evidence was adduced. (Id. at ¶¶ 40-47.) Defendant Gail Barton, acting as the appointed authority over the matter, found Plaintiff guilty of lying about her role in submitting her friend's Medicaid application and terminated her employment. (Id. at ¶¶ 48-49.)

Based upon these factual allegations, Plaintiff's Complaint asserts the following nine claims against the indicated Defendants: (1) a claim that Plaintiff is entitled to vacatur, as provided for in Article 78, of Blechman's recommendation and DSS's determination affirming and adopting Blechman's recommendation, due to a violation of her right to adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard under the Due Process Clauses of the state and federal constitutionsand New York State Civil Service Law § 75 (against the County of Tioga ["County"] and Barton); (2) a claim that the County's opposition to her request to submit evidence, after the close of the hearing, regarding the Medicaid application was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion under Article 78 (against the County and Barton); (3) a claim that Defendants abused their discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously under Article 78 in naming Barton the appointing authority because Barton was biased against Plaintiff (against the County and Barton); (4) a claim that Defendants violated lawful procedure and acted arbitrarily and capriciously under Article 78 and New York Civil Service Law § 75 based on their opposition to Plaintiff's request to present evidence of Blechman's lack of impartiality, as well as her demand that Blechman produce information on his previous appointments and decisions as an Impartial Hearing Officer (against the County and Barton); (5) a claim that Defendants violated her right to substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution through a conspiracy to have her terminated (against Fetherbay and Whipple); (6) a claim that Defendants violated her right to substantive due process under the New York State Constitution based on the same allegations as in the fifth claim (against Fetherbay and Whipple); (7) a claim that Defendants violated her right to procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution because she was found guilty of uncharged conduct and thus deprived of notice and an opportunity to be heard under New York Civil Service Law § 75 (against the County and Barton); (8) a claim that Defendants violated her right to procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution because Defendants refused to permit her to submit evidence regarding her friend's Medicaid application and eligibility (against the County and Barton); and (9) a claim that Defendants were negligent underNew York law because they failed to carry out a reasonable investigation regarding submission of the Medicaid application (against the County and Yetter). (Id. at ¶¶ 50-86).

Familiarity with these claims, and the factual allegations supporting them, is assumed in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for the review of the parties.

B. Parties' Briefing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's Cross-Motion, and Defendants' Motion to Strike

1. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss

Generally, in support of their motion to dismiss the Complaint, Defendants assert seven arguments. (See generally Dkt. No. 3, Attach. 7, at 9-21 [Defs.' Memo. of Law].)

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims alleging violations of substantive and procedural due process under the U.S. Constitution and New York State Constitution must be dismissed because she received notice and an opportunity to be heard, inasmuch as the procedures set forth in New York Civil Service Law § 75 were properly followed. (Id. at 7-8.) Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff asserts claims for a violation of her right to substantive due process, Defendants further argue that those claims must be dismissed because governmental employment is not a fundamental liberty protected against "infringing legislation." (Id. at 9.) With regard to Plaintiff's claims concerning Blechman's impartiality, Defendants argue that Plaintiff also waived those claims by failing to raise them before the hearing commenced, and has offered no explanation as to why any alleged evidence of that fact could not have been discovered before the hearing. (Id.)

Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Article 78 claim that she did not receive adequate notice is facially meritless because she was afforded the process set forth in New YorkCivil Rights Law § 75. (Id. at 10-16.) In the alternative, Defendants argue, to the extent Plaintiff may be understood to allege that she was found guilty of uncharged conduct, the following is true: (a) the charges were sufficiently specific; (b) Plaintiff herself addressed the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud at the hearing; (c) in any event, Plaintiff was not found guilty of uncharged conduct; and (d) each of the charges and specifications was supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 10-11, 13.)

Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's second claim must be dismissed because Civil Service Law § 75 does not permit the submission of evidence directly to the appointing authority rather than the hearing officer, and the County's opposition to reopening the hearing was not arbitrary or capricious. (Id. at 14-15.)

Fourth, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's third claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff's allegations do not "demonstrate" that Barton was incapable of acting impartially or that any of the Defendants had any notice of any alleged circumstances suggesting Barton could not act impartially as the decision maker. (Id. at 15.)

Fifth, Defendants argue...