Nkenganyi v. Garland

1

FIDELIS NKENGANYI, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 21-70184

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

April 26, 2023

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Argued and Submitted October 19, 2022 Portland, Oregon

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals, Agency No. A213-187-006

Before: BADE and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and LEFKOW ^[**] District Judge.

MEMORANDUM ^[*]

Fidelis Nkenganyi, a native and citizen of Cameroon, seeks review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of asylum withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the petition in part and deny it in part.

We review the "factual findings underlying the BIA's determination that a petitioner is not eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief" for substantial evidence. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022). The agency's determination is not supported by substantial evidence if the record compels a contrary conclusion. Id. Where, as here, the BIA's decision "relies in part on the immigration judge's reasoning, we review both decisions." Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2012).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency's denial of asylum and withholding of removal on adverse credibility grounds. The IJ must provide "specific and cogent reasons" for an adverse credibility determination, Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010), considering the "totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors," Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2020). "Such factors include . . . an applicant's 'demeanor, candor, or responsiveness' as well as the consistency between an applicant's statements and other evidence in the record." Id. at 1065 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)).

The IJ found Nkenganyi not credible based on a lack of candor and fourteen separate inconsistencies within his testimony and between his testimony and the record evidence. The IJ properly considered Nkenganyi's "explanation[s] for [the] perceived inconsistenc[ies]," Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044, and provided "specific and cogent reasons supporting" her determination, id. at 1042. On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ's adverse credibility determination "[b]ased on the significant inconsistencies in the record and the unpersuasive explanations for those discrepancies."

The agency's denial of asylum and withholding of removal on adverse credibility grounds is supported by substantial evidence because the record does not compel a contrary conclusion. Thus, the petition is denied with respect to the asylum and withholding of removal claims.

2. Substantial evidence does not support the agency's denial of CAT protection. An applicant for CAT relief bears the burden of proving that he is "more likely than not" to be tortured "by . . . or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official" if sent to his designated country of removal. Kamalthas v. I.N.S., 251 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). "It is important to keep in mind that the CAT standard is 'distinct' from that of asylum and the two bases for relief 'should not be conflated.'" Udo v. Garland, 32 F.4th 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Farrah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003)). An adverse credibility determination is not fatal to a CAT claim, so long as other evidence standing alone supports the claim. Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048-49. When deciding whether to grant relief under CAT, the agency must consider "all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). "In particular, where potentially dispositive testimony and documentary evidence is submitted, the BIA must give reasoned consideration to that evidence." Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 2011). Evidence of past torture is highly relevant to CAT claims, see Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 2020), and "country conditions alone can play a decisive role" in granting CAT relief, Kamalthas, 251 F.3d at 1280.

Nkenganyi submitted both third-party affidavits and country conditions reports to support his claim that he will be tortured by Cameroonian government forces if removed to Cameroon. Taken together, the affidavits from Nkenganyi's wife, brother, and former employer describe Nkenganyi's being beaten, detained, tortured, and extorted by government forces, apparently fueled by accusations (which, according to Nkenganyi, are false) that he is a separatist supporter. The affidavits further state that the Cameroonian "forces of law and order" have been searching for Nkenganyi since he left. The country conditions reports describe an ongoing conflict between the Cameroonian government and Anglophone separatist groups, in which "government forces [have] killed civilians." Because the affidavits provide accounts of prior torture and abuse at the hands of military officials, this potentially dispositive evidence required reasoned consideration by the agency. See Udo, 32 F.4th at 1201, 1204-05.

In affirming the IJ's denial of CAT relief, the BIA mentioned that the CAT claim was "based on the same testimony that the [IJ] found not credible" and that Nkenganyi did not demonstrate his eligibility "independent of the incredible testimony." This brief reference to the IJ's decision does not, alone, show that the BIA adequately considered the highly probative evidence presented.

The IJ's decision regarding the CAT claim contained only a cursory mention of this evidence. Although the IJ discussed the affidavits elsewhere in the decision, it was only to point out perceived inconsistencies with Nkenganyi's testimony. The IJ did not evaluate the affidavits independently to assess Nkenganyi's claim of torture or determine that this evidence lacked credibility or weight.^[1] "In the face of persuasive evidence, the agency's dismissive, fleeting reference to that evidence is insufficient and falls far short of the agency's obligation to give 'reasoned consideration' to the evidence." Id. at 1205.

Regarding the country conditions evidence, the IJ acknowledged that the reports showed "significant human rights abuses" against Anglophones in Cameroon but concluded that this did not establish Nkenganyi's eligibility for CAT protection because he had not "met his burden in demonstrating that he is an Anglophone." But the BIA did not adopt the IJ's finding that Nkenganyi lacked candor regarding his Anglophone status and did not otherwise discuss Nkenganyi's Anglophone identity anywhere in its decision. In the absence of the rationale relied upon by the IJ, the BIA did not provide any other explanation for concluding that the country conditions evidence was not sufficient to meet Nkenganyi's burden for demonstrating CAT eligibility.^[2] Finally, even if the BIA had adopted the IJ's finding that Nkenganyi failed to establish his Anglophone status because he testified that French is his best language, remand is still appropriate. The affidavits from his family and school administrator are potentially dispositive evidence that the government perceives him to be an Anglophone separatist and he experienced torture based on this imputed characteristic. See Udo, 32 F.4th at 1205 ("Had the agency accorded any weight to this evidence, it could have" found "the missing factual finding upon which the agency predicated its denial of CAT relief.").

On remand, the agency must give reasoned consideration to potentially dispositive evidence, including the affidavits and country conditions reports. Id. at 1202-03; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) ("In assessing whether it is more likely than not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of removal, all evidence relevant to the possibility of future shall be considered.").

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART.

BADE Circuit Judge, concurring in part, and dissenting in part:

I concur in part 1 of the disposition, which denies the petition with respect to the petitioner's asylum and withholding of removal claims. But in part 2, the majority fails to follow our well-settled precedent that requires us to consider both the BIA's and IJ's decisions when the BIA incorporates or agrees with the IJ's reasoning, and it ignores our caselaw applying the CAT implementing regulations, 8 C.F.R § 1208.16(c)(3). When the record is properly reviewed, substantial evidence supports the agency's denial of CAT relief. Therefore, I would deny the petition in its entirety. I respectfully dissent from part 2 of the disposition.

1. As an initial matter, the majority correctly acknowledges that "[w]here, as here, the BIA's decision 'relies in part on the immigration judge's reasoning, we review both decisions.'" Mem. Disp. at 2 (quoting Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2012)). Indeed, we have long held that when the BIA incorporates portions of the IJ's decision "as its own, we treat the incorporated parts of the IJ's decision as the BIA's." Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).^[1] Here, the BIA incorporated the IJ's reasoning for denying CAT relief, with direct citations to the incorporated section of the IJ's decision, and without additional commentary.^[2] See Sinha, 564 F.3d at 1019-20. Specifically, the BIA adopted the IJ's reasoning in denying CAT relief based on Petitioner's incredible testimony and his failure to present objective evidence of government acquiescence. See Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that the BIA adopted the IJ's reasoning...